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Abstract 
 
 
Acts of intolerance and persecution against religious minorities rose significantly in 
Indonesia during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), despite 
the nation's constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. This thesis aims to 
understand the motivations for and justifications of the persecution of Christians and 
Ahmadi Muslims in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. It details the extent of 
the problem, explains how it differs from previous periods, and examines the 
actors including Islamist activists, conservative Muslims, President Yudhoyono, his 
ministers, state institutions, religious minorities and the public. A key question 
was: what role did morality play in the rise of religious persecution in Indonesia? And 
further: why do people do “bad” things in the name of “good”? Drawing on Haidt's 
moral foundations theory, the thesis explores the ideological narratives of Islamists and 
situates those within global Islamist narratives. Data sources include media reports, 
scholarly literature on Islam, Islamism and Indonesian politics, as well as interviews 
conducted in 2014 in Bogor, West Java, with residents, activists and members of local 
Muslim and Christian faith communities, including the Ahmadiyah 
community. Morality is theorised as an evolved response to threat, wherein ideological 
narratives are created that cast outgroups as threats and sanction the ingroup’s righteous 
self-defence from the threat, real or imagined. In this way, morality plays a role both in 
motivating the persecutory actions of Islamists and in justifying those actions after the 
fact.   
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INTRODUCTION 
What role has morality played in the rise of religious persecution in Indonesia? Further, 
what explains the paradox that people can act within a moral framework and yet 
persecute or restrict the religious practices of others? In answering these questions, I 
hope to increase understanding of inter-group conflict, clarify what motivates people’s 
behaviour within groups, and cast some light on how people’s rationales for their 
behaviour.  
Acts of religious intolerance – such as church closures, intimidation and sometimes 
murders – increased in Indonesia between 2004 and 2014, the period of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s presidency (see Table 1a). However, the years of Yudhoyono’s presidency 
were much less violent than the preceding eight years, from 1996 to 2003, when 
Indonesia endured a wave of church burnings, bombings and mass killings in conflicts 
apparently between religious and ethnic groups (Tables 1b and 1c). By the Yudhoyono 
era, Indonesia had stabilised following the turmoil of the transition period from the end 
of the autocratic New Order era (President Suharto’s time) through to an increasingly 
democratic period overseen by three presidents who held office for short periods from 
1998-2004: presidents Habibi, Wahid and Sukarnoputri.  
Table 1a: Acts violating religious freedom in Indonesia  
Acts against 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
All religions 185 367 291 286 299 371 292 134 
Sourced from Setara Institute reports such as “Where Is Our Place of Worship?”1 
The rise of persistent and widespread violations of religious practices during the 10 years 
of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency has often been blamed on so-called 
“hardliners” or radical Islamists.  
An “Islamist” gives Islam a central political role, rather than primarily religious or 																																																								
1 Setara Institute, Where Is Our Place of Worship? A Thematic Review of the Violation of the Freedom of 
Religion/Belief Regarding Places of Worship and the Right to Worship, January-July 2010 (Jakarta: Setara 
Institute, 2010). 
	 2	
spiritual role. Islamists believe “Islam can and should form the basis of political 
ideology”2 and Islamist groups are “those movements that have a conception of Islam as 
a political system and strive to establish an Islamic state”.3 Other actors with political 
goals played significant roles, including the President, the state and its institutions – the 
military, courts, police and local government – and non-state actors including local 
communities and activists. 
Table 1b: Collective Violence in Indonesia, 1990-2003 
Years 1990-6 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Deaths* < 25 1000 1300 3500 2600 1600 75 25 
* Rounded numbers: from Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean4 
The problem of why, after religious and other violence declined, acts of religious 
intolerance rose during SBY’s presidency has been well explored. My focus on morality 
draws on ideas from moral and social psychology to help me examine issues around 
freedom of religion in Indonesia, with a specific focus on issues faced by members of 
Ahmadiyah and Christian communities in and around the city of Bogor, near Jakarta.  
Table 1c: Terrorist fatalities in Indonesia 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
9  71  79  52  233  12  49  79  9  3  0 
Sourced from: “Terrorist fatalities recorded in the Global Terrorism Database, University of 
Maryland and US Department of State ‘patterns of global terrorism’ report.”5 
Morality plays a key role in mediating group dynamics, and therefore affects how people 
interact within and between groups. Humans are social animals and group impulses 
shape behaviours, as explained in the principal theory I will rely on, moral foundations 																																																								
2 Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Singapore: Ridge Books, 2005), 84.  
3 Martin van Bruinessen, "Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the 
Conservative Turn of the Early 21st Century," in Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: 
Explaining the Conservative Turn, ed. Martin van Bruinessen (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013), 17. 
4 Ashutosh Varshney, Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, and Rizal Panggabean, "Creating Datasets in 
Information-Poor Environments: Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia, 1990-2003," Journal of East 
Asian Studies 8 (2008). 
5 John Braithwaite, "Anomie and Violence in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, 1997-2009," Journal of Asian 
Criminology 6, no. 1 (2011). 
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theory, which suggests that morality is a process that operates within a group in order to 
promote group survival.6 As I will explore later, moral frameworks bind groups into co-
operative networks. We live in a complex modern world, and people belong to many 
groups. I will explore the interplay that occurs when one strong group identity, religious 
identity, comes into conflict with another strong identity, nationalistic. I will explore the 
difficult-to-reconcile tensions between loyalty to Islam, perceived as under threat from 
religious minorities, and loyalty to Indonesia and its rule of law, threatened by some 
activists’ actions.  
My qualitative field research was interview-based exploration of these ideas and 
questions with local populations and activists, in and around Bogor, where Christian and 
Ahmadiyah communities have been prevented from worshipping. For the Christians, I 
focus on GKI Yasmin church in the Taman Yasmin residential area. For Ahmadiyah, I 
look at a number of communities and locations in the Bogor area. I seek to establish 
how, and to what extent, people working towards political goals in the name of Islam 
use morality to further their agendas, or conversely how morality shapes the political 
agendas and actions. While trying to avoid pre-judgments, I am looking for any 
evidence, in addition to the literature, that Islamists fuel religious intolerance and 
persecution to further their political goals.  
I begin, in Chapter 1, by examining moral foundations theory, which places morality in 
its evolutionary context in order to show some of its universal characteristics. Some of 
the persecution in Indonesia is justified by reference to the need for greater morality, 
sometimes by citing the Koran and Muhammad. Moral foundations theory includes an 
analysis of the purpose of the concepts of sanctity and purity.  
In Chapter 2, I examine the extent of the problem in order to show its significance. 
Persecuted minorities include the groups on which I focus, Christians and Ahmadiyah 
Muslims. Christians and Ahmadiyah are those for whom acts of intolerance have been 
persistent over most of the years under examination.  																																																								
6 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2012). 
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In Chapter 3, I trace the history of Islamisation, and its competitors, including 
nationalism in the 20th century, in order to show that contemporary events have roots in 
historical events. I highlight themes including the alienation of activist Islam and 
Islamists from political power, and a growing fear of Christianisation and proselytising. I 
aim to establish that the roots of current issues lie in the quite distant past.  
In Chapter 4, I look at use of the Other as a threat or enemy as revealed in the language 
of Islamists in order to show some of the reasoning behind their actions. This leads me to 
examine the relationship between ideological narratives, persecution of minorities and 
fatwas. I will examine causes of persecution towards religious minorities in Indonesia, 
including fear of Christianisation and a desire for religious purity. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the literature on the causes of religious intolerance in the 
Yudhoyono period in order to show how Islamists engaged with other political actors 
from 2004 to 2014. I consider government inaction, local politicians exploiting Muslim 
fears, government regulations, and Islamist and conservative clerics’ influence on 
governments, police and communities.  
In Chapter 6, I will reflect on how data from my field research in Bogor relates to the 
literature on Islamism, morality and the causes of religious persecution in order to show 
the relationship between local, national and international narratives. I will attempt to 
answer the question: how does the interaction of morality, identity, ideological 
narratives, group interests and power help explain issues around religious persecution in 
Indonesia?  
“Islamism” is a more neutral term than alternatives such as radical Islam, militant Islam 
and fundamentalist Islam, which some scholars use to distinguish between violent and 
non-violent Islamists or to divide Islamism into categories.7 The term Islamism more 
dispassionately distinguishes between that set of ideologies and Islam in general.8 
Indonesians often use the term hardliners, which seems pejorative. However, van 																																																								
7 Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (Routledge, 2007). 
8 Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?," Middle East Quarterly Spring (2003). 
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Bruinessen’s definition of fundamentalist suggests fundamentalism and Islamism are 
synonymous: “Fundamentalists wish to place the sharia, God’s law, above human-made 
law. The striving for implementation of the sharia constitutes perhaps the most apt 
criterion for distinguishing fundamentalism, a minimum definition.”9 I have found no 
better definition of the terms than van Bruinessen’s:  
The term “conservative” refers to the various currents that reject modernist, liberal or 
progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines and 
social order. Conservatives notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges 
to established authority, as well as to modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture. 
There are conservatives among traditionalist as well as reformist Muslims (i.e. in NU as 
well as Muhammadiyah). By “fundamentalist”, I mean those currents that focus on the 
key scriptural sources of Islam – Qur’an and hadith – and adhere to a literal and strict 
reading thereof. They obviously share some views with most conservatives, such as the 
rejection of hermeneutics and rights-based discourses but may clash with conservatives 
over established practices lacking strong scriptural foundations. The term “Islamist” 
finally refers to the movements that have a conception of Islam as a political system and 
strive to establish an Islamic state.10  
These definitions reveal overlaps and differences between the terms. The distinction 
between Islam and Islamism, such as Tibi makes, avoids conflation, which might occur if 
someone assumed one interpretation of Islam represented all of Islam, or was the real 
Islam. 11 Attempts to conflate Islamism and Islam are a trademark of conservative Western 
commentator-activists, particularly outside academia. Islamism tends to reject local 
variations and syncretism, instead harking back to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855), who 
created one of four Sunni schools of law that minimised private aspects of religion. Other 
influences from the Middle East on Islamism globally, and hence in Indonesia, include 
																																																								
9 Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslim Fundamentalism: Something to Be Understood or to Be Explained 
Away?," Islam and Christian Muslim Relations 6, no. 2 (1995). 
10 "What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam? Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative 
Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia," in RSIS Working Paper (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, 2011), 7. 
11 Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
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Ibn Taimiyya and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawiyya, some 800 years ago.12 A more 
recent reference point for Islamists is with Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the father of 
Wahhabism (1703-1792) and the contemporary Salafi current, a “militant Islamism that 
very frequently proceeded to a skewed and decontextualised reading of these authors, 
particularly in the case of Ibn Taimiyya”.13 Indonesian Islamists are also influenced by 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, especially Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.  
A defining characteristic of Islamism is the desire to implement sharia law. For an 
Islamist, sharia is a litmus test of commitment to god, of loyalty, argue Feillard and 
Madinier, who write:  
Militating for the enforcement of sharia proves the sincerity of one’s engagement and 
enables one to contribute to the group’s strength… The Muslim who does not want to 
implement the sharia is thus an apostate (murtad) and a traitor to his country.14 
Answering the question “why?” will rely on the theory I will use, so I will turn in the next 
chapter to exploring the parts of the theories that will be useful in understanding 
religious intolerance in Indonesia and the role of morality.  
																																																								
12 Andree Feillard and Remy Madinier, The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of 
Radicalism (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011). 
13 Ibid., 181. 
14 Ibid., 214. 
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Chapter 1: MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY 
“A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of 
patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one 
another, to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most 
other tribes; and this would be natural selection.”  
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, 18711 
 
In the introduction I set up the problem of understanding how morality can play a role as 
both a force for co-operation and a force for conflict. To help me answer this question I 
will refer to moral and social psychology theories that cast light on group behaviour.  
Human beings have an impulse that unites us in a spirit of co-operation and yet divides 
us in conflict. This impulse helps humans survive and yet at its extreme is also a source 
of tragedies such as war, as well as the greatest cruelties of history – the dispossession of 
indigenous people by European colonisers, the oppression of women, the Holocaust or 
slavery. In the narratives that accompanied each injustice, one group was framed as 
separate and superior to another: masters over slaves, men over women, Aryans over 
Jews, farmer Europeans over nomadic native Americans.2 In Indonesia, the massacres of 
communists, Chinese Indonesians and others in the mid 1960s is an equivalent example. 
Every such framing solidified a group around difference; us and them. Us and the Other. 
This research will examine group behavior across the religious divide between majority 
Muslims and religious minorities in Indonesia; one large group, and a number of smaller 
groups. Specifically, a Muslim majority exists, with activist groups claiming to represent 
that majority, or give voice to it, and a host of minorities, including Christians and small 
groups within Islam such as Ahmadiyah. What group dynamics are taking place, and 
which theories of groups can help us understand the dynamics? I will begin to 
operationalise my theory by highlighting instances of threat as a point from which to 
																																																								
1 Mark van Vugt, "The Male Warrior Hypothesis," in Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression, ed. 
Joseph P. Forgas, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Kipling D. Williams (New York: Psychology Press, 2011), 233. 
2 David Livingstone Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 2011). 
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examine how the actors use morality and tribalism to further their own ends and goals. 
My approach is consistent with one of Sidel’s arguments that religious violence is a 
product of the fragility and vulnerability of faiths in the face of competition with other 
ideas, while religious in-groups cast their internal problems on to the religious Other.3 
These ideas relate to the theory I am using – moral foundations theory, along with 
elements of social psychology relating to tribalism – via the phenomena of threat. 
Groups have an inherent “need to unite against a threat”.4 Therefore, identifying threats 
and perceived threats to groups, and defining those groups, is a critical first step.  
I am using a universal theory because I am interested in answers that explore the human 
condition, elements that humanity shares, thereby helping me understand intergroup 
conflict generally, as well as in Indonesia specifically. Many disciplines have tackled this 
problem. Political science, anthropology and sociology often call it ethnocentrism, social 
and evolutionary psychology call it groupism.5 Philosophy has looked at it, with Bertrand 
Russell noting that “instinctively we divide mankind into friends and foes”.6 In this thesis, 
I choose to refer to this impulse as tribalism, although tribalism can also refer to tribes 
and forms of government that revolve around (often patriarchal) kinship networks. 
Tribalism affects our everyday lives and its influence on humans is a factor in geo-
politics.7 Early in the 20th century, anthropologist Franz Boas identified a form of 
tribalism, white supremacy, in which “the inferiority of the Negro race is dogmatically 
assumed”.8 Boas saw an assumption when others saw a fixed truth. The profound 
changes in assumptions in Europe and the US since then reveal that intergroup 
perceptions are not fixed, but subjective and fluid.  																																																								
3 John T. Sidel, "On the 'Anxiety of Incompleteness': A Post-Structuralist Approach to Religious Violence 
in Indonesia," South East Asia Research 15, no. 2 (2007): 141-5. 
4 Judith S. Kullberg and J. David Singer, "Bringing Neuroscience into Political Science: The Caregiving 
System and Human Sociopolitical Evolution," in Moving Beyond Self-Interest: Perspectives from 
Evolutionary Biology, Neuroscience, and the Social Sciences, ed. Stephanie L. Brown, R. Michael Brown, 
and Louis A. Penner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 254. 
5 Robin Allott, "Religion and Science – Sex and Society: Forms and Processes of Cohesion," in In-
Group/Out-Group Behaviour in Modern Societies, ed. Kristiaan Thienpoint and Robert Cliquet (Brussels: 
NIDI/CBGS Publications, 1999). 
6 Bertrand Russell, Authority and the Individual (London: Unwin Hyman; repr., 1990). 
7 E.O. Wilson, "Tribalism, Groupism, Globalism," in The Globalist (Washington, D.C.). 
8 Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 15.  
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Why does banding together lead to conflict and violence as well as peace and 
cooperation? To answer these questions, I have chosen to focus on moral foundations 
theory,9 with additional references to social psychology. The American psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt, who developed moral foundations theory, says morality is the glue of the 
group. Haidt defines moral systems as “interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, 
practices, identities, institutions, technologies and evolved psychological mechanisms 
that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make co-operative societies 
possible”.10 In short, morality regulates self-interest. If people pursued only self-interest, 
power (or a person’s ability to get what she or he wants) would determine every dispute. 
Power, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote, is man’s “present means to 
obtain some future apparent good”.11  
Moral foundations theory posits that “morality” is a mechanism that facilitates human co-
operation in the interests of the group’s survival. The fewer competitions (power 
struggles), the more co-operation. Morality ensures that people think beyond themselves 
and their self-interest. Within groups, people temper individual self-interest in favour of 
some level of collective self-interest. Between groups, competition remains, and the self-
interest of the individual finds expression in the collective self-interest of the group. Self-
interest is not abolished within the group. The self is redefined; individual selfishness 
becomes group selfishness. ‘I’ becomes ‘we’.12  
Morality creates group cohesion through systems of accountability, which works because 
people care deeply about reputations.13 If someone does wrong, their reputation suffers. 
Accountability to a moral system means people’s responsibility extend beyond their kin 
or family to the group. The catch is that “co-operative groups will always be cursed by 
moralistic strife”.14 Cultures have some compulsory virtues which if not observed results 
																																																								
9 Haidt, The Righteous Mind. 
10 Ibid., 270.  
11 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1985), 150.  
12 Diane M. Mackie, Angela T. Maitner, and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions Theory," in Handbook of 
Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination, ed. Todd D. Nelson (New York: Psychology Press, 2009). 
13 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 74.  
14 Ibid., iv.  
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in others making moral judgments of those who stray, which can lead to conflict.15  
Moral foundations theory draws on social, moral and cultural psychology. It explains the 
research about the human brain’s processes in relation to morality. Cognition is critical. 
There are two ways of thinking: intuition and reasoning. Moral intuitions (emotions) are 
made quickly. Moral reasoning is slow, a conscious and intentional process. Moral 
judgments appear quickly in the conscious, and Haidt contends that “moral emotions 
and intuitions drive moral reasoning”.16 In opposing the primacy of reason, Haidt rejects 
a common tenet of philosophers that the conflict between reason and emotion is a 
conflict between divinity and animality.17 He agrees with Hume and as such moral 
foundations theory sits outside the mainstream Kantian stream of philosophy of the past 
two centuries, as well as in opposition to the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s cognitive 
rationalists. The idea of intuition trumping reason is not restricted to psychologists, nor is 
it new. Boas wrote early last century of:  
the so-called ‘instinctive’ aversion to foreign types, founded to a great extent on the 
feeling of a fundamental distinctiveness of form of our own race… it is not based on 
scientific insight but on simple emotional reactions and social conditions. Our aversions 
and judgments are not, by any means, primarily rational in character.18  
Yet humans do not hate all foreigners nor have conflict with everyone different, which is 
part of the complexity and the reason it is necessary to look at psychology in some depth 
in the search for insights. Psychology stepped out of the rationalist tradition in the late 
19th century until the cognitive revolution of the 1960s shifted the balance of intellectual 
power in that discipline back to the rationalists. The cognitive rationalists dominated the 
debate from the 1960s until the early 21st century.19 If reasoning is not primary, as the 
cognitive rationalists argue, but is in fact secondary – “the servant of the intuitions”20 – 
then moral reasoning is a “post hoc search for reasons to justify the judgments people 																																																								
15 "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," 
Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 817.  
16 Ibid., 830.  
17 Ibid., 815.  
18 Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man, 4. 
19 Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail," 816.  
20 The Righteous Mind, 46.  
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had already made”, Haidt argues.21 This helps explain why people’s justifications for 
their actions might not be the main reason or the real reason for their actions. I will 
examine the literature and my data for any evidence of people’s tendency to justify their 
emotional decisions with post-hoc rationalisations.  
Haidt began work on moral and cultural psychology with Richard Shweder in the early 
1990s.22 They argued that some cultures emphasise “autonomy” and the individual, 
others “community”, the group and duty.23 By 2004, Haidt was arguing that four patterns 
existed – formed out of an intuitive ethics – which fostered “an innate preparedness to 
feel flashes of approval or disapproval towards certain patterns of events involving other 
human beings”.24 This was the beginning of moral foundations theory, which 
incorporates an evolutionary perspective to argue that key aspects of morality are innate 
and shared across cultures and ethnicities. Humans have in-built templates of morality 
(nature), which include a range of options, and they choose how to prioritise those 
options (culture/nurture): “By recognizing that cultures build incommensurable 
moralities on top of a foundation of shared intuitions, we can develop new approaches 
to moral education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society.”25 This 
claim – that humans share intuitions around morality but that cultures build moral codes 
that can have no common standard of measurement on top of the shared intuitions – will 
inform my search to understand what groups share and do not share morally. This will in 
turn inform my analysis of the way groups in Indonesia interact across religious divides.  
According to the latest tenets of moral foundations theory, morality rests on these five 
foundations: care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity/purity.26 Each foundation is 
like a trigger that can be pulled by certain events or actions. The resulting intuitions of 
																																																								
21 Ibid., 40.  
22 Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt, "The Future of Moral Psychology: Truth, Intuition and the 
Pluralist Way," Psychological Science 4, no. 6 (1993): 363.  
23 "The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions: Ancient and New," in Handbook of Emotions. 2nd Edition, 
ed. M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 408.  
24 Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, "Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate 
Culturally Variable Virtues," Daedalus Fall (2004): 56.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 124. 
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approval or disapproval promote behaviour consistent with expectations embedded 
within these foundations. In the case of care, the trigger exists for the purpose of 
preventing harm, which serves to promote the protection of children, for example. A 
group’s collective approval of an action promotes the behaviour, while disapproval 
discourages the behaviour. The functions of the other foundations are: for fairness, to 
prevent cheating within the group; for loyalty, to prevent betrayal, which can cause 
harmful disunity within the group; for authority, to prevent subversion; for sanctity/purity, 
to prevent impurity or degradation, which can result in the spreading of disease, for 
example.  
Haidt compares the five foundations to taste buds.27 In the way a person or cultural 
cuisine might prefer chili to sugar, a culture might put a higher preference on care/harm 
as a moral principle than authority/subversion. Each culture develops the importance of 
each foundation. They are like a graphic equaliser in a hi-fi system. There are five 
controls, and each culture or sub-culture can adjust the level of each, so that some 
foundations may assume relatively greater importance. Haidt says cultures “can shrink or 
expand the current triggers of any module”,28 placing more emphasis on one or two 
modules (or foundations), for example, care and fairness, and less emphasis on the other 
three.  
Moral foundations theory has been criticised from various perspectives. One centres on 
evolution, because moral foundations theory relies to an extent on evolutionary 
psychology, which emerged in the early 1990s out of sociobiology. To argue that 
adaptations and natural selection can take place at the group level, that adaptations that 
benefit the group can be selected for in evolution, as Haidt does, and Charles Darwin 
did, has raised the ire and opposition of scientists such as George C. Williams.29 Another 
critique comes from a utilitarian perspective and argues that Haidt “leaves little room for 
the pursuit of moral understanding and progress through rational reflection and the 																																																								
27 Ibid., 112.  
28 Ibid., 124.  
29 David Berreby, Us and Them: The Science of Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
303.  
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search for consistency”.30 This critic argues from a Kantian perspective that if in looking 
at the rights of men and women in a culture you believe they should be equal, then you 
must judge patriarchies accordingly. Haidt denies being a relativist, but he does try to get 
inside moral systems, to describe them more than to judge them. Criticisms from 
rationalists (who prefer reason as a driving force in morality) are unsurprising. Haidt 
acknowledges his differences with Kantian philosophy (he prefers Hume) and Kohlberg’s 
psychology (Haidt sides with cognitive intuitionists).31  
In contrast, neuroscientists level criticisms at the precision of his terminology, 
particularly “innate” and “modules”, while praising his emphasis on moral intuitions. 
The North American philosophers Christopher Suhler and Patricia Churchland accuse 
Haidt’s theory (Haidt is shorthand for all the researchers cited with Haidt) of creating “a 
vague ‘black-box’ restatement of the behavioural data, lacking computational, 
neurobiological, or other details”.32 They also claim that “no detailed factual support 
from neuroscience, molecular biology, or evolutionary biology (save for very general 
adaptationist speculations) is marshaled for the theory”33 and that there are more than 
five candidates for foundations, anyway. Haidt’s response to the last point was that the 
five foundations were only ever a start (he has a sixth in mind), that he and his 
colleagues were open to suggestions, and that it was a work in progress.34 On the 
neuroscience criticism, Haidt argues that it seems there are no genes for traits and that 
neuroscience is still developing, so it is unreasonable to insist they have all the answers 
when the science as a whole does not.35 On innateness, Haidt stands by his definition of 
organised in advance of experience, and claims Suhler and Churchland set the bar too 
high. On the modularity black-box accusation he says a theory being incomplete does 
not make it wrong. He concludes by noting that from the outset moral foundations 																																																								
30 Thomas Nagel, "The Taste for Being Moral," The New York Review of Books, December 6, 2012. 
31 Haidt, The Righteous Mind. 
32 Christopher L. Suhler and Patricia Churchland, "Can Innate, Modular “Foundations” Explain Morality? 
Challenges for Haidtʼs Moral Foundations Theory," Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23, no. 9 (2011): 
2105. 
33 Ibid., 2111-12. 
34 Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, "How Moral Foundations Theory Succeeded in Building on Sand: A 
Response to Suhler and Churchland," ibid. 
35 Ibid., 2119. 
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theory had been “an attempt to bridge the nativism of evolutionary psychology with the 
constructivism of cultural psychology”.36  
Moral foundations theory’s value will be in how useful it is analysing the literature and 
understanding my research data. The more we understand what drives people in their 
moral, religious and group behaviours, the better we can understand the causes of 
conflicts. Other researchers have made comparable links between neuroscience and 
politics with humans’ evolved moral systems for caregiving that resonate with Haidt’s 
argument about intuition, the quick-thinking mechanism.37 Hopefully, such 
psychological perspectives will aid understanding despite my research being mostly 
qualitative and my thesis discursive rather than positivist. I accept that a lot of the 
research in psychology takes place in clinical settings, but I maintain that I am able to 
use the insights fruitfully. Jesse Graham and Haidt suggest that moral foundations theory 
“provides the most comprehensive account of the ‘hooks’ in the moral mind to which a 
good ideological narrative can attach”.38 I will be looking for such hooks and ideological 
narratives, which I explore more fully in chapter 4.  
Idealistic evil or violence is “nearly always fostered by groups, as opposed to 
individuals”,39 according to US psychologist Roy Baumeister, and will be more likely to 
happen across divides between moral visions or worlds. This sense that the other group 
is doing evil is related to the sense that they are a threat. Threats can occur outside the 
physical realm. An ideological-conflict effect can occur between groups with different 
moral visions. Such symbolic threats to values and beliefs strongly predict prejudice 
against groups that are ideologically different.40 While “much behaviour… appears to be 
produced or influenced by the limbic system”,41 such as in response to threats, people 
																																																								
36 Ibid., 2121. 
37 Kullberg and Singer, "Bringing Neuroscience into Political Science: The Caregiving System and Human 
Sociopolitical Evolution," 248. 
38 Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt, "Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: A Moral Foundations 
Approach," in Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil (IDC Herzliya, 
2010), 8.  
39 Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1997), 190.  
40 Mackie, Maitner, and Smith, "Intergroup Emotions Theory." 
41 Kullberg and Singer, "Bringing Neuroscience into Political Science." 
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still need to justify their actions after the fact in order to preserve their reputations as 
moral people. Ideological narratives help justify extremism using morality. I will argue 
that actors who persecute others in Indonesia justify their actions using moral arguments.  
Haidt draws a distinction between authority and power, with human authority being not 
just power backed by the threat of force but responsibility to maintain order and 
justice.42 Authority is about hierarchical orders being legitimated by the functions they 
serve, one of which is to hold power – characterised by force – at bay. People willingly 
submit “to the rules and restraints that make social life possible”.43 The flipside of the 
obedience and loyalty they show to those in authority is that they expect guidance and 
protection in return. Positions of authority within human hierarchies carry 
responsibilities, and leaders are held accountable within the authority foundation. This 
moral foundation, the authority foundation, serves the function of encouraging people to 
support the hierarchy.  
Hierarchies are part of the human brain’s structures, in the sense that humans are wired 
to respond to them.44 Chemicals in the brain reward successful attainment of goals, in 
the case of social dominance, serotonin. This brain chemical motivation system evolved 
to prompt actions that promote survival of the self or the self’s genes (offspring). All 
mammals, including humans, form social hierarchies around power or status within their 
herd or pack. “Status improves reproductive success, so mammals invest energy in status 
seeking.”45 This longing is similar to the urge to seek sex and food. “If your status rises 
within a social hierarchy, it feels good. Happy chemicals flow in your brain when you 
get recognition from others.”46 This desire for status is why fear of losing your good 
reputation inspires people to act, or appear to act, consistently with moral principles. 
Status serves a productive purpose in the group, on average motivating behaviour that 																																																								
42 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 143. 
43 Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham, "Planet of the Durkheimians, Where Community, Authority, and 
Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality," in Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System 
Justification, ed. J. Jost, A.C. Kay, and H. Thorisdottir (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 377.  
44 Loretta Graziano Breuning, I, Mammal: Why Your Brain Links Status and Happiness, Kindle ed. 
(Oakland, California: System Integrity Press, 2011), 6. 
45 Ibid., 2.  
46 Ibid., 24.  
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conforms with the group’s morality, hence benefiting the group. This is one reason that 
people seek to justify their actions with a moral argument. Status hierarchies can even be 
created around religion and spirituality, either between individuals or between groups. 
“Some religions posit a hierarchy in which all members dominate all non-members.”47 
Such religious tribalism deploys narratives that draw on people’s inclination to see their 
group as better than other groups, according to social identity theory.48 I will explore this 
more in chapter 4.  
Methodology 
My field research methodology is qualitative. I aimed to assume a neutral stance, by 
asking questions without preconceived answers and avoiding seeing events entirely 
through my own Western liberal perspective, to the extent I was able. Notwithstanding 
the perils and unlikelihood of a “view from nowhere”, I attempted, like Sidel, to avoid 
pinning the blame simplistically on one party, for example, “on ‘intolerant’, or ‘extremist’ 
Muslims”49. It seemed appropriate to gather data via interview because the research 
problem related to matters of individual psychology. My questions were designed to 
explore the issues around religious freedom in Indonesia. The material I gathered during 
my field trips consisted of one-on-one interviews and documents gathered in the field. 
Much of the literature examines the big picture, large-scale trends and national 
implications, as well as some detail of individual situations, but there is not a lot of 
material which reports people’s perceptions of what was happening and why. 
I acknowledge that the interview method throws up a range of potential problems. 
Firstly, in a partial attempt to counter my own subjectivity, the interviews will be 
interpreted in the context of the other interviews, the literature and documentary 
evidence. I made an effort to interview people who represent many sides, not just one or 
two perspectives. Time constraints also affected comprehensiveness, because my field 
trips involved four weeks in the Bogor area. I relied partly upon the “snowballing” 																																																								
47 Ibid., 40.  
48 Michael A. Hogg, "Social Identity Theory," in Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, ed. Peter J. 
Burke (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 120. 
49 Sidel, "On the 'Anxiety of Incompleteness'," 135. 
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method with each contact helping me find another interviewee. By the end, I had 
interviewed Christian and Ahmadiyah community leaders and community members, 
Muslim leaders, activists and community members, Yasmin housing complex community 
members, politicians and wannabe politicians, academics, journalists and a human 
rights expert. Within the largest group, Muslims in Bogor, I interviewed a range of 
people. I gathered conservative Muslim voices, as well as interviews with a nationalist 
perspective to religious tolerance. Interviewees skewed towards middle-class and upper 
middle class residents of Bogor because of my method of snowballing, with a starting 
point of a range of professionals I had contact with, as well as my method of contacting 
institutions, which tend to be administered by middle-class people. I countered this 
shortage to some extent by talking informally to people I met in Bogor. They were not 
particularly aware of or interested in the issues I was investigating. I believe the range of 
interview subjects was comprehensive enough for me to draw broad conclusions.  
The issue of religious freedom and tolerance is sensitive, more so when the interviewer is 
from another country. Was the oft-stated response that Bogor was a very tolerant 
community in terms of religion the simple truth or was it what the interviewees wanted 
to present to a foreign academic and journalist? Many subjects chose to remain 
anonymous. This protected their security and made them willing to speak. Without this 
option I would not have had as many interviewees. While having anonymous 
interviewees reduces information for the reader, this thesis is richer for the comments 
made under that protection.  
I think psychology provides the most direct focus on and most thorough analysis of 
group issues. Moral foundations theory provides an intellectual tool, which along with 
social identity theory and intergroup emotions theory, helps illuminate human behaviour 
from the perspective of what we share: our mammalian brains, our evolutionary history 
and our belonging to groups. The more strongly a person identifies with a group, the 
more that person will define what their group is doing as right, and what another group 
	 18	
is doing as wrong.50 Stronger identification with the group begets stronger group feelings 
and prejudices towards the ingroup and against outgroups. Ultimately, a key virtue of 
moral foundations theory, supported by some social psychology theories, is that it 
explains why inherently “good” values (morality) can result in “bad” outcomes (violence 
and exclusion) via analysis of the role of morality within groups. 
																																																								
50 Charles R. Seger et al., "Knowing How They Feel: Perceiving Emotions Felt by Outgroups," Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2009); Hogg, "Social Identity Theory," 120. 
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Chapter 2: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN INDONESIA 
On October 1, 2010, there was an attack… They burned our houses, our vehicles, one 
motorbike, one car, the glass in our houses was broken, and 32 houses were hit with 
stones… They also stole goods from our houses, our small shops. They took everything, 
candies, cigarettes, and eggs. They said they were Moslem, but they burned Korans. Fifty 
Korans were burnt… This made me the most sad; they burned Korans.1 
This account of an attack on an Ahmadiyah community in Cisalada, West Java, 
Indonesia, is representative of the larger issue of persecution of minorities in Indonesia. 
The context of the attack relates to religious tolerance. While Indonesia is not riven with 
religious conflict, the issue deserves attention and examination. This chapter will outline 
the key events and statistics that establish the scale of religious persecution in Indonesia.  
Indonesia is 87 percent Muslim, while 9 percent are Christians (Catholic, 3.1 percent, 
Protestant, 5.9 percent), nearly 2 percent are Hindu (mostly in Bali), 0.8 percent 
Buddhist, 0.1 percent follow Confucianism and 0.1 percent others.2 Indonesia’s 
reputation for religious tolerance has been under threat abroad because of violence 
against Ahmadis, Christians and Shia, among others, particularly by hardline groups.3 
Police, officials, courts and religious leaders are known to stand by or assist intolerant 
actions against religious minorities. The religiously different risk arrest.  
In the first 21 years of Indonesian independence, under President Sukarno, only two 
churches were attacked. Most of the 455 attacked in the 32 years of Suharto’s rule from 
1966-1998 occurred in the last three years when violence flared up repeatedly in a huge 
wave of riots and church burnings, mostly aimed at Chinese-Indonesians. 4 In 1997 and 
																																																								
1 Sayidul Mukhsin (Ahmadiyah community leader), interview with author, Bogor, August 30, 2014. 
2 Ismail Hasani, State Should Take Action: Reality of Discriminatory Legal and Impunity of Persecution 
Practices by Society against Freedom of Religion/Belief, ed. Bonar Tigor Naipospos (Jakarta: Setara 
Institute, 2010), 3.  
3 USCIRF, Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom: April 
2013, ed. Katrina Lantos Swett (Washington: United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, 2013), 235. 
4 Sadanand Dhume, My Friend the Fanatic (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2008); International Crisis 
Group, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Indonesia Briefing (2001). 
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1998, 400 mainly Chinese-Indonesian churches were damaged or destroyed.5 This 
pattern continued as Indonesia began its transition to democracy, with churches 
becoming the targets of bombings. For example, in Medan, North Sumatra, in 2000, a 
bombing at a Protestant church injured about 47 people.6 Christmas eve in 2000 was a 
peak, with simultaneous bombings killing 18 and badly injuring 36 at or close to 
churches – Catholic and Protestant – in 10 cities in six provinces. While the incidents 
were extreme, they were not necessarily religious, with many attacks on churches 
indistinguishable from anti-Chinese violence or alternatively conflict between rival 
communities, as was the case in Maluku.7  
In his analysis of the religious violence of the past two decades, Sidel has identified three 
periods – riots (1995-98), pogroms (1999-2001), and jihad terrorism (2000-2005).8 These 
particularly violent periods were tied up with instability towards the end of the Suharto 
era and in the post-Suharto transitional period. The frequency and intensity of attacks 
declined by the mid 2000s. This thesis focuses on the following 10 years. 
During Yudhoyono’s first term as president, the number of incidents of religious 
intolerance and lapses of religious freedom appeared to increase substantially as the 
number of violent incidents decreased, as shown in Tables 1a to 1c. My research focuses 
on this widespread and steady pattern of harassment and persecution from 2004-2014. 
Towards the end of this period, Indonesia was classified by an international report as tier 
2 for violations of religious freedom, meaning that violations engaged in or tolerated by 
the government are particularly severe.9 As a tier 2 country, its company includes 
Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and Cuba, while if Indonesia became a tier 1 country it would 
join nations such as China, Iran and Pakistan. The commission that made this judgment 
reported that in 2012:  
																																																								
5 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 5.  
6 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, 4.  
7 Ibid., 6.  
8 John T. Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
9 USCIRF Annual Report: 2013, 3.  
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governmental action and societal violence led to the death of a Shi’i follower, the forced 
closure of Christian churches and Ahmadiyya mosques, and the imprisonment of 
individuals practicing allegedly heterodox versions of Islam or spreading atheism. 
Individuals who killed Ahmadiyya Muslims during a February 2011 mob attack were 
released from prison after serving light sentences of five to seven months.10 
While this is a fair summary of the concerns over religious tolerance at that time, 
religious life for most Christians in majority-Muslim regions in Indonesia is uninterrupted 
and uncontroversial.11 Similarly, Muslims can worship freely in non-Muslim majority 
areas, although Islamist activists cite some cases of intolerance of Muslims around 
Indonesia. The head of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s women’s arm said Muslims were 
discriminated against in some non-Muslim majority areas of Indonesia: “The Muslim in 
Bali, Papua, their number is not small, not majority, but quite big in Bali, Papua, Ambon, 
as if they are deserve to get discrimination or restriction even to wear their hijab.”12 
Human Rights Watch gives the case of a Muslim minority community which 
experienced difficulties in building a mosque: “Since 2002, Muslim families in Batuplat, 
Alak district, Kupang, on Timor island in East Nusa Tenggara province, have faced 
difficulties in building a mosque due to protests from Christians in the predominantly 
Christian area.”13 These examples appear, however, to be the exception.  
Zainal Adidin Bagir, a co-author of an annual report on religious life in Indonesia,14 
suggests keeping the issue of religious intolerance in perspective, because terrorism and 
large-scale communal violence have declined in the face of effective government action, 
leaving Indonesia still religiously harmonious in many areas.15 Nevertheless, Bagir 
worried about the growing intolerance of the Yudhoyono period and feared at the end of 																																																								
10 Ibid., 237.  
11 Franz Magnis-Suseno, "Christian and Muslim Minorities in Indonesia," in Democracy and Islam in 
Indonesia, ed. Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
12 Iffah Ainur Rochmah (women’s spokeswoman and head of women’s arm of HTI), interview with the 
author, Bogor, September 12, 2014.  
13 Human Rights Watch, In Religion's Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia (USA: 
Human Rights Watch, 2013), 57. 
14 Suhadi Cholil et al., Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2009 (Yogyakarta: Center for 
Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University, 2010). 
15 Zainal Adidin Bagir and Gerry van Klinken, "Stopping Intolerance," Inside Indonesia, Oct-Dec 2013. 
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2013 that intolerant acts would become more widespread. That has not happened yet, 
with an apparent decline in the number of attacks in 2014.16 Perhaps, as Robin Bush 
argues, that decline is because Yudhoyono’s policies and appointments contributed to 
the persecutions, and Yudhoyono left office in late 2014.17 If the period of Yudhoyono’s 
presidency was no longer one of “riot, pogroms or jihad”, as Sidel suggests in analysing 
the previous decade or so, then perhaps it could be described as something close to the 
US scholar of comparative politics Jeremy Menchik’s idea of productive intolerance.18 I 
will explore this idea through the thesis.  
If the number and seriousness of the incidents make the issue worth examining, what are 
the numbers? According to the Communion of Churches in Indonesia, more than 430 
churches were attacked between 2004 and 2013.19 The most systematic, regular and 
thorough analysis comes from the Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace, which has 
published reports on freedom of religion and belief at least annually since 2007. 
Although there are minor gaps in categories of data reported in the Setara Institute’s 
annual reports from 2007 to 2014, I have disentangled the data from each annual report 
and collated them into Table 2a, which distinguishes between violations (individual acts) 
and the events at which the acts occurred. Each year the reports detail the types of 
violations,20 which included: damaging of places of worship and properties; arrest and 
detention; forbidding of issuance of documents relating to religion; dismissal and 
limitation to access because of different belief; court verdict on particular belief; and, 
battery and attack.  
  																																																								
16 Halili and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, From Stagnation to Pick the New Hopes: The Condition of Freedom 
of Religion/Belief in Indonesia 2014 (Jakarta: Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace, 2015). 
17 Robin Bush, "Religious Politics and Minority Rights During the Yudhoyono Administration," in The 
Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia's Decade of Stability and Stagnation, ed. Edward Aspinall, Marcus 
Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015). 
18 Jeremy Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 56, no. 3 (2014). 
19 Human Rights Watch, In Religion's Name, 15. 
20 Bonar Tigor Naipospos, Rahadi T. Wiratama, and Fery H. Machsus, Submissive to Mass Judgment: 
State's Justification in Prosecuting Freedom of Religion and Belief. Report of Freedom of Religion and 
Belief in Indonesia, 2007, ed. Ismail Hasani (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2007), 10.  
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Table 2a: Ahmadiyah, Christian, All Religions 
Acts (and events) violating religious freedom in Indonesia  
Acts against 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
All religions 
(Events) 
185  
(135) 
367  
(265) 
291  
(200) 
286  
(216) 
299 
(244) 
371  
(264) 
292 
(222) 
134 
(117) 
Christians 
(Events) 
28 15 18  
(12) 
* 
(75) 
* 
(54) 
* 
(50) 
* 
(48) 
* 
(25) 
Christian 
% of total 
15% 4% 6% 
(6%) 
 
(35%) 
 
(22%) 
 
(19%) 
 
(22%) 
 
(21%) 
Ahmadiyah 
(Events) 
21 
 
238 
(193) 
* 
(33) 
* 
(50) 
* 
(114) 
* 
(31) 
* 
(59) 
* 
(11) 
Ahmadiyah 
% of total 
11% 65% 
(73%) 
 
(17%) 
 
(23%) 
 
(47%) 
 
(8%) 
 
(27%) 
 
(9%) 
SOURCE: SETARA INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORTS, 2008-2014          * Unavailable 
In 2012, for example, Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace counted 264 events that 
violated religious freedom, which amounted to 371 separate violations of religion or 
belief.21 This is a similar number to 2008. While other years from 2007 to 2014 recorded 
fewer violations, they still numbered in the hundreds. The numbers in each year reveal a 
consistent, ongoing issue. The violations in 2012 were spread throughout 26 provinces, 
with the highest number, 76, in the province with the largest population, West Java.22  
Table 2a shows that acts against Christians increased after 2009. As an example, early in 
2012, HKBP Filadelfia church in Bekasi was prevented from worshipping by protesters 
despite having their permits, an apparent example of a local government ignoring the 
orders of a court decision.23 One Setara Institute report notes at least three cases of 
churches having licences, “but under the insistence of other religious groups government 
officials then revoked them”.24 These detailed lists of attacks reveal a national pattern of 
																																																								
21 Halili, Leadership without Initiative: The Condition of Freedom of Religious/Belief in Indonesia 2012, 
ed. Bonar Tigor Naipospos (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2013), 27.  
22 Ibid., 37.  
23 Ibid., 51-60.  
24 Cholil et al., Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2009, 32.  
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incidents every month, every year. It is not dramatic or extremely violent incidents that 
are noteworthy, as might have been the case with extremely violent incidents of previous 
years, but rather the ongoing and sustained nature of the incidents. The data reveals that 
Christians in some areas, for example, are consistently harassed, and regularly attacked. 
The authorities admit the scale, at least implicitly. Before Christmas in 2010, police met 
church leaders to discuss security for the holy day, which included 87,000 security 
personnel stationed at places of worship nationally.25 
Violations of religious freedom are often the result of activists taking vigilante action in 
the name of enforcing these laws. For example, a vigilante group might justify its actions 
violating religious rights against a church by claiming it was upholding the law because 
the church did not have a permit.26 In response to the pattern of vigilantism, the 
International Crisis Group concluded: “The Indonesian government needs a strategy to 
address growing religious intolerance, because without one, mob rule prevails.”27 An 
example of mob rule by Islamist vigilantes occurred in June 2008 at an interfaith rally for 
religious harmony in Jakarta (the Monas tragedy), which led to the injury of 34 men, 
women and children, with a muted government and police response.28 In some instances 
it is authorities that act to prevent worshipping on the basis of the law. In Bogor, in July 
2009, police tore down a church used by 375 parishioners who had consent forms 
signed by locals, but no permit.29  
The Ahmadiyah Muslim community has experienced an even higher number of 
violations against them than Christians, despite being a smaller group. Ahmadiyah is an 
internationally persecuted group within Islam that has a reverence for its founder, Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad.30 Some orthodox Sunni Muslims strongly object to the status of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, claiming he is placed in the controversial role of prophet and imam 																																																								
25 Arientha Primanita and Zaky Pawas, "With Hopes for Peace on Earth, Security Personnel Deployed to 
Protect Jakarta Churches," The Jakarta Globe, December 17, 2010. 
26 Setara Institute, Where Is Our Place of Worship?, 21.  
27 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: 'Christianisation' and Intolerance, Asia Briefing (Jakarta/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 2010). 
28 Tim Lindsey, "Australia and the Real Battle for Indonesian Islam," The Asialink Essays 3, no. 5 (2011): 3.  
29 Cholil et al., Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2009, 29.  
30 Detailed background available at "https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/."  
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mahdi (messiah) that challenges Mohammed’s status as the final prophet.31 The national 
statistics (Table 2a) show that Ahmadis experience greater persecution in some years 
than others. The years 2008 and 2011 represent peaks of intolerance towards 
Ahmadiyah community members, with 193 and 114 events that violated their freedom of 
religion. The most violent and well-known incident against members of the Indonesian 
Ahmadiyah community was the killing of three people in February 2011 in Cikeusik.32 
The subsequent mild sentences for those accused of the attack caused a human rights 
outcry33, not least because an Ahmadi victim received a similar sentence for not fleeing 
the attack as police had ordered.34 That year, other attacks on Ahmadiyah communities 
and mosques took place in West Java, Banten and South Sulawesi.35 Such incidents have 
been ongoing and increasing since a July 2005 edict by the MUI (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia: Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) that Ahmadis deviate from the 
Koran,36 as well as later ministerial decrees.37 Human rights NGOs have noted that 
“prohibiting the Ahmadiyah from practising their religion also violates the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Indonesia in February 2006”.38 One 
such violation relates to a long-running issue in West Lombok. Dozens of families were 
evicted from their village in 2006, and their subsequent struggles to return from internal 
displacement within Lombok.39 Attempts by some of the 127 displaced people to 
reoccupy their homes, such as in 2010, were rebuffed by their neighbours.40  
I chose Bogor as the location of my field research for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was 																																																								
31 Muhammad As'ad, "Ahmadiyah and the Freedom of Religion in Indonesia," Journal of Indonesian Islam 
3, no. 2 (2009): 398. 
32 Melissa Crouch, "Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: A History of Religious Tolerance under Threat?," Alternative 
Law Journal 36, no. 1 (2011): 57.  
33 Rizieq Shihab and Indriaswati Dyah Saptaningrum, "Cikeusik Verdict ‘Chilling’ Message to Minorities," 
The Jakarta Post, July 29, 2011. 
34 lfr, "Cikeusik Ahmadi Leader Gets 6 Months Prison," ibid., August 15, 2011. 
35 Human Rights Watch World Report 2012: Events of 2011 (USA: Human Rights Watch, 2012).  
36 Phil Robertson to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Indonesia: Guarantee Freedom of Religion 
and Stop Attacks on Ahmadiyah. Letter to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono," (Jakarta: Human Rights 
Watch, Asia Division, 2010). http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/03/indonesia-guarantee-freedom-
religion-and-stop-attacks-ahmadiyah 
37 Melissa Crouch, "Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications," ARC Federation 
Fellowship, ‘Islam, Shariah and Governance’ Background Paper Series, no. 4 (2009). 
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close to the national headquarters of the Ahmadiyah community, which is a few 
kilometres outside Bogor, in Parung, in the regency of Bogor, a location at which the 
community has experienced a number of attacks on the basis of their religion that I will 
detail soon. There was also an attack on an Ahmadiyah mosque in Bogor itself in January 
2006.41 Secondly, the city of Bogor is the location of a well-known example of a church 
being banned, the GKY Yasmin church, a case which does not particularly involve 
violence, so the focus is on the legal and community issues, rather than the physical 
conflict. Thirdly, this combination of two interesting and meaningful cases of religious 
disagreement in the same area provides the possibility of comparison. Fourthly and 
lastly, Bogor regency and Bogor city are in West Java, which is consistently the province 
with the highest reported number of violations of religious freedom in Indonesia.42 While 
most of the incidents in West Java that are cited in the Setara Institute reports did not 
occur in Bogor – but rather in Tangerang, Bekasi and Depok – West Java has a reputation 
as a province whose Islamic inhabitants are conservative by Indonesian standards.  
I interviewed six Ahmadi community members, most of who lived in Bogor, near Bogor 
or in Parung. One of them told me in Indonesia “religious freedom is only meant for the 
majority“.43 Another Ahmadi community member, a leader of the community in the city 
of Bogor, said there was conflict in the area, especially in rural areas, but in his area “in 
fact they are kind to us” and they interact with their neighbours on many levels.44 
Another Ahmadi missionary, who lives in a village (or kampung), said nevertheless “our 
relationship with people in kampungs is good in many ways. We work together to clean 
the environment, we make a visit of condolence if somebody dies, we also pay a visit if 
there’s somebody sick.”45 These comments contextualize the problem within Indonesia’s 
generally tolerant landscape. Mansur’s comments also supported evidence in various 
Setara Institute reports that attributed responsibility for acts of religious intolerance to 																																																								
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MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars).46 Mansur said 
“the government is good to us. Those who did bad things are mullahs in MUI from 
outside the government.”47 However, I will present evidence that government and state 
institutions are involved in the persecution of, or not preventing persecution of, 
Ahmadiyah communities.  
The actions against Ahmadiyah communities during the Yudhoyono years began with 
incidents that have had long-term consequences for the community at time before data 
was comprehensively collected and collated. A mob attack on its national headquarters 
compound in Parung, Bogor, in early July 2005 was led by Amin Djamaluddin, the head 
of Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI-Islamic Research and Study Institute), 
resulting in the destruction of buildings, the plundering of houses and the displacement 
and evacuation of thousands of physically intimidated, injured or threatened Ahmadiyah 
community members.48 An Ahmadi community member said ever since the attack, 
which he had witnessed in July 2005, the Ahmadi community could no longer run its 
annual meeting, a large gathering on the extensive grounds of the Parung compound. He 
said that in 2005, 15,000 to 20,000 people had gathered for the event:  
All of a sudden come some people to demonstrate and they attack us, throw stones. Even 
the government of Bogor they sent some vehicles and rescue some of our youngster… 
more than 30 people got injured… some of them badly injured.49 
Security remains tight at the compound and normal activities such as the annual 
gathering have not resumed. Another Ahmadi leader, who was also present on that day, 
said the Parung compound was closed to the community for four months and at the time 
of interview the community could still not use the mosque, so community members had 
to pray in their homes:50  
And we were discriminated against. They yelled ‘traitor’ [murtad]. They also paid 
attention if my wife went outside the house… There was someone who yelled at me 																																																								
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when I was standing in the street on my way to the market in Parung. He shouted at me: 
‘Ahmadiyah!’ I understood the point was to attract attention to me… They also used the 
word ‘kafir’. Until now, they don’t want to shake their hands with me… I went to the 
market, and they threw stones and shouted at me. There was someone who shouted: 
‘Qomar, I will beat you down’.51  
The data from these interviewees demonstrate the impact of events on people’s lives, 
going beyond the numbers. The attack at Parung was one of several major incidents in 
the area during the Yudhoyono years. After the attack, in late July 2005, the MUI issued 
a fatwa against Ahmadiyah.52 Another interviewee has lived his long life as an Ahmadi 
community member in Cisalada, in the regency of Bogor, about an hour’s drive from the 
city of Bogor, and part of his account of an attack on his home and village begins this 
chapter. In further details of that event in 2010:  
[The attack] took about two hours. The police station was nearby though. It was about 20 
minutes from our place. We felt that they did nothing because they were afraid of the 
attackers… There were about 500 to 1000 people, many of them… It was around 8pm 
until 10pm. The fire didn’t stop until dawn because there was no firemen helping us.53  
The lack of action by the police is significant, because there are many instances of 
religious persecution in which the police are accused of standing by or not acting, for 
whatever reason, when they could have enforced the law, including at the July 2005 
Parung incident.54 In its report on 2012, for example, Setara Institute notes that police 
perpetrated 40 of that year’s 371 violations of religious freedom.55 That is the highest 
number for a state actor. This fact undermines the Ahmadiyah member’s earlier 
statement that the problem came from the mullahs. Certainly MUI (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia: Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) is a key non-state actor, with the 
highest number of violations (25) in 2012, followed by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) 
with 24.56 The state – national, provincial, district and local – is also an actor in violence 																																																								
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and in its failure to apply the law. In 2009, the Wahid Institute counted the state 
involved in at least 35 violations of religious freedom among 93 acts of intolerance 
nationwide.57 These acts have occurred despite Indonesia’s constitution protecting 
religious freedom, and with the assistance of various laws and local regulations around 
Indonesia restricting religious freedom.58 Legal restrictions are placed on groups 
including Ahmadiyah Muslim community and activities such as blasphemy, building 
houses of worship, overseas aid to religious institutions, proselytising and interfaith 
marriage.  
Despite instances of police inaction there is evidence that the army on occasion filled 
the police’s domestic security, as a community leader notes in his description of an 
attack on his Ahmadiyah community:  
I was with my wife, and then we prayed inside our house. There were some people who 
stepped inside our house, I really wanted to hit them. But I took pity on them. They threw 
things at me, but nothing hit me. The glass in my house was broken… about six 
windows… I called the army and then the army sent their troops. Three trucks of troops 
to guard the location. 59  
From these descriptions a pattern emerges of Ahmadis afraid and sometimes angered by 
attacks. Incidents such as the ones I have detailed and the many more recounted in 
Setara Institute reports constitute terrorism under a definition of terrorism as 
“premeditated, threatened or actual use of force or violence to attain a political goal 
through fear, coercion or intimidation”.60 The fear, coercion and intimidation is apparent 
from the data quoted. I will discuss how these attacks relate to political goals in later 
chapters.  
Ahmadiyah community members I spoke to hoped to live peacefully in Indonesia. One 																																																								
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leader said in reference to the 2005 attack on the Parung headquarters:  
I am not free. I lived here before the attack and I could go outside through the front gate 
freely. We can go everywhere. Now, we live under the threats. I hope, my biggest hope, 
is that we can stay here. Our symbol of happiness is that we can get through that front 
gate without any threats.61 
My research suggests this might be a difficult goal to achieve in the short to medium 
term, because many mainstream Muslims I interviewed quickly and unreservedly 
rejected the Ahmadiyah’s right to practise their religion, either at all, or within Islam.  
As a group, Shiites were left mostly undisturbed until 2012, before which they rarely 
appeared Setara Institute’s reports; in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011 none, in 2008 two.62 
In 2010, all manner of other religions and groups are mentioned as being subject to 
violations, including: Buddhist (9), Bahai (3), Confucian (1) and a range of named sects 
within one or two violations in the year.63 But in 2012, Setara Institute records that 34 of 
the 264 incidents violating religious freedom nationwide were against Shia, even more 
than the Ahmadis’ 31 events.64  
Regarding the other dispute I am examining in Bogor, the building of GKI church in the 
Taman Yasmin residential area, the church went through an extensive consultation and 
regulatory process from about 2001 until it received its permit in 2006, and soon after 
began building.65 However, opposition appeared quickly, culminating in the mayor 
suspending the permit in 2008, the church responding with various legal actions and the 
permit being revoked in 2010.66 The congregation held services on the land where the 																																																								
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church was partially built or on the street outside the land for a number of years before 
the police forced them to move to home church services nearby after disputes with 
Islamist activists.  
I attended a number of services held by this GKI congregation, which has an alternating 
fortnightly pattern of locations for their informal services, never held in a church. One 
week they hold a protest service near the presidential palace in Jakarta, and the alternate 
week they hold a service in a house of a congregation member. On the day I attended, 
as for a number of years, the location was secret and the address was text messaged to 
me on the morning. They used to tell the police each fortnight’s location, said one 
member of the congregation: “The police always ask where you did the service. When 
we told the police and then eventually the demonstrator know where we did the 
service… now we didn’t talk to the police anymore.”67 Like the situation faced by the 
Ahmadis, this experience demonstrates that religious minorities cannot always rely on 
the police to be impartial. This lack of trust comes at a time when the church most needs 
police protection, having been forced off their church land into private houses.  
This feeling about a lack of impartiality extends to the state as a whole, and indeed the 
country, with one congregation member saying:  
I feel sad, as if we are not part of Indonesia, which is fundamentally based on Pancasila, 
protecting all religions in Indonesia… I don’t think there is discrimination during the 
Soeharto era, unlike now. We were free. We had no problem during Soeharto, which is 
different after a decade of this reform era. My Muslim friends from Shia and Ahmadiyah 
also face the same problem.68 
This personal reflection goes beyond the statistics cited in this chapter, revealing lived 
experience which in this case suggests greater religious freedom under the Suharto 
regime than under democratic government. In this chapter I have tried to reveal the 
extent of the problem via referencing statistics and reports on religious persecution. The 
instances of harassment, violations of religious freedom and persecution are regular, 																																																								
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widespread and consistent over years. The data I have gathered give voice to the 
statistical and other evidence.  
In the next chapter, I will start my examination of the causes of the general upsurge in 
intolerance by considering the historical, political and ideological roots of the current 
situation.  
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Chapter 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO LAPSES IN TOLERANCE 
 
Having looked at the extent of the problem of religious intolerance in chapter 2, I will 
turn to the causes. This chapter examines Islamisation in 20th century Indonesia and its 
engagement with colonialism, Christianity and nationalism. I will analyse the sense of 
threat that underpinned changing relations between religions, influencing events in 21st 
century Indonesia. I will explore four periods: colonialism, independence, 
authoritarianism (the New Order) and democracy. This chapter ends at democratisation 
in 1999. A later chapter examines how the patterns and relationships of the 20th century 
played out in democratic 21st century Indonesia, particularly during the Yudhoyono 
presidency in relation to religious persecution.  
Colonial history: positioning for independence  
Islam came gradually to Indonesia, with large-scale conversions beginning around the 
13th century. The conversion to Islam of the Majapahit Kingdom, the last Hindu-Buddhist 
dynasty on Java, helped to shift the balance in Islam’s favour across the archipelago.1 
Many Muslims in Indonesia practised a syncretic mix of the imported Islam with 
traditional local practices, creating multiple and complex versions of Islam over the 
centuries.2 Part of Indonesian Islam’s syncretic tradition is that it is a place where “the 
Indic world view continued under a nominal conversion to Islam” creating something of 
a “spiritual balance of power” in pre-independence times.3  
To understand the Islamic world today, scholars recommend examining the colonial 
Muslim world, and the major forces competing for power in the late 19th and early 20th 
century.4 In Indonesia’s case four major forces emerged: Islamic, colonialist, nationalist 
and communist. Christian-Muslim antagonisms can be traced back to the mid 19th 																																																								
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century, and the decision by the Dutch colonial government to support Christian 
missionaries.5 In the 19th and 20th centuries, Dutch colonial authorities discouraged 
Islamisation with measures that suppressed political Islam and the haj, and encouraged 
Christian conversion. These attempts to contain threats of Islamic anti-colonial rebellion 
led Hefner to conclude that the “Dutch legacy had a lasting illiberal influence on 
religious politics in Indonesia”.6 Dutch repression of Islam meant Islamisation occurred 
more in rural areas, away from the centre of Dutch colonial power in larger urban areas, 
through the establishment of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in the regions and 
villages.7 Dutch missionary and colonial activities were intertwined, with the goal of 
creating more loyal subjects, such that by 1935 more than 2 million Christians lived in 
the archipelago, mainly outside Java. Most Christian churches in Indonesia today 
descend from colonial-era missionary work.8  
The global context of this Christianisation is that just five Muslim countries had escaped 
colonial control by a Christian European power between 1800 and 1950, a time of 
consistent ongoing warfare in defence of homelands with majority Muslim populations.9 
The Dutch, colonialism and Christianity threatened the autonomy, culture, religion and 
safety of the indigenous residents of the archipelago. This threat has existed for centuries, 
which is an important fact in understanding current conflicts.  
Until the late 19th century, the Dutch did not impose an educational system on the East 
Indies in the fashion of heavy-handed colonial powers elsewhere. The Dutch knew Islam 
was central to Indonesian communities and had fought “too many wars with 
Indonesians… not to know that the Indonesian, however easy-going, could become very 
fierce when his religion was encroached on”.10 While Indonesian Islam is not as 
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monolithic as this quotation implies, nevertheless forces identified as Islamic have 
evidently long been recognised as willing and able to defend against threats. A notable 
example occurred during the Padri wars in Sumatra in the early 19th century. Three of its 
leaders were probably exposed on the haj to the puritanical Islam of Wahhabism, a 
somewhat milder and over time more compromising version of which they brought back 
to and spread in the region known as Minangkabau by peaceful and violent means.11 It is 
quite possible that this war contributed to Christianisation in Sumatra, because the Dutch 
response included pushing into Batak territory, where in the mid 19th century they 
forcefully, with official backing, converted pagans to Christianity.12  
In the 20th century, educational policies became increasingly intrusive under the 
influence of Christian Snouck Hurgronje. The surge of Westernised education aimed to 
reduce Islam’s influence, split opposition to colonial rule and increase support for the 
Dutch. One response to this push was the establishment in 1912 of Sarekat Islam 
(Islamic Union), the first mass political organisation for indigenous political rights in the 
modern era.13 Sarekat Islam soon developed opposing factions of leftists and Muslims, 
weakening the organisation in the face of Dutch repressions in the 1920s. The Dutch 
policies in the early 20th century also helped to generate nationalists such as Sukarno, 
who sought Western-style freedom for his people.14 In 1927, the Indonesian Nationalist 
Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) formed under Sukarno’s leadership with a secular 
nationalist agenda, one aspect of which was to confine religion to the private sphere. 
This nationalist movement drew support from Westernised urban elites and became 
increasingly popular for its anti-colonial stance.15  
The nationalist movement did not draw huge immediate support from Islamic leaders, 
nevertheless Muslim life and politics in Indonesia was culturally plural, Hefner writes.16 																																																								
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The reformers of the late 19th and early 20th century supported modernisation by 
borrowing from Western education and science. In the early 20th century, the modernist 
movement developed. A strict Islamist strand, manifested in the Al-Irsyad and Persatuan 
Islam (Persis) organisations, identified with Indonesia’s Hadhrami Arab immigrant 
community. Modernist Islamic scholars in the Middle East influenced the groups’ 
interpretation of Islam. The groups were, Sidel notes, “more openly and stridently 
antagonistic towards the influence of Christianity in the archipelago, and towards the 
accretions of local customs, the worship of saints and shrines, and the mysticism of Sufis 
and Javanists alike”,17 compared with other modernist groups that formed soon after. 
In 1912, one such group, Muhammadiyah formed to represent another strand of 
modernism, one which acknowledged different ways of being Muslim. Muhammadiyah 
was established partly in reaction against traditionalists, “a strongly rooted Indonesian 
version of Islam”, which modernists eschewed opposing the fact that “adat or traditional 
custom has been cherished by Indonesian Muslims throughout history”.18 In turn, these 
traditionalists, the second major strand of Indonesian Islam, emerged in response to the 
modernists with the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: Renaissance of the Clerics) 
in 1926 to safeguard their practices, which included prayers for the dead, cult of saints 
and visits to sacred tombs.19 The traditionalist abangan (syncretic Muslims), many from 
Java, practised a more mystical mix of local and Islamic practices. Islam was not 
monolithic and these two visions marked a significant religious and political divide.20  
These Islamist groups – divided roughly into traditionalist, modernist and 
modernist/puritanical – opposed the creation of a secular state to varying degrees, seeing 
secularism as a threat to Islamic values.21 Mohammad Natsir – a Persis leader and early 
proponent of a democratic, Islamic state – was a leading voice within the puritanical 
strand. This strand was the strongest Islamic voice against secular-nationalists, while NU 																																																								
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support for an Islamic state was tempered by its pragmatism and never strongly 
entrenched, Munhanif argues.22 Muhammadiyah supported an Islamic state, but due to 
the preferences of its urban, educated membership, not as wholeheartedly as Persis.  
Despite the differences between these dominant strands, they were able to unite against 
those they completely disagreed with, such as the Ahmadiyah Muslim community. The 
marginalising of Ahmadis by Muhamadiyah, Persis and NU dates to soon after the sect’s 
arrival in Indonesia in the 1920s. NU issued the first fatwa on Ahmadiyah in Indonesia in 
1935 condemning them as aberrant, infidels and apostates.23 Ultimately all major Islamic 
bodies excluded Ahmadiyah, which Menchik argues helped unify the generally divided 
Muslim groups, “demonstrating the productive power of exclusion for generating 
solidarity in the emergent nation”.24 Menchik details how this unity ultimately led to a 
partnership of Muslim organisations, excluding Ahmadiyah, that came to constitute the 
Ministry of Religion upon the formation of the Indonesian state.25 Menchik’s idea of 
productive exclusion or intolerance reveals a political purpose behind overtly doctrinal 
disputes, a scapegoating of the religious Other that I will explore more in the following 
chapters.  
Muhammadiyah was the more active Islamic force in 1930s Java, focused mostly on 
reforming practices of santri (more observant, orthodox, pious) Muslims and less so with 
abangan, according to Ricklefs.26 Muhammadiyah was established partly in response to 
Protestant and Catholic missionary-led Christianisation, he writes. Any political action 
was severely limited, Ricklefs notes, by Dutch crackdowns after the communist uprising 
of the 1920s and the hardships of the Great Depression. 
Notwithstanding some exceptions as outlined, by the 1940s, in the face of colonialism, 
Indonesia had developed a plural and multiethnic nationalism. Many Muslims eschewed 
the goal of an Islamic state in favour of joining Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and secular 																																																								
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nationalists in search of a plural, democratic nation-state. The consequences of Japanese 
occupation included the establishment of Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, 
Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim), which fused traditionalist and modernists 
strands temporarily.27 After independence Masyumi became a political party.  
As the end of the war approached, some Muslim leaders, many of whom belonged to 
puritanical strands, saw in a post-colonial, independent state, “the answer to their 
prayers for a deeper Islamisation of state and society”.28 Islamic organisations fully 
supported the revolution. Islamists’ goal was an Islamic state. However, crumbling unity 
within Islam – splits between traditionalists and modernists, and within reformism 
between puritans and moderates – inhibited action to establish such an Islamic state in 
the face of opposition.  
For some Muslims, the cultural memory of conflict with the Dutch, colonialism and 
Christianity goes back centuries. These patterns echoed throughout the 20th century, 
even as the groups periodically changed positions towards secularism, nationalism, the 
state and other religions. Even 70 years or more ago, religious minorities such as 
Ahmadiyah and Christians were situated in a similar fashion to today in relation to 
Islamic groups, albeit in a different legal framework and with some differences in scale. 
Even in the 1930s, Christians were perceived within the puritanical worldview as an 
external threat, while Sunni Muslim orthodoxy dictated that Ahmadiyah resided 
spiritually in or near the realm of heresy, a threat from within. This is an important and 
long-standing distinction to bear in mind when considering contemporary religious 
persecution. Although actions against minorities were limited in the colonial era, they 
increased over the following decades as narratives that cast minorities as threats to Islam 
developed.  
Independence: the constitution, Pancasila and Sukarno 
From its birth as an independent nation in the 1940s, “Indonesia has been divided over 																																																								
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the question of the legal status of Islam in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious state”.29 
The founders of the Indonesian Republic created a state based on religious and moral 
principles through the ideology of Pancasila, five principles Sukarno argued reflected 
cultural and moral values shared by the diverse ethnic and religious communities across 
the archipelago.30 One of its principles, often translated “Belief in the Oneness of God”31 
(Ketuhanan yan Maha Esa), and referred to as “Belief in One God”, was a compromise 
born in controversy. The phrase was part of a deal that denied Islamists something akin 
to an Islamic state because the constitution’s preamble did not impose sharia law on 
Muslims.32  
At the birth of the nation in August 1945, Christians from the east of Indonesia 
threatened not to join the republic if sharia law was applied.33 Disputes over the removal 
from the draft constitution of the seven words in the Jakarta Charter that would have 
imposed sharia have re-emerged periodically since then.34 Dissatisfied supporters of an 
Islamic state rebelled against the Republican government. This led to the Darul Islam 
movement and its Islamic State of Indonesia, a Muslim militia that began in West Java 
and inspired rebellions elsewhere in Indonesia until its defeat forced it underground in 
1962.35 Darul Islam’s ideological descendants survive today as radical Islamists who 
maintain their grievance over the failure to achieve sharia law and an Islamic state.  
A different political response to not achieving Islamist goals of sharia law occurred with 
the foundation of the Masyumi party – out of a Japanese-created organisation – in 
November 1945. Initially Masyumi included NU as well as modernist/reformist and 
puritanical groups. The animosity between Masyumi and communists in the late 1940s 
revolutionary Indonesia peaked when PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist Party 
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of Indonesia) activists seized Madiun in 1948. PKI slaughtered Nationalist and Masyumi 
followers before the army crushed them with Sukarno’s approval.36 This critical incident 
highlighted the division between abangan and santri, or leftist versus Islamic. Ricklefs 
wrote that “for Traditionalists who relied on Qur’anic sources, the leftists of the emerging 
Indonesian scene represented not just a contending political ideology and competing 
faction, but people in rebellion against God who were destined for hell”.37 NU split from 
Masyumi in the early 1950s out of fear that modernist domination would threaten NU’s 
religious interests. Natsir remained, leading a Masyumi dominated by Muhammadiyah 
that was often compared to European social democratic parties and which supported a 
democratic Islamic state.38 Within the two main currents of Indonesian Islam, Nahdlatul 
Ulama’s party came to represent the traditionalists politically and Masyumi the 
reformists.39  
Aliran (streams) politics dominated independent Indonesia’s early years, with Ricklefs’ 
rough calculation that the Javanese population broke down into majority abangan and a 
sizeable minority of santri.40 Perhaps this was not obvious at the time, because before the 
nation’s first fully democratic election in 1955 (the last until 1999), the Islamic parties 
had been expected to gain a majority and fulfil their platforms by amending the 
constitution with the addition of the phrase “with the obligation for Muslims to carry out 
the sharia”.41 Liddle argues that the main reason Partai NU was campaigning for sharia 
was to avoid being outflanked by the larger and more assertive Masyumi. In the event, 
about 40 percent of the votes went to the two Islamist parties, Masyumi and Partai NU, 
while the majority of votes went to parties opposing sharia, including the nationalist PNI 
(22 percent) and the communist PKI (17 percent).42 The remaining very minor parties 
included the PSI (Socialist Party) and Partai Katolik, so even if the Islamic parties were 
united they could not reach a simple majority to introduce sharia, let alone the two-																																																								
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thirds majority required for constitutional change.43 A deadlock arose at the Constituent 
Assembly. Campaigning for the elections had hardened divisions between abangan and 
santri, Ricklefs writes, citing evidence from Geertz’s and others’ fieldwork.44 One cultural 
manifestation of this division was the increasingly hardened identification of santri 
women as wearing the kerudung (headscarf) and abangan women not wearing them. 
After the elections, the combined representations of PNI and PKI clearly blocked santri 
aspirations to introduce sharia, compounding the grievance established at independence.  
By the late 1950s, the Islamists were isolated, with opposition from Christians, Hindus, 
Buddhists, PKI, those of nominal faith or holding to traditional spiritual practices, secular 
nationalists, and most of the leadership of the military.45 Masyumi – having lost their 
push for Islamic law and the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter – became impotent 
members of a governing coalition dominated by PNI. Masyumi leaders felt unable to 
leave for fear of PKI taking their place, but they finally left in early 1957.46 Sukarno had 
never really supported democracy, Cribb says, preferring the ideal of a pre-colonial past 
and a consensus style that led him in this period to float his konsepsi (concept).47 
Masyumi believed this idea favoured PKI it led to increased turmoil and martial law 
around the country. This facilitated the introduction of Guided Democracy and the 
greater involvement of the military as a counter to an increasingly assertive and 
politically successful PKI. In 1959, “a coalition led by Sukarno and the leaders of the 
army overthrew the fledgling democracy, ushering in four decades of autocratic rule”.48 
Masyumi opposed Sukarno’s growing authoritarianism. After becoming involved in 
regional rebellions, it was banned in 1960. The ramifications of this banning are still felt 
today, Feillard and Madinier argue, contributing to the rise of radicalism over ensuing 
decades.49 Natsir was jailed soon after, and not released until 1966. In the early to mid 
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1960s, NU allied with the army against a resurgent PKI, as violence spread.50  
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the state’s role in religious affairs, interpretations of 
constitutional provisions on religious freedom and new laws on matters relating to 
religion had ensured religion remained a significant political issue. Highlights included: 
in 1950, constitutional revisions increasing state intervention in religious affairs; in 1951, 
compulsory religious study in state schools; and, in 1952, the establishment of a unit 
within the Ministry of Religion to combat new religious movements considered deviant. 
Hefner notes that these developments “consolidated and centralised the administration 
of religious affairs in Indonesia, thereby providing ‘a critical foothold pending the further 
Islamisation of Indonesia’”.51  
This apparent normalising of state intervention in religion affected the character of the 
nation. If the law is a “powerful discourse coupled with the physical means to impose 
compliance on others”, as Bourdieu writes, and an “instrument of normalisation”, then 
laws and regulations around religion are “the efforts of dominant or rising groups to 
impose an official representation of the social world which sustains their own world view 
and favours their interests, particularly in socially stressful or revolutionary situations”.52 
Introducing laws, in other words, is part of the process a group initiates to impose its 
worldview and accumulating power. In 1965, Islamic organisations helped create the 
intolerant law on prevention of abuse and defamation of religion (blasphemy law).53 The 
1965 blasphemy laws originally targeted mystical Javanese sects, but they have come to 
be used against groups such as Christians, Ahmadiyah and Shia. Menchik notes that 
Sukarno’s 1965 blasphemy law, supported by those Islamic groups that had not been 
sidelined, including NU and Muhammadiyah:  
formalised the orthodox definition of religion that the Islamic organisations had long 
sought… By demarcating the boundaries of tolerance, Sukarno brought together and 
placed himself at the head of a coalition of organisations… Sukarno strengthened the 																																																								
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framework for godly nationalism put into place by the Muslim organisations [in previous 
decades].54  
Sukarno was attempting to leverage opposition to these non-orthodox religious 
movements to shore up his political power (productive exclusion), legitimising such 
methods. Prosecutions for both blasphemy and heresy resulted, but the full ramifications 
would take decades to emerge. While fewer than 10 cases were prosecuted during the 
New Order (1966-1998), between 1998 and 2011, 47 cases led to 120 people being 
convicted, with sentences of up to five years.55 
The period after independence was difficult for Indonesia, with political division amid 
violent conflict at home and abroad and an underdeveloped economy. By the mid-1960s 
the economic deterioration had created rampant inflation and 1 million people in Java 
and 18,000 in Bali starving.56 Sukarno’s economic policies “had the country in ruins by 
the mid 1960s, with accelerating inflation, crumbling infrastructure and an agricultural 
sector whose production fell increasingly short of the country’s needs”.57 Such an 
environment compounded the political pressure on Sukarno, increasing the temptation 
on him to deploy productive exclusion and isolate religious minorities. The post-
independence era under Sukarno was marked by religious conflict and frustrated 
aspirations among Islamists, whose ultimate ambition, sharia law and some form of 
Islamic state, was prevented by political forces including the nationalists, the 
communists, the military and Christians. The failure of the Old Order to address 
fundamental issues and more effectively govern ethnic, religious and regional conflicts 
created space for a new authoritarian solution, albeit one that inherited the grievances 
generated by its predecessor.  
New Order: coercion, regulation and Suharto 
During the transition to the New Order in the mid 1960s, mainstream Islamic 																																																								
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organisations allied with the regime and co-operated in the massacre of hundreds of 
thousands of the supposedly atheistic, internationalist communists.58 This tragic 
culmination of santri-abangan division occurred, Ricklefs writes, amid:  
Mutual suspicions and stereotyping across hardening aliran boundaries, bitter political 
party animosities with aliran roots, politicized tensions over folk rituals and arts, the part-
class and part-aliran conflict in the countryside of Java that had already turned violent – 
all of this now gave birth to the worst domestic bloodletting in the history of Indonesia.59 
I note Ricklefs’ use of the word stereotyping. Intergroup emotions theory holds that an 
individual integrates the group into the self via a depersonalisation process and sees the 
world from the group’s perspective, reacting emotionally to events on behalf of the 
group, whether or not he or she is personally threatened.60 The depersonalisation process 
results in a person seeing themselves and others in terms of shared stereotypes of the 
groups they belong to, with ingroup members evaluated more positively than outgroup 
members.61 Thus phenomena such as ethnocentrism occur, which is “a belief that ‘we’ 
are better than ‘them’ in every possible way… self, as social identity, is defined and 
evaluated in group terms, and therefore the status, prestige, and social valiance of the 
group attaches to oneself.”62 Such “we are better than them” behaviour is central to 
tribalism. Similarly, Ricklefs’ reference to hardening aliran boundaries suggests that a 
greater degree of identification took place within these groups. The strength of 
identification affects the extent to which people appraise their social situation according 
to the salient social categorisation.63 The more identified a person is with the group, the 
more positively they feel about the group, and the more negative they feel about 
outgroups, according to intergroup emotions theory.64 Greater identification increases a 																																																								
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tendency towards conflict with outgroups, with highly identified group members “more 
likely to justify ingroup actions, feel inter-group satisfaction, and thus support further 
aggression”.65 Indonesians were under stress and identifying strongly with their aliran 
(streams) in a manner that fuelled aggression and conflict. Sukarno was warning of such 
trends from late 1956, although he was referring to political parties, as part of his 
konsepsi promoting musyawarah (discussion) and mufakat (consensus). These ideas led 
to others, such as the ideology soup of NASAKOM (nationalism, religion [agama] and 
communism), which did not solve the problem.66  
Despite the assistance of organised Islam in the slaughter, Suharto’s military-dominated 
New Order government began to restrict political parties, including Islamic. Natsir and 
other Masyumi leaders were released from prison full of hope that the diminution of its 
communist and nationalist rivals would provide fresh political opportunities for Islam. 
The New Order would not allow them to re-establish their party, in the end, because it 
wanted neither strong opponents nor forces pushing for an Islamic state.67 While the 
formal influence of Islamic groups declined in the early New Order, with Masyumi 
banned and NU sidelined, the demographic imprint of Islam also suffered a setback. As a 
result of the massacres of communists and others, in the late 1960s and early 1970s up 
to 2 million Indonesians, mostly in Java, converted to Christianity, not least because 
Islam had been seen as a partner in their persecution.68 Some former communists and 
some Javanese abangan Muslims adopted Christianity, to the dismay of conservative 
Muslims. However, over the following decades, most nominal Muslims shifted towards a 
more orthodox and pious version of Islam.69 The manner of this shift and its long-term 
implication for religious minorities and tolerance is the subject of this section.  
By 1967, religious tensions between Christians and Muslims began to mount. An 
incident in Aceh that year in which a majority Muslim community objected to a new 
church, the Meulaboh case, gained national attention. This type of objection was to echo 																																																								
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through the generations. Muslims saw Christianisation as a threat especially in the 
context of more proselytising from missionary activities sponsored by international funds, 
for example donations from Christians in the US.70 Mujiburrahman’s extensive study of 
Muslim-Christian relations details speeches to Parliament in 1967 by prominent 
Muhammadiyan Lukman Harun complaining that Christians used foreign aid for 
religious expansion (making Muslims apostates).71 They allegedly used unacceptable 
methods such as door-to-door proselytising and material assistance including food and 
medicine for poor Muslims. Also in 1967, attacks extensively damaged more than a 
dozen Christian buildings in Makassar. Natsir called the attacks excessive but also a 
response to “Muslim disappointment at the Christians’ aggressive missionary activities”.72  
This veiled sympathy towards illegal acts in the name of a grievance foreshadowed 
positions that would harden during the following years. The Muslims who objected to 
Christianisation and proselytising argued that as members of a recognised religion the 
government should protect them from foreign-backed attempts to convert them. They 
said Christian evangelising should only be allowed towards those without religion or a 
recognised religion. Natsir evoked the annihilation of Islam in Spain as a warning to 
Indonesian Muslims not to be complacent.73 That year the Arab-Israeli war ended and 
the US became identified with “the humiliating occupation of Muslim lands” and “an 
uncompromising commitment to Israeli military superiority”.74 Important themes of 
threat, aggression, foreign backing and trickery were established in 1967, another step 
away from mutual understanding between religions.  
In the late 1960s, Christians felt threatened in turn by the push to reinstate the Jakarta 
Charter, fearing it would lead to their becoming second-class citizens.75 The push failed. 
Christian leaders countered the proselytisation and Christianisation arguments by 
drawing on discourses of freedom, for which they had Western support, was well as 																																																								
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nationalism and Pancasila, for which they had support from the army and the New 
Order regime. Some alignment between the regime and Christians, particularly 
Catholics, became the cause of another grievance that some Muslim leaders and activists 
held against Christians. Christians, arguing for their right to proselytise to anyone, 
admitted their gospel required this of them, which seemed to confirm to Muslims that 
Christians wanted to evangelise.76  
The New Order government’s response was not conclusively on either side of this 
religious power struggle in 1967, but the government did reiterate the principle of 
religious freedom. It also warned Christians to consider Muslim feelings. In 1969, the 
government issued the houses of worship decree. Arifianto argues the law was the New 
Order’s attempt to appease conservative Muslims’ disquiet at the alleged 
Christianisation.77 Regional governments gained the power to regulate new places of 
worship. The law was part of the New Order’s system of control, according to Crouch.78 
The law made it more difficult to establish a place of worship, except for members of the 
majority religion in a region. The resulting restrictions fell mainly on Christians, the 
largest minority in most regions except the less populated east of Indonesia.  
The law did not promote harmony, instead furthering division and violence against 
minorities, especially Christians.79 Facing difficulties obtaining permits to build new 
churches, Christians sometimes resorted to worshipping at home. Such tactics were not 
always successful, as nearby Muslims could and sometimes did object.80 Eventually the 
New Order acted on the proselytisation complaint. In 1978, the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs issued decrees against proselytising towards those in recognised religions and 
restricted foreign missionary activities, in practice mainly targeting Christian 
missionaries. Conservative Muslims supported the regulations on the basis they would 
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protect Muslims from Christiansiation efforts directed towards them.81 
In the Suharto era, most actors in Islamic politics pursued goals other than an Islamic 
state.82 The regime’s focus was elsewhere, imposing a nationalistic, pro-development 
agenda, rooted in its interpretation of Pancasila, with economic and political stabilisation 
its top priority. One manifestation of this was the regime’s ban on the topics of tribe, 
religion, race and ethnic differences (SARA: suku agama ras antargolongan) from media, 
political and social discourse.83 The New Order saw such forms of division and disunity 
(tribalism) as a threat to the nation’s unity, and thus the nation. Its repressive solution 
typified the regime, but it was successful. Anecdotal evidence confirms this, with several 
of my research sources saying they felt freer to practise their religion in the Suharto era 
compared with 2014.84 Suharto manipulated divisions in Indonesia for his own political 
gain, as noted below, but the regime did not want anyone else to do the same.  
With hugely restricted political space and representation, the Muslim community split 
into two camps, Hefner says.85 One group was alienated from the idea of party politics 
because of the social division it had caused. The other group still wanted to capture the 
state, but focused on dakwah (preaching/Islamic appeal) and a long-term view. The first 
strand of this split has been labelled neo-modernism – with its most influential Islamic 
proponents being Djohan Effendi, Nurcholish Madjid, Ahmad Wahib and Abdurrahman 
Wahid – and it helped reshape thinking among intellectuals and many in the public in 
the direction of pluralism and core democratic values.86 These thinkers concentrated on 
contextualised ijtihad (personal interpretation of the scriptures) and combined classical 
Islamic scholarship with Western-style rationalism. Wahid exemplified this trend, Barton 
wrote in 1993, because he represented “in his person the resolution of half a century of 
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antagonism between modernists and traditionalists in Indonesia”.87 This tolerant strand 
drew on the scriptures to establish the right of all faiths and beliefs to exist and argued 
Muslims should not strive for an Islamic state. Barton records one of Effendi’s sentiments 
that “ijtihad must be an ongoing process because absolute knowledge of truth can never 
be achieved”.88 Madjid’s place within this strand was as a leader of the Muslim students 
association HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam: Islamic Students Assocation), which 
developed a slogan “Islam yes, Islamic party, no!”89 It promoted religious tolerance and 
an inclusive approach towards Christianity. The pembaharuan (renewal) movement’s 
embrace of an Indonesian Islam made it easier for them not to be in direct conflict with 
the New Order and through the 1970s and 80s the group became established within 
professional, bureaucratic and commercial elites. 
The other strand was mainly former Masyumi politicians with new strategies and a new 
organization, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia: Indonesian Islamic Preaching 
Council). It became a voice of dissent and a leading proponent of conservative and 
fundamentalist understandings of Islam, rejecting many pembaharuan ideas, for 
example.90 It accepted Saudi and other overseas funding towards its efforts to encourage 
religious schooling and proselytisation.91 Saudi money channeled through Rabitat al-
Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League) supported preacher training, mosque building, 
translations of Wahhabi works and was influential among state university students.92 
DDII became “the vector of a Wahhabi-inspired rigorism… [and] increasingly suffered 
from a siege mentality”.93 While al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb were among DDII’s 
intellectual influences, a non-revolutionary version of Muslim Brotherhood materials 
held more sway from the 1980s.94 The West became a threat, having previously been 
seen as an ally by Masyumi, amid what van Bruinessen described as “an almost paranoid 																																																								
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obsession with Christian missionary efforts as a threat to Islam”.95 So too were Jews, 
while DDII’s Saudi and Kuwaiti patrons encouraged the sense of threat to Islam from 
within, such as Shiism and Islamic liberalism.  
The Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) gained national prominence – soon after being 
established in the 1970s as the New Order’s representative within the Muslim 
community – by making generally conservative fatwas, “condemning inter-religious 
marriage in 1980 and banning Muslims from wishing Christians a merry Christmas the 
following year”.96 In 1980, it issued a fatwa regarding the Ahmadiyah group.97 There is a 
trend of escalation here, from a general anti-Christian stance within puritanical strands in 
the 1930s, through to stronger, specific complaints against proselytising and foreign-
backed missionary activity. This developed into Othering (viewing or treating other 
people or groups of people as intrinsically different from and alien to the self) within 
increasingly elaborate narratives and more tightly grasped grievances.  
Over the decades, anti-Christian and anti-Christianisation discourses within conservative 
and radical Islamic communication led to the spread of those ideas. Researchers such as 
Feillard and Madinier blame Islamists for escalating tensions with religious minorities, 
noting that bitterness was a factor in radicalisation.98 The radical Islamic media has been 
blamed for increasing the sense that new places of Christian worship were centres of 
proselytising, with DDII publications in particular repeating the theme that the Muslim 
community was victimised “in the hands of a New Order regime colluding with the 
Christian minority”.99 Such narratives of threat drew on aspects of reality, such as 
Christian overrepresentation compared with the population in appointments by the early 
New Order.100 Chinese Indonesians were associated with cronyism and the overriding of 
local concerns about development, and with the growth of churches in Muslim-majority 
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areas.101 Meanwhile, the authorities fed clandestine Islamist radicalization, playing up its 
threat in the 1970s and 1980s, and curbing its political space.102 The narratives of threat 
were spreading.  
The rise of discourses of threat from organisations such as DDII was but one of many 
ways in which Indonesia changed through the New Order period. The large mainstream 
Muslim organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama were still the driving forces 
in Islam, Hefner argues, with their leaders supporting the integration of Islam and 
democracy as they carved out a corner of the opposition to Suharto for themselves.103 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, NU had seemed more conservative than most other 
sections of the Islamic community. By the 1980s and 1990s they appeared “perhaps 
more open to pluralism, inter-religious tolerance and secular conceptions of democracy 
than reformist Islam”.104 Wahid played a significant role in that change, and his insights 
into the New Order period are worth reviewing.  
In 1994, looking back at nearly 30 years of the New Order, Wahid described a process 
of de-confessionalisation under which Islam and other ideologies were reduced to 
political orientations, culminating in laws in the mid-1980s requiring all political and 
social organisations to base themselves upon the Pancasila ideology.105 Wahid 
characterised the Islamist position as: 
the argument that Islam never recognises a total separation between religion and politics, 
and that the state should reflect in itself the norms of the majority… the nominal demand 
of those ‘legal-formalists’ among Muslim political activists has not changed during all 
those years; it merely submerges when the time is not appropriate for the making of such 
a demand”.106  
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Wahid said minorities were marginalised in the process and he noted the political 
patience and opportunism of the Islamists. He described an alternative – the moral, 
educational and persuasive approach – which would maintain political participation for 
goals consistent with Islam, and a third option that went further by working to enhance 
social institutions such that they reflect Islamic concerns for liberty, social justice and the 
rule of law. Ultimately, his goal to help democratise Indonesia was envisaged within “the 
framework of achieving a national identity shared by all Indonesians in the future”.107 
Islam surged in the late 1970s and 1980s, with mosque building, Friday worship, 
religious education and haj pilgrimages increasing, many more Muslim women wore 
head coverings (hijabs) and Islamic programming saturated radio and television.108 The 
opening up of Indonesia to the world, to globalisation and to itself (through movement 
around the country, including urbanisation), both accelerated secularisation and 
strengthened scripturalist Islam, and contributed to the decline of the abangan, van 
Bruinessen suggests.109 Abangan village life was de-institutionalised (PKI destroyed, PNI 
marginalised) while santri organisations flourished: 
Mosques and prayer-houses, pesantrens and madrasahs, universities, clinics and 
hospitals, orphanages, books, magazines, sermons, Muhammadiyah, NU, DDII, 
Persatuan Islam… government programs promoting Islam – all these institutionally 
strengthened the santri side of Javanese life. There were no abangan equivalents of any of 
them of any consequence. Pious Islam was associated with progress, modernity and 
development. Abangan were regarded as backward, ignorant peasants.110  
The piety can be seen in some ways as a reaction to a “pernicious subversion of public 
morality” that was blamed on the influence of American culture, which was becoming 
seen as representing “sexual hedonism and do-your-own-thing individualism”.111 In 
addition to the pembaharuan movement and groups such as DDII, Hefner identifies a 
number of others, such as the Salman movement and pop revivalists, remarking that 																																																								
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“public Islam was one of the last remaining discourses of social resistance”.112 This is 
consistent with Ricklefs’ point that after the headscarf ban was lifted in 1991, it become 
a sign of protest against the regime, as well as of Islamic identity and piety.113 Despite the 
greater piety, a consequent rise in electoral support for an Islamic state did not occur, as 
evidenced by election results in the democratic era.114 Nevertheless, the piety was one 
sign that Islamisation was widespread, including in the villages, and it became known as 
santrinisasi (santrinisation). 
In the early 1990s, after a decline in its support among sections of the military, the 
Suharto regime began courting support from organised Islam via ICMI (the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). The organisation drew in reformists, including 
Islamists, fundamentalists, Muslim bureaucrats and liberal neo-modernists among its 
members.115 Some of these told Ramage they hoped “to take advantage of Suharto’s 
perceived need for them to advance their own political interests, particularly to promote 
their conceptions of an Islamic society”.116 ICMI strengthened the radical Islamists’ 
position, van Bruinessen argues.117 The flagging New Order regime began to use 
minorities in a strategic process of divide and rule, despite these groups having been 
allies and contributing to development under the New Order.118 As Hefner notes, they 
used:  
stridently anti-Christian and anti-Chinese appeals in an effort to divide the opposition 
along ethnic and religious lines. Responding to these overtures, a few Muslim 
ultraconservatives moved out of the opposition into alliance with the regime. They 
collaborated in the campaigns of intimidation and terror that marked Soeharto’s final 
years.119 																																																								
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The DDII was prominent among the more hard line Islamic groups that shifted from 
regime critic to supporter, blaming “Chinese Indonesians for the Asian financial crisis 
and Christians for the anti-Suharto democracy movement”.120  
The New Order period is contradictory in some senses, because of the way that Islam 
flourished into an ever-more complex and nuanced diversity while at the same time 
mostly being marginalised from the formal corridors of power. While Pancasila became 
increasingly dominant, and religious politics and conflict was mostly suppressed, 
Muslims got on with exploring what it meant to be Muslim. Innovative ideas from the 
neo-modernists emerged seemingly fusing Islamic and Indonesian identities.  
The more puritanically inclined DDII, on the other hand, took a tribal path to an 
increasingly Islamic identity, complete with transnational Islamic influences and 
increasingly ingroup-centric worldviews. With the arrival of democracy at the end of the 
century, the stage was set for the Islamists to re-emerge, as Wahid would have it, into a 
freedom that allowed them more voice, but was correspondingly increasingly crowded 
with a multitude of other voices competing to be heard. No longer was Indonesia a 
nation whose Islamic community could be divided simply into abangan, santri and 
priyayi. Identities were complex and even uncertain for some, and yet a fundamentalist 
strand offered certainty and strong identities to its followers. This Islamist identity was 
increasingly a key source of religious division, with Islamists still hoping the state would 
help them enforce a more puritanical version of Islam.  
In the 60 years from the late 1930s to the late 1990s, Indonesia changed and progressed 
to an astonishing degree. Forging an independent nation with a political compromise 
over an Islamic state and the Jakarta Charter was only the beginning. Religious divides 
reverberated through the 1940s and 1950s, but at the time the main Islamist groups, 
Masyumi (democratic) and NU (pragmatic), were not emphasising identities in 
opposition to other religions so much as towards the (atheistic) communists and the 
(Islamic state denying) nationalists. But from the late 1960s onwards, with the 
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communists gone, the PNI nationalists marginalised and the nationalist military in 
charge, the resentments of the politically marginalised former Masyumi elite intensified 
to encompass not just the New Order but also their alleged fellow travellers, Christians 
and Chinese Indonesians. A hardening of their tribal identity over time only increased 
the number of their enemies (Jews, Shiites, the West), while other groups entrenched 
their Indonesian Islamic identity in the other direction, inclusiveness and democracy.  
Sidel refers to the tendency of identities to contain a sense of a theft “that can be imputed 
to an Other who deprives ‘us’ of the full enjoyment of those material, discursive and 
social practices, which, we imagine, (would) allow ‘us’ to be fully ‘ourselves’.”121 Within 
the DDII discourse, the theft is of the opportunity to create the Islamic state, and the 
actors who denied them that destiny change over time, as described above. One of the 
problems for Islamists living within a secular nationalist Indonesia without sharia law – 
although there is perda syariah in many areas now – is that: “Political Islam [Islamism] 
seeks to create a single Islamic identity that takes precedence, at least in one’s moral life, 
over even the national identity.”122 With a single Islamic identity, compromise is not an 
option. There is one political goal, sharia. Muslims who do not agree are misguided, and 
non-Muslims who do not agree do not matter, because they have their designated place 
within an Islamic order. Dividing the world into Islamic, or Western or Hindu parts, that 
is, religious categories, is ultimately unsuccessful because other distinctions – such as 
class, language or nationality – cannot be obliterated, as Sen argues.123 However much 
the “champions of Islamic fundamentalism would like to suppress all other identities of 
Muslims in favour of being only Islamic”, it cannot be done .124 People have multiple 
identities. Defining and limiting an identity is an attempt to control people. Islamists do 
not see the world in relative terms, or value pluralism, as Burhani writes of the 
Indonesian context: “For the conservatives, the belief that all religions are equally valid 
violates the belief that Islam is the only true religion, whereas liberalism conflicts with 																																																								
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the basic tenet of Islam that all Muslims must submit totally to God.”125 It is this righteous 
sense of Islam’s superiority and the proposition that submitting to God equates with 
submitting to an Islamic state that suggests to me that Islamism is the right place to look 
for further understanding of religious persecution in Indonesia. I will do so in the next 
chapter, aware that activists’ are only effective given the right context. That is, the 
preferences of the Muslim population are critical to determining how Islamic politics 
plays out. 
Conclusion 
In the 1930s, the Indonesian Muslim community could be roughly divided into 
traditionalist, modernist and puritanical strands. By the 1950s, NU and Masyumi were 
the dominant political players. By the 1970s, New Order politics forced former Masyumi 
politicians to come up with alternative tactics such as creating DDII, while NU 
undertook a rethink which led them away from the idea of an Islamic state. By the 
1990s, NU and Muhammadiyah had assumed an oppositional but non-Islamist position, 
while Islamists made a Machiavellian pact with Suharto and his regimist Muslim allies. 
The dawning of democracy gave hope to those who still harboured ambitions for an 
Islamic state in Indonesia or sharia law, because Islamic forces were freed from New 
Order restrictions. Elections offered the prospect of popular support. Overall, the seven 
decades just described represented a period in which religious tensions built gradually 
from the first fatwas against Ahmadiyah and the colonial-era puritanical disinclination 
towards Christians, through the anti-blasphemy and houses of worship laws and on to 
increasingly explicit rejection of heterodoxy and difference, complete with anti-Christian 
and anti-heretical discourses. 
Holding those impulses at bay at the end of the 20th century was Indonesia’s “proud 
tradition of Muslim civil associations, most of which have long been committed to 
constitutionalism and democracy… Indonesia’s most distinctive political legacy by 																																																								
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comparison with other Muslim societies”.126 In a summary of the great achievements of 
Indonesian independence and development, Hefner argues that:  
While affirming the legitimacy of religion in public life, civil Islam rejects the mirage of 
the ‘Islamic’ state, recognising that this formula for fusing religious and state authority 
ignores the lessons of Muslim history itself. Worse yet, without checks and balances in 
state and society, the ‘Islamic’ state subordinates Muslim ideals to the dark intrigues of 
party bosses and religious thugs.127 
In other words, Indonesia has created a political system that acknowledges the perils of 
theocracy as well as the benefits of religious insights and morality to better manage 
public affairs. In doing so, Indonesia has created checks and balances including 
democracy, Pancasila and its constitution. However, systems cannot obliterate the 
experiences of groups and the grievances they develop over threats, missed opportunities 
and unfairness. Significant risk factors remain, including the possibility that 
fundamentalists can activate group feelings among the majority that can push religious 
issues towards crisis.  
In ensuing chapters, I will explore the questions: to what extent has Islamisation 
provided more fertile ground for Islamists to generate their versions of Islamic identity for 
political purposes, and what role does morality play?  
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Chapter 4: ISLAMISTS: THREATS, IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES, AGENDAS 
In chapter 3, I outlined the historical forces that helped shape relations between religious 
groups through the 20th century. This chapter begins by looking at the period when 
Indonesia transitioned to democracy. In 1999, elections allowed the population to freely 
express their political preferences for the first time in 44 years. I will focus on the 
question of how Islamists’ moral motivations and ideological narratives contributed to 
the significant spike in intolerance in post-Suharto Indonesia.  
Democracy’s political opportunities changed the ways groups interacted. A series of 
major conflicts characterised the late Suharto and early democratic periods. The US 
scholar of Southeast Asia, Islam and politics John Sidel, divides political/religious 
violence during into periods – riots of 1995-98, pogroms of 1999-2001, and jihad 
terrorism of 2000-05.1 Sidel concludes in a related work that extremist Muslims, or 
fundamentalist Islam, are not to blame, but rather: “Both the structures and the agency of 
forces associated with Christianity, secularism and ecumenism have been in 
considerable measure responsible for the broad pattern of religious violence in 
Indonesia, as well as many specific episodes of violence.”2 
Religious violence in eastern Indonesia from the late 1990s was about Christians trying 
to win back the power and influence they had lost in the late Suharto era, when the 
ageing president began to court Islam more deliberately. But to protect their power 
bases, Muslim politicians in eastern Indonesia facilitated the entry of radical Muslim 
groups entry into the region – with their Wahhabi and Salafi influences from the Middle 
East. The resulting violence, particularly in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, played out 
over several years until 2001.3 These events are the backdrop to this thesis. Here, I am 
focusing on acts of intolerance after these three periods, which included sporadic 
violence not mass violence. 
Political changes are often cited as the causes of the rise in religious persecution during 																																																								
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the Yudhoyono years. These range from increased freedom of expression, 
decentralisation of political authority through to assertive Christian proselytising, Islamist 
vigilante groups, new regulations on religion and Indonesia’s status as a religious, 
although not Islamic, state.4 Some sources highlight the actions of radical Islamists and 
conservative Islamic organisations, which share the goal of achieving sharia.5 In 2002, 
the Islamists lobbied for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution, but once 
again the proposal to introduce sharia law for all Muslims collapsed.6 I will map the 
landscape of Islamism and conservative Islam during this period, identify some threats 
and present a model for understanding the role of morality in the rise of religious 
persecution.  
Defining the orthodoxy 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI: Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars) has become a 
fundamental force in informal politics in the 21st century. MUI was largely a servant of 
the government under President Suharto but redefined itself as a servant of the ummah 
(Muslim community) in the democratic period.7 Since the early 2000s, MUI has pursued 
a strategy of defining and purifying Islam and Islamic identity, restricting opponents and 
promoting sharia. MUI leaders drove two initiatives; firstly, extending its support base by 
reaching out to centrist and conservative scholars in the major Muslim organisations, 
including NU and Muhammadiyah; secondly, removing moderates from its executive 
board, replacing them with more conservative scholars.8  
Meanwhile, in 2004, the mass-based Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and NU 
purged liberals, ushering in what has been called “a conservative turn in mainstream 																																																								
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Islam”, one symptom of which was a focus on confronting deviant groups and their 
ideas.9 Alongside the shift towards conservatism within NU and Muhammadiyah, 
transnational movements arose to compete with them. These included the political party 
PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Welfare Party), with its Muslim Brotherhood 
connections and influences, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the local branch of a global 
caliphate movement, and some less political Salafi movements.10 These transnational, 
conservative and fundamentalist groups exerted influence through dominating MUI, 
creating what Hefner called an “ideologically hardened MUI executive”, the most 
influential component of which was associated with DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia: Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council).11 At the national congress of MUI in 
July 2005, the council promoted a conservative orthodoxy, issuing fatwas against a range 
of activities, groups and practices including:  
inter-faith prayer, inter-faith marriage, and inter-faith inheritance; religious pluralism, 
liberalism and secularism; so-called deviant beliefs, including the Ahmadiyah sect; 
dealings with the spirit world (kahanah) and fortune-telling (irafah); and any form of 
conversion of Muslims away from conservative orthodoxy (pemurtadan, “apostasy”).12 
These fatwas had an enormous impact, laying a foundation for years of political actions. 
I have identified three main underlying threats the fatwas address: the threat of freedom, 
the threat of apostasy and the threat of deviancy. Beneath each conceptual threat lies an 
existential threat to Islam. Each perceived threat provoked a response from organised 
Islam.  
Threat of freedom 
The 2005 MUI fatwa that targeted secularism, pluralism and liberalism was dubbed 
SiPiLis (an acronym for secularism, pluralism and liberalism which is also the Indonesian 
word for syphilis). It targeted ‘contaminating’ Western thought. The opposition to these 
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belief systems is widespread among conservatives. Din Syamsuddin, who has been 
secretary-general of MUI and president of Muhammadiyah, was known “as a 
mastermind of anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, anti-secular Muslim and anti-democratic 
discourse and actions in Indonesia”,13 although his positions changed from time to time. 
Vickers writes that paranoid anti-Semitic, anti-Western conspiracies “had long been fed 
by the underground publication in Indonesian of works such as the fraudulent Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion”, which were published openly in democratic times.14 Islamists 
argued particularly strongly against pluralism, secularism and liberalism. A senior 
member of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) explained how democracy is un-Islamic: 
“Because democracy is based on freedom… the government and the parliament are 
always being taken hostage by certain groups. So, for example, alcoholic drinks, for 
Muslims it’s forbidden. But because Indonesia adopted a democratic system, there is a 
compromise.”15 That is, if Indonesia was truly Islamic such compromises would not 
occur and alcohol would not be readily available in Indonesia because it is a Muslim-
majority country. HTI argues the US has created or fuelled conflicts and wars since 1945 
in order to “control the world… maintain its hegemony and defend its economic 
interests… [which] shows how ugly the face of capitalist ideology is as practised by the 
US through its vulgar imperialism”.16 The values and system of the West, which arrives 
with the abusive and corrupt power of capitalism, is a godless ideology, with Jewish and 
Christian antecedents. Democracy, as a system born outside God’s law and in the West, 
places God below man in the power balance. This offends the dignity and authority of 
God, a threat to sanctity, authority and the natural order. This is an existential struggle, 
an idea that Islam is threatened with obliteration by the massive power of the West. 
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Threat of apostasy 
Of the four great forces of recent Indonesian history (colonialism, Islam, communism and 
nationalism), Islam and nationalism remain strong. However, Christianity is colonialism’s 
ghostly echo. The commonalities between Islam and Christianity partly explains the 
tensions between the religions, as does their thousand year-old history of rivalry, van 
Bruinessen notes.17 The historical context and discourses developed over time mean that 
Islamists often conflate Western civilisation with Christianity.18 In such an equation, 
Islam is not an overwhelmingly powerful majority within Indonesia but an embattled 
subject of Western Christian attack at home and abroad. Kato argues that fundamentalists 
perceive this “attack” as multi-faceted, including ideological elements such as 
materialism that fundamentalists frame as a neo-jahiliayah (time of darkness before Islam) 
and oppose with revivalism.19 
An International Crisis Group report suggests that as mass violence between Muslims and 
Christians receded around the archipelago in the early 2000s, the threat of 
Christianisation was used to rally people to the Islamist cause.20 New Order censorship 
had helped contain anti-Christian rhetoric until the 1990s, when radical Islamic media 
emerged and fanned the flames of inter-religious conflict, building from the mid-1990s. 
Feillard and Madinier analyse anti-Christian and anti-Christianisation discourses in 
radical Islamic media and the manner in which they promoted the sense that new places 
of Christian worship were also centres of proselytising.21 Christian missionaries were 
blamed for sinister acts, as opposed to previous decades when they were accused merely 
of unfair competition – using their economic advantage to spread religion and attract 
converts. “Sabili, for example, dedicated a dossier in 1999 to an alleged vast plan to 
have young Christian men seduce Muslim girls for the sole purpose of bearing Christian 
children.”22 This story is a narrative of threat. Firstly, the alleged seduction by Christian 																																																								
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men is harmful to the girls who are used duplicitously. Secondly, the alleged activity 
threatens Islam demographically. Islamists’ grievance and martyr discourse of the 20th 
century (as discussed in chapter 3) hardened amid the media freedom of post-Suharto 
21st century. Islamists had free rein to create stories that belittled Christians and 
Christianity, who were perceived as a fast-growing existential threat to Islam’s 
demographic dominance.  
This agenda crystallised with the 2005 MUI fatwas. Ichwan notes that MUI’s apostasy 
fatwas were aimed at Christianisation, one of DDII’s main concerns.23 The anti-
proselytisation agenda had found expression via an institution, MUI, which possessed 
more political power than radical Islamist groups. With the support of the fatwas, in 
August 2005, radical Islamist groups began attacking allegedly illegal churches in Jakarta 
and West Java as part of a campaign to force the government to regulate churches more 
tightly.24 In 2006, an MUI sub-committee against apostasy began co-operating in actions 
with radical Islamist groups opposing the building of new churches and against 
missionary activity. A joint ministerial regulation on houses of worship was pronounced 
in March 2006. MUI had proven its value as the intellectual spearhead behind which an 
alliance of Islamists and conservatives could act.  
Threat of deviancy  
The 2005 MUI conference also issued a fatwa on deviancy, which declared Ahmadiyah 
to be outside Islam. Part of the reasoning was expressed by a leading anti-Ahmadiyah 
activist, Amin Djamaluddin, who highlighted the group’s growth in the late 20th century 
as well as its apparent dream of dominating Islam in Indonesia by the end of the 21st 
century.25 Prominent Muslims, such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Hasyim Muzadi, call 
for Ahmadiyah to split from Islam and establish a separate religion rather than, as 
Burhani puts it, “linger threateningly on the fringes of the mainstream Muslim 																																																								
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community”.26 In this idea lies the sense that Ahmadiyah are illegitimate as Muslims, and 
hence not protected by Indonesian principles of religious freedom. The community is 
marginalised and vulnerable, trapped between Muslim and non-Muslim identity within 
the discourse. Minority sects accused of heresy, one Salafi cleric said, are “thorns in our 
flesh... far more dangerous than the infıdels” because they “weaken Islam from within”.27 
To challenge that status is to risk being identified as defending heretics. Zito suggests the 
heretic presents a moral threat to orthodoxy: “The true believers sense that in some way 
their innermost selves have been violated, their moral values usurped, their very 
existence as a moral community placed in jeopardy.”28 Whoever defines the orthodoxy 
also defines heresy, both of which form part of the process of accumulating power.  
Purity, impurity and purification  
Purity plays an important role in the Islamists’ response to a range of threats to Islam. 
Islamists use language to elicit disgust, an emotional reaction to the threat of 
contamination. Burhani notes that conservative’s Othering of opponents attempt to 
manipulate feelings of disgust, with liberals labelled as a virus or poison that would 
destroy Islam.29 In the public discussion after the SiPiLis fatwa, DDII leader Cholil 
Ridwan said the edicts should be spread during Friday prayers. “We have to vaccinate 
our congregation to prevent them from this SiPiLis virus.”30 Similarly, the leader of FPI 
(Front Pembela Islam: Islamic Defenders’ Front), Habib Rizieq, used images of impurity 
when he said democracy was “more dangerous than pig’s meat… if we consume pig we 
are polluted, but can still be returned to a state of purity if we cleanse ourselves”, but “if 
democracy is fully embraced by Muslims, and the laws of Allah in turn ignored, then 
they become apostates (murtad). Democracy can transform us into infidels.”31 Terms of 
abuse with disease motifs used against Ahmadiyah include ‘abscess’ (bisul) used by 																																																								
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radical Islamists in Indonesia, and in Pakistan ‘cancer’.32 These are direct calls to register 
disgust, part of an appeal for purity.  
Fealy has said Indonesians are “pre-occupied with the religious purity of their 
environment… the sanctity of their environment”.33 Within moral foundations theory, 
impurity is a threat identified within the purity/sanctity foundation, the function of which 
is to encourage purity and reject impurity. In an evolutionary explanation, the 
foundation’s function includes helping prevent people eating dangerous or contaminated 
food.34 Associating the Other with impurity is a way to trigger repulsion. In the 
Indonesian religious context, the repulsion people feel for the impure is instrumentally 
co-opted by the Islamists. According to McCoy, the purpose of labeling and associating 
the religious enemy with disease is to create a situation in which “the continued 
presence of this group may come to feel intolerable, making expelling the group from the 
body seem the only solution”.35 The act of expulsion could bring the sense of relief that 
follows recovery from an illness, or at least that is the feeling that those wishing to expel 
might anticipate. Banning Ahmadiyah as many Islamists and conservatives seek, would 
be in effect an expulsion, although one with profound and uncertain ramifications. 
The MUI in particular deploys purity discourses. Hasyim argues that for MUI, heretical 
groups represent a threat to the purity of Islam that justifies actions to prevent their 
heretical activities, which if tolerated could lead to social unrest.36 He notes the way in 
which the terms “freedom” and “liberal” are considered Western contamination and 
used to destroy Islam: “The MUI argues that religious freedom paves the way for 
heretical groups to flourish.”37 Religious freedom is, according to this discourse, disorder, 
by virtue of being Western and threatening. Sharia, though, is order and purity.  
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Ichwan argues that MUI’s 2005 fatwas are acts of purification, namely to purify: public 
morality (countering pornography); schools (preventing apostasy through the education 
system); the image of Islam (rejecting terrorism, defending jihad); Islamic thought against 
pluralism, liberalism and secularism; and, the Islamic faith (excluding Ahmadiyah).38 In 
these five cases, MUI is countering groups that threaten Islam. Purifying is morally good. 
Purification helps defend against others groups (Christians, extremists, Ahmadis, 
Western-style liberals). But what do purity discourses achieve? The anthropologist Mary 
Douglas wrote that purity rituals are unifying, while:  
ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their 
main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by 
exaggerating the difference between within and without, above and below, male and 
female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created.39 
Some Indonesians consider life in the 21st century an untidy experience, with prominent 
examples including the perception of moral decline since the Suharto era, the financial 
crisis of the late 1990s and the uncertainties of freedom and democracy in an 
increasingly globalised world. Douglas’s insights help to clarify a link between the desire 
to define heresy and the will to purify. Both are part of a process of reducing anxiety by 
imposing order, a process that generates the accumulation of power.  
Harmony, stability and order 
Anxiety-producing change enhances the effectiveness of an order, harmony and stability 
discourse, and make purification drives more appealing. McCoy argues that in post-
Suharto times Islamists have reimagined Suharto’s communist threat to the national body 
as a threat from religious minorities. Islam is imagined as a house or body, at risk of 
infection, defilement and assault, metaphors that deploy language that labels the 
religious Other as “infesting” and “spreading”, part of a discourse against Christianisation 
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and the building of new churches.40 Radical and mainstream religious leaders, backed by 
allies in government and state security, McCoy writes, use a “harmony-and-stability 
rhetoric to justify repression, arguing that certain religious groups are threatening public 
order by proselytising or otherwise insulting Islam”.41 If one key role of authority is to 
ensure order is maintained, then assuming the role of creating or imposing order could 
be described as seizing power.  
The public order theme has become a consistent message from the lslamists, repeated so 
often as to resemble a script. One of Olle’s sources, identified as Pak S, believes “young 
people’s fashion and lifestyles… show that things are ‘out of control’ and society is 
increasingly unstable, thus making a ‘return to the sharia’ attractive”.42 In the worldview 
of this Islamist, Western-influenced lifestyles represent disorder, while sharia represents 
order. Pak S recounted a national MUI meeting in 2005 that agreed the solution was to 
return to sharia, hence MUI’s mission statement, which includes “to direct and guide the 
Islamic community in planting and fertilising Islamic beliefs along with carrying out the 
sharia”.43 Pak S said “if you talk about violence, there must be those who give rise to the 
violence”, which was his way of explaining that it was Ahmadiyah’s fault they were 
attacked, because they were heretics whose behaviour was provocative.44 Similarly, 
“Ma’ruf Amin (head of the MUI fatwa commission) said that the role of MUI was to 
prevent strife and mass violence, which it fears, could occur as a result of heresy”.45 
Who, however, is creating this strife?  
In February 2008, the secretary-general of the FPI, Banjar, West Java, Sobri Lubis, 
declared: 
Muslim people! We call upon you! Let’s fight against the Ahmadiyya! Kill the Ahmadis 
wherever they are, my brothers! Allahu akbar! Kill, kill, kill... kill them all! It is okay to 
kill them. This is a self-defense. They destroy our religion. [Therefore, their lives] are no 																																																								
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longer sacred... Without any doubt, it is permis- sible [to shed Ahmadis’ blood]... Fight 
the Ahmadiyya, kill the Ahmadis, and exterminate the Ahmadis in Indonesia! Allahu 
akbar!46 
On the one hand, the Islamists claim Ahmadiyah disturbs public order. On the other 
hand, the violent actions are mostly at the hands of FPI and other activist groups. This 
public order argument is contradictory, as Hefner notes: “In the name of public order 
and morality, Islamist militias in the post-Suharto era have made the public arena more 
chaotic and insecure”.47 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Islamists were ready with the 
solution to this chaos.  
Inflammatory rhetoric forms part of the Islamists’ political arsenal. Via the media, the 
rhetoric fuelled the public opposition that it was supposedly responding to. The well-
established desire for order in Indonesia is co-opted and twisted to serve Islamists’ 
political goals. The publicity generated by media interest in the religious conflict of 2008 
led to a situation in which, “by June 2008, people in the Jakarta streets who had never 
heard of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his followers six months earlier expressed anger that 
they could continue to operate in Indonesia”.48 This Orwellian method is akin to a 
protection racket, although instead of money the troublemakers are paid off with laws 
against their opponents. On the surface, the argument is a moral one. It is good to 
preserve order and peace. Heresy disturbs the theological order because it casts doubt 
on the boundaries between Islam and non-Islam, boundaries that Islamists police in 
order to reinstate and maintain order. 
Threats and ideological narratives  
How do threats help those who identify them accumulate power? The first two threats to 
Islam discussed here, freedom and apostasy, are related because freedom discourses 
support proselytising. The freedom discourse is backed by the power of the West, with 																																																								
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some Islamists calling Christianity “a willing partner in the vast Judeo-Christian 
conspiracy to annihilate Islam… a likely target of a holy war”.49 An ideological narrative 
has been constructed, a binary view of the world, with good Islam and bad Christianity, 
good Islam and bad West (the US, Jews, Israel).50  
In Haidt’s idea of ideological narratives, sacredness resides within a story about good 
and evil, with heroes who will win the good fight against villains.51 Humans have 
developed, Haidt says, “the ability to rally around leaders when our group is under threat 
or is competing with other groups”.52 Threats have a binding role, like morality, which 
role is group forming and group binding. Within moral foundations theory, threat and 
morality have a symbiotic relationship. Each foundation has a threat embodied in it. In 
the case of the threat inherent in the first foundation, care, the threat is harm, and the 
intuitive emotional reaction against it serves the function of preventing harm. By 
responding intuitively to threats of harm, humans have a greater ability to reduce injury 
and death, aiding their survival.  
The five moral foundations are deconstructions of a process that exists to ensure that the 
behaviour of people in the group conforms to agreed standards of care, fairness, loyalty, 
authority and purity. Behaviour that promotes these standards is considered virtuous or 
good. Behaviour that threatens them is bad. As Haidt details, people react quickly and 
powerfully to threats because their responses are intuitive.53 The morality mechanism 
reacts to the threat by provoking an emotional reaction against the “bad” and towards 
the “good”. Thus, moral virtues are agreements about what a group will value in order to 
protect the group and its members from those threats. In other words, morality is a 
mechanism that prompts positive and negative emotions in response to threats for the 
benefit of the group. Actions are justified by an implicit argument that what is good for 
the in-group’s strength, power and unity is good universally.  
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How does this analysis of morality help us understand Indonesia’s religious politics? 
Alleged threats from another religion or ideology can elicit group emotions by those who 
identify with the group supposedly under threat, according to intergroup emotions 
theory.54 Persuading people to identify with a group is thus a primary goal of those who 
wish to lead (or manipulate) a group. Group emotions can even be activated when the 
perceiver is not personally threatened, provided the individual’s group identity is 
foremost.55 Characters within a narrative serve to personalise the ideas and make them 
more accessible. A villain plays a critical role as a threat personified. Obstacles play an 
important role in social psychology theories such as intergroup emotions theory. 
Obstacles provoke anger, and anger prompts action.56 If anger can be provoked through 
a threat or obstacle (Christians, Christianisation), an increased desire to support the 
ingroup and an increase in ingroup identification is likely to result. Once those villains 
become obstacles to a good Muslim’s path to God, force becomes necessary to right the 
world. 
According to Hefner, conservatives mobilised in response to the 2005 fatwas with rallies 
and attacks on Christian evangelicals, Ahmadiyah and Islamic liberals in a tactical co-
ordination across organisations and media that considerably increased their national 
influence.57 One of the reasons that the conservative coalition’s influence exceeded its 
numbers was that democratically and liberally inclined Muslims could not mobilise 
people in support of religious freedom as effectively as Islamists could mobilise people 
against supposed deviancy.58 Threats played a role in mobilising action by eliciting 
emotions, including anger, which helped consolidate the power of the 
Islamist/conservative alliance.  
																																																								
54 Mackie, Devos, and Smith, "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an 
Intergroup Context." 
55 Ray et al., "Changing Categorization of Self Can Change Emotions About Outgroups," 1210. 
56 Mackie, Maitner, and Smith, "Intergroup Emotions Theory; Mark G. Frank, David Matsumoto, and 
Hyisung C. Hwang, "Intergroup Emotions and Political Aggression: The Ancodi Hypothesis," in Social 
Psychology and Politics, ed. Joseph P. Forgas, Klaus Fiedler, and William D. Crano (New York: 
Psychology Press, 2014). 
57 Hefner, "A Conservative Turn in Indonesian Islam? Genesis and Future," 43-44. 
58 Bruinessen, "What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?," 8. 
	 71	
The unattained goal of sharia law remains the central issue. The debate and anger over 
the omission of the Jakarta Charter from the constitution has been maintained since 
independence as a grievance against the secular nationalists, Christians and the state.59 
Christians are seen as an obstacle to enacting sharia law. Feillard and Madinier argue 
that Islamists perceive and present sharia law as a sacred touchstone: ”The sharia, if 
applied rigorously, would cure all of humanity’s ills.”60 Moral psychologist Haidt writes 
that sacredness is “the human tendency to invest people, places, times and ideas with 
importance far beyond the utility they possess… [which] tie individuals to larger groups 
with shared identities and ennobling projects”.61 Shared emotions around sharia have a 
binding effect among Islamists and potentially among Muslims in general. The sacred 
nature of sharia enables believers to see their efforts on its behalf as part of an ennobling 
group project, in God’s name. This sacralising might have effects such as diminishing the 
importance of other values, such as tolerance, if they are perceived to prevent the 
realisation of a sacred value. Sharia forms a cornerstone of Islamists’ ideological 
narratives as the ultimate goal.  
Threats and the Other 
The goal of implementing sharia forms part of a utopian future within a narrative about 
recreating a lost – generally rendered as stolen – ideal, the way the Islamic world was 
ordered during the time of Muhammad.62 Threats to implementing sharia abound. 
Democracy is only legitimate to the extent it is consistent with Islam, and reinstating the 
Jakarta Charter and having sharia law in Indonesia would be evidence of such 
consistency, says Habib Rizieq, leader of FPI.63 Rizieq uses a threat against Islam, the 
idea of Islam being under attack, to justify the defence of Islam, which for FPI is 
generally a case of attacking sinful places (bars, discotheques, supposedly illegal 
churches, Ahmadiyah communities). Rizieq said of the alleged SiPiLis threat:  
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If we want to prevent conflict, then the government should implement the fatwa and ban 
the teachings of liberalism, pluralism, and secularism from being taught in Indonesia. But 
if the government continues to allow these sources of conflict to exist, then it won’t be 
possible to prevent violence. They will continue to attack Islam, and we have an 
obligation to defend ourselves.64  
Even symbolic threats to values and beliefs strongly predict prejudice against groups that 
are ideologically different, according to intergroup emotions theory.65 What seems like 
an attack – on a minority religion, on a bar, on a disco – is within the narrative a defence 
against a moral threat or alleged moral attack. Hilmy argues that “Indonesian Islamists 
are constructing the concept of enemy based on the concept of binary opposition 
between the ‘authentic’ selves and the ‘corrupted’ ones.”66 That is, a narrative of good 
and evil. The most prominent binary opposition in the Islamists ideological narrative is 
between the authentic Islam and the corrupted West. Indonesian Islamists’ ideological 
narratives cast Americans and Jews (or the US and Israel) as evil, villains with the upper 
hand in a fight against Islam in Palestine and globally.67 Within this narrative, Jews and 
Christians (or Israel and the West, led by the US) attack Islam in part by preventing the 
implementation of sharia law. By association with the evil West/US, Indonesian 
Christians are no longer a minority, but part of a threatening global power.  
Fundamentalists refer to feeling under siege “by the kafir and their systematically 
organised power”, presenting Muslims as being “ravished by packs of voracious wolves” 
within the “kafir’s global conspiracy against Islam”, recalling grievances and injustices 
such as the Crusades, colonialism, and the war in Bosnia, or the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the US war in Afghanistan.68 This is not a discourse unique to Indonesia. It 
belongs to a narrative told worldwide. The German scholar of Islamism Bassam Tibi 
argues that “political Islam constitutes both a claim and a mandate to mobilise Islamic 																																																								
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civilization against the West and… to contest the Western institution of the nation-
state”.69 The Islamist ideological narrative is situated within a global political context.  
The Islamist narratives deploy language and ideas that stir emotions through a sense of 
moral violation. The Indonesian Islamist Imam Samudra said: “I hate America because it 
is the real centre of international terrorism, which has already repeatedly terrorised 
Islam.“70 Opposition to the US is framed as righteous. State-sponsored terrorism by the 
US is judged morally as harmful and unjust, violations of the care and fairness 
foundations. In the face of such moral violations and attacks on Islam, Islamists see a 
need to create a new world order. Tibi observes that Islamism is a “worldview, that seeks 
to establish its own order, and thus to separate the peoples of Islamic civilisation from 
the rest of humanity while claiming for their worldview a universal standing”.71 Over the 
decades this global context formed a backdrop to developments in Indonesia. 
Kristenisasi (Christianisation) and Islamisasi became rallying points for grievances over 
the unfair advantage each religion allegedly had in its access to power. Over time, 
Christians and Muslims developed, Arifianto notes, “more exclusivist religious 
expressions that portrayed the other religion through a lens of much distrust and hatred, 
which eventually encouraged them to address their grievances through violent means”.72  
Islamist groups: narratives in action 
FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia were key members of the Islamist forces that co-
operated to gain influence within MUI and in 2005 set up FUI (Forum Umat Islam) to 
enforce the fatwas introduced that year. Other members included DDII, MMI (Majelis 
Mujahideen Indonesia: Indonesian Mujahedeen Council), some conservative members of 
NU and Muhammadiyah, and representatives of the four Islamist political parties (PPP, 
PBB, PKS and PBR).73 A range of scholars and commentators have linked the 2005 fatwas 
to a rise in intolerance or weakening minority rights, especially by creating a pretext for 																																																								
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attacks by radicals.74 In 2006, radical Islamists declared they would enforce the new 
houses of worship laws because the government would not, which led to an increase in 
“attacks on ‘unauthorised’ religious activities”, Jones notes.75 Anti-vice militias such as 
FPI have carried out a lot of the anti-minority violence. Setara Institute statistics show FPI 
conducted 29 (10 percent) of acts described as criminal or intolerant in 2008 (42 actions 
by MUI), with those actors appearing at the top the list again for 2009.76  
Islamist opposition to proselytisation became a containment strategy under which they 
use the law to justify their acts against churches old and new. Wilson says FPI leadership 
has “manipulated local tensions arising from demographic shifts in Jakarta’s peri-urban 
periphery into moral panics regarding the so-called ‘Christianisation’ of Jakarta, often 
linked in FPI rhetoric to the spread of secularism and ‘liberalism’.”77 This, Wilson says, is 
part of a method by which it appropriates “localised tensions and conflicts and frame 
them as part of a broader and unified ‘Islamic’ response to what are seen as the threats 
posed to the Islamic community by decadence and immorality”.78 Thus narratives 
around the two threats interweave, freedom spawned by the West allows immorality and 
proselytising. The rule of law is weak in Indonesia.79 This partially validates FPI’s 
argument that its morality policing is needed because state action is ineffective.  
FPI frequently uses the provocation justification, including for its vigilante violence. This 
argument that Islamic morality supersedes the law is a critical aspect of FPI’s worldview. 
Hefner notes that activists’ appeal to amr bil ma’ruf wal nahi al-munkar (enjoining the 
good and forbidding evil) allows them to “legitimate their usurpation of state authority by 
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claiming to act on the basis of divine law, rather than merely human”.80 Former 
Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid wrote that Islamists turn Islam into an 
ideology as part of their political struggle against those with different beliefs.81 They use 
the language of Islam, often used by all Muslims, but understand these terms differently, 
he wrote. In the hands of “radicals” amr ma’ruf nahi al-munkar becomes “a formula for 
legitimising compulsion, violence and attacks against anyone who differs from them. 
They excuse themselves by claiming to promote the good and forbid evil every time they 
commit such acts of violence or defame others”.82 Just as Wahid says, the ostensible 
concern and motivation of FPI and its leader, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, is the 
Koranic injunction amr bil ma’ruf wal nahi al-munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding 
evil), Jahroni says.83 This justification filters down to local branches. Bekasi FPI leader 
Murhali Barda justified the group’s attacks in 2012 with those very words.84 Barda has 
justified violent actions with anti-Christianisation arguments when he accused them of 
using deceit to convert Muslims, such as debt traps that are forgiven upon conversion.85 
As Feillard and Madinier have noted, once an Islamist group has defined a group as evil, 
they have the justification to attack them.86 Grievance discourses of being wronged, 
moral arguments, become justifications for violent action. The radical Islamist discourse 
that Indonesian law is not legitimate compared with sharia is a self-justifying moral 
argument that, because illegal actions often go unpunished or under-punished, further 
undermines the rule of law.  
Wilson explains some of the politics behind FPI’s vigilantism by noting that it occurs 
when the state does not meet the moral expectations of the community, with the 
supposedly unsatisfactory post-New Order governments being FPI’s justification to fight 																																																								
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crime and establish order.87 As Wilson writes: “Rejecting the state’s label of their own 
violence as criminal, the FPI vigilante represents themselves as a virtuous vanguard 
protecting society from moral and social decay. As one FPI member explained, ‘If they 
[the state] won’t uphold decency and order then we will’.”88 This is an example of 
morality motivating as well as justifying action. In this case, they are justifying idealistic 
violence, which moral foundations theorist Haidt argues is morally motivated.89 FPI steps 
into alleged vacuums of authority to impose order, which is a moral act if it can justify its 
authority as legitimate. That justification is its ideological narrative.  
Is there more to the situation than groups using the cover of the accusation of evil to 
wreak havoc? Rizieq’s family background is the puritanical group within the Hadhrami 
Arab community of Indonesia, which was instrumental in forming Persis (Persatuan 
Islam) in the early 20th century. According to Jahroni, Rizieq is genuinely concerned 
about the gambling, drugs and prostitution that beset poor neighbourhoods, which 
Rizieq blames on official failure to maintain law and order.90 Wilson confirms that the 
mix of motives for membership of FPI includes local populations trying to hold back the 
tide of drug dealers.91 Local populations argue that the FPI franchise (and uniforms) 
increased their power in these morality struggles. Conveniently, those FPI members who 
sought money could get it by enforcing haram levies. 
FPI is the most prominent of the militia-type Islamic groups and through its use of street 
toughs (preman) is similar to Pemuda Pancasila and other New Order-sponsored preman 
organisations which acted as an extension of state control or elite interests.92 This 
preman element and the fact that FPI often targets nightclubs and bars, sometimes for the 
purpose of financial extortion, has discredited the organisation’s Islamic intentions and 
means it is sometimes not taken seriously.93 However, its leader Rizieq studied at the 																																																								
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Saudi-backed Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in Jakarta, before 
spending years studying in Riyadh.94 Rizieq’s study is typical of a pattern identified by 
van Bruinessen in which LIPIA, Saudi money and Saudi universities are sources of the 
growing influence of transnational Islamism (particularly the Salafi Islam or puritanical 
Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia), as well as Saudi and Yemeni clerics (ulama).95 Arabs, he 
says, including Indonesian Arabs, “have played a prominent part in the transmission of 
neo-fundamentalist and jihadist discourse from the Middle East to Indonesia”.96 The 
money has paid for translations of simple fundamentalist texts, while Indonesian Arabs’ 
prominence among radical circles points to their role in an Arabisation of Indonesian 
Islam.97 This Arabisation is an aspect of the ongoing Islamisation of Indonesia, which I 
discussed in chapter 3. With the goal of mobilising support for their Islamisation project, 
Islamists’ ideological narratives help generate a sense of Islamic consciousness through 
the politics of “us” and “them”.  
‘Us and them’ narratives  
Islamist discourses contain consistent negative images of the Other in words and stories, 
resulting in an us-and-them consciousness and narratives around enemies.98 The 
negative images form part of the narrative, specifically the creation of the villains (non-
Muslims and non-conforming Muslims) who stand in the way of achieving the world 
order the Islamists seek. Islamists have associated their religious opponents with filthy 
matter as part of the process of creating the Other.99 Labeling such as this creates 
hierarchies, as Burhani notes, with groups placing themselves at the top of the 
hierarchies, and the ones down below in the hierarchy receiving offensive labels.100 
According to Magee and Galinsky, US analysts of power, hierarchies can consist of 
individuals or groups, with groups stratified into hierarchies of groups and individuals 
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able to feel the status of their group within a hierarchy.101 This contributes to individuals 
feeling good via reward signals to their brain as part of the bio-chemical motivational 
system.102 This process of status and reward occurs at least partly because the group’s 
status and prestige attaches to the person who identifies with the group via self-
categorisation, according to social identity theory.103 Ramakrishna explains the research 
from social psychology suggests that a sense of control is important to overcome the 
uncertainties of life, with strong ingroups providing beliefs, norms and identities that 
contribute to this purpose.104 In this way, the very act of labeling, which positions the 
Other as inferior, helps to allay some of the anxiety over religious identity that Sidel 
refers to.105  
Such positioning brings with it inherent risks. The British philosopher and moral 
psychologist David Livingstone Smith argues that imagining the universe as a hierarchy 
with god at the top and groups placing themselves a step or two below god tends to 
legitimate treating those below worse than you would yourself, as lesser. 106 This 
ultimately plays a role in the process that leads to the demeaning, enslaving and 
exterminating of others. The demonisation of the Other has a dehumanising effect, 
creating a clear distinction between the ingroup as civilised and the outgroup as 
uncivilised. The British philosopher and rabbi Jonathan Sacks attributes the beginning of 
violent, even genocidal, Othering to dualism:  
Dualism resolves cognitive dissonance by saying, in effect, ‘It wasn’t us, and it wasn’t 
God, so it must be Them,’ whoever the ‘Them’ happens to be. It turns penitential cultures 
into blame cultures, externalising evil and projecting it on a scapegoat, thereby redefining 
the faithful as victims… From there it is a short step to seeing them as subhuman (for the 
Nazis, Jews were ‘vermin, lice’; for the Hutus of Rwanda, the Tutsi were inyenzi, 
																																																								
101 Joe C. Magee and Adam D. Galinsky, "The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Social Hierarchy: Origins and 
Consequences of Power and Status," in IACM 21st Annual Conference Paper (2008), 8. 
102 Breuning, I, Mammal: Why Your Brain Links Status and Happiness. 
103 Hogg, "Social Identity Theory," 120. 
104 Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean 
Mindset (Singapore: Springer, 2015), 38-9. 
105 Sidel, "On the 'Anxiety of Incompleteness'." 
106 Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others, 39. 
	 79	
‘cockroaches’). They can then be killed without compunction. There is a straight line 
from dualism to demonisation to dehumanisation to genocide.107  
This view suggests that the language that leads to atrocities is similar to the language 
Islamists use towards religious minorities, particularly Ahmadiyah, as discussed. Humans 
in general tend towards binary thinking, as Ramakrishna notes.108 The risk with Islamists’ 
ideological narratives is that they reinforce binary opposites and inflame feelings towards 
people thus framed. They are, unfortunately, engaged in a mode of thinking at risk of 
leading to dehumanisation.  	
Conclusion 
Graham and Haidt write that ideological narratives are always stories about good and 
evil. “They identify heroes and villains, they explain how the villains got the upper hand, 
and they lay out or justify the means by which – if we can just come together and fight 
hard enough – we can vanquish the villains and return the world to its balanced or 
proper state.”109 In the ideological narratives of Indonesian Islamists, they are the heroes 
who will vanquish the villains (the West, Christians, Ahmadiyah) who pose the threats of 
freedom, apostasy and deviancy, the primary obstacles on the path to their goals, 
including a morally pure Indonesia, based on sharia. Narratives such as this, with 
assignations of good and evil, appeal to emotions and moral intuitions. Morality exists 
within groups, to serve the groups, and groups are power structures. Hence morality 
serves power. A moral argument is not necessarily an argument about what is universally 
right, or right for everyone. It is often an argument about what behaviour suits the 
interests of the group, and therefore the interests of a power structure. This begins to 
explain how morality, which seems at first glance to be about doing good, can be used 
in the cause of doing bad (to another group). The behaviour seems good to the ingroup. 
Morally motivated actions can be justified by that morality, in a somewhat circular 
argument. The very acts of defining orthodoxy or heresy, or enforcing morality, are acts 																																																								
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of power and control that the enforcers can attempt to justify. One means of justification 
is an effective ideological narrative. Narratives, through their persuasive power, their 
power to mobilise action, are sources of power. As such, they are often deployed in 
efforts to gain and consolidate power. This is what I believe is happening with Islamists 
in Indonesia, and indeed happens to humans around the world.  
In addition to the narratives, the links between Islamist groups such as DDII and FPI with 
elite members of the state and society have helped them gain influence greater than their 
numerical strength.110 Hefner suggests a key reason that post-Suharto governments were 
hesitant to crack down on Islamists’ vigilante activities is that “a small but influential 
wing within the coalition governments that have ruled Indonesia since 1999 subscribes 
to an anti-liberal and anti-pluralist model of religious freedom”.111 Identifying some of the 
members of this “influential wing” is one aim of the next chapter, which will examine 
how Islamism operated in the Yudhoyono era, with reference to the state and the 
government.  
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Chapter 5: THE YUDHOYONO YEARS: THE PUBLIC, PIETY AND POLITICS 
Having examined Islamists’ ideological narratives, I turn now to how these were 
deployed during the years of the Yudhoyono presidency. I begin, after some brief 
background, by outlining Yudhoyono’s political relationship with organised Islam, as 
well as the relationship of his team. I follow that by examining the contextual question of 
the public’s involvement in, attitude towards and reaction to these issues.  
At the 1999 national elections, the secular nationalist PDI-P won the largest bloc with 34 
percent of the vote, see Table 5a later in this chapter. The Islamic vote was split among 
multiple parties totaling about 21 percent (modernists, not all of whom were Islamists) 
and another 12.7 percent for the NU-affiliated party, PKB. Despite not getting near a 
majority, a coalition of Muslim parties – the Central Axis – ensured Megawati 
Sukarnoputri did not become president, instead maneuvering to have Abdurrahman 
Wahid elected in 1999.1 As president, Wahid did not deliver the anticipated patronage 
to the Central Axis, concerned as he was for the rights of minority faiths as opposed to 
Islamicising Indonesia. He lost favour with those Muslim parties, which contributed to 
the opposition that led to his impeachment. Despite their inability to form a majority in 
parliament, the Islamic parties had established their ability to influence politics.  
Suaedy says Yudhoyono made a pact with conservative Islamic forces before the 2004 
presidential elections in his bid for power: “Yudhoyono and his political allies… 
approached conservative religious groups, including the MUI, and asked for their 
political support. In return, Yudhoyono promised to treat MUI’s doctrines as policy.”2 
Suaedy, who worked for many years with the liberal Wahid Institute, says Yudhoyono’s 
support for and promotion of MUI as the authorised interpreter of Islam facilitated 
religious intolerance.3  
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Yudhoyono’s statements at MUI events support that argument, for example his speech to 
the 2005 MUI congress:  
We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommendations and fatwas 
from the MUI and ulama [Islamic scholars] at any time, either directly to me or the 
minister of religious affairs or to other branches of government. We want to place MUI in 
a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the 
difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the 
government or state should heed the fatwa from the MUI and ulama.4 
This statement, which was made at the conference that produced the fatwas discussed in 
the previous chapter, is explicit and important. An unelected body, which is subject to 
the influence of non-transparent forces, shifts from an advisory role in which it was a 
servant of state interests to an apparent reversal of that role. Members of MUI claimed 
this rule-making authority, this territory, for themselves. National chairman of the MUI 
fatwa commission Ma’ruf Amin said soon after the 2005 fatwa against deviancy: “Given 
the existence of the MUI fatwa, the government clearly has the obligation to prohibit 
[Ahmadiyah]. It’s not us asking. Because there is a fatwa from MUI, the government is 
automatically obliged to prohibit them.”5 Amin stakes out ownership of this territory. 
MUI, an institutional face of conservative Islam in Indonesia, used deviancy and heresy 
as a threat to unite people behind its agenda. An official role did seem to emerge over 
Yudhoyono’s presidency. The Australian scholar of Indonesian law Tim Lindsey writes 
that MUI, having achieved official regulatory functions overseeing Islamic banking, 
finance and halal certification, and influence over haj administration, produced some 
fatwas that “now have a regulatory status as a form of quasi-legislation”.6 Despite the 
‘our morality trumps the rule of law’ argument of Islamists such as FPI having no legal 
basis, the status granted to MUI fatwas muddy those waters because of the quasi-official 
position they have came to occupy.  
Burhani suggests Yudhoyono might be inclined towards the conservative agenda, and 																																																								
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cites the president telling an MUI meeting in November 2007: “The MUI issues fatwas. 
The president cannot issue a fatwa. But after a fatwa is issued, the tools of the state can 
do their duty. Hopefully our cooperation will deepen in the future... We must all take 
strict measures against deviant beliefs.”7 
The implication that the MUI dictates the state’s duty reveals the overt power Yudhoyono 
granted it. Yudhoyono’s words on deviance suggest he supports the campaign against 
deviancy and is offering state support for it. Here, Yudhoyono projects a conservative 
Islamic identity and suggests he is one of them (conservatives who oppose deviant 
streams). The “us and them” discourse serves his political interests because it helps 
ensure ongoing support from his coalition allies. Yudhoyono’s use of “we” implies that 
the issue of deviance supersedes citizenship, since “deviants” such as members of 
Ahmadiyah are Indonesian citizens with various legal rights, but are evidently not 
included in “we”. Yudhoyono and conservative clerics are openly colluding to create an 
Other. Bush also suggests Yudhoyono might have sympathised with a conservative 
Islamic agenda and was “not an innocent bystander to the deterioration of minority rights 
and religious pluralism during his presidency”.8 Yudhoyono’s actions are more important 
than his personal perferences though, because it is his behaviour as a politician that 
matters, rather than his own beliefs.  
As for his behaviour, Yudhoyono helped amplify the idea that Ahmadis provoked the 
troubles they face, blaming them for antagonising Muslims because of their 
outspokenness and continued proselytising, according to Fealy.9 Yudhoyono seemed to 
position himself in support of unlawful behaviour. He played a supporting role in the 
Islamist project, deploying similar ideas and language to their narratives. As the nation’s 
leader, he needed to maintain stability and order as a priority. Islamists appeared to 
exploit Yudhoyono’s and the nation’s desire for order and stability. Ultimately, was  
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stability and order also a justification for the president acting, or not acting, in ways that 
happened to coincide with the preferences of his Islamic supporters?  
Pancasila and godly nationalism 
The context of these contemporary political positions is Indonesia’s ambiguous status as 
neither an Islamic nor a secular state. Human rights advocates argue for the primacy of 
the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom: “Indonesia’s constitution of 1945 
explicitly promises the right to religious freedom under article 29(2): ‘The state 
guarantees each and every citizen the freedom of religion and of worship in accordance 
with his religion and belief’.”10 However, conservative Muslims tend to interpret article 
29(2) illiberally as meaning it restricts religious freedom to those who express a religion, 
which opens the way for the state to determine who has religious legitimacy and who 
does not.11 Yudhoyono’s position and actions seem to confirm Menchik’s point that 
“despite claims to being a ‘secular democracy’, the state is fully involved in the firm 
demarcation of religious orthodoxy”.12 This insight seems critical in understanding the 
context of the state in religious affairs. The state, while not Islamic, is not secular either. 
Menchik says the “Belief in One God” principle is central to the way the nation imagines 
itself and therefore “for a godly nation to endure, it must privilege some beliefs and 
prosecute acts of deviance as blasphemy”.13 Menchik concludes:  
The promotion of belief in God and the exclusion of heterodox faiths help unify the 
country’s diverse population behind a common theism… [one goal of which] is a polity 
where individuals, organisations, and the state are partly responsible for one another’s 
moral condition rather than it being the domain of self-determining individuals.14  
This reveals a role for morality expressed through the state beyond where Western 
secular liberal democracies generally legislate in the 21st century. Such a difference 
reveals the gap in worldviews between the system Indonesians have developed and the 																																																								
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more individualistic West, each having had its own historical development, 
notwithstanding some common elements. Indonesia is not an Islamic state. The power 
and influence of the clerics (ulama) is not direct and is only wielded via the state, hence 
the need for MUI to argue and pressure the government to enact laws to enforce its 
fatwas. Yet religion, monotheistic religion in particular, is privileged in Indonesia, 
“through state support for religious orthodoxy over liminal and heterodox faiths. Godly 
nationalists feel that belief in God is a civic virtue that accrues both individual and social 
benefits.”15 The 2010 Constitutional Court ruling that affirmed the 1965 blasphemy law, 
which denied religious freedom to heterodox faiths such as Ahmadiyah, added judicial 
support to the view among some parts of official and elite Indonesia that the state is 
integrated with religion, Ricklefs suggests.16 
Framing debate 
So how does godly nationalism and other religious politics actually play out in 
Indonesia? In the previous chapter, I discussed the role of purification initiatives, 
particularly by MUI, as a response to threats, including moral threats. MUI’s purification 
initiatives should be contextualised within its institutional strategising. Barker and van 
Klinken say MUI created a heresy crisis to influence the government as part of its struggle 
for rule-making authority among state institutions: 
By deliberately creating a moral panic about religious ‘deviants’ and then adopting a 
censorious stance it knew few would comfortably oppose, it aimed to insert itself into the 
place long occupied by the larger, more mainstream religious organisations… [targeting] 
the ‘heretical’ Ahmadiyah… not so much to injure Ahmadiyah members as to raise a 
panic about heresy among the wider population.17 
MUI and Islamist activists highlight threats that alarm the population at the same time as 
they present the solution to the threat, such as banning a sect. MUI’s impact during the 
Yudhoyono presidency included its 2005 fatwa against “pornografi (pornography) or 																																																								
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pornoaksi (porno-action)”.18 The fatwa and subsequent activism, including FPI attacks on 
the headquarters of the new Indonesian edition of Playboy magazine, led to new anti-
pornography laws being introduced, although in a form that was a compromise to MUI’s 
original plan.19 The Indonesian Muslim feminist Julia Suryakusuma argues the laws were 
“a potent combination of social conservatism and political opportunism” directed against 
women’s freedom.20 Suryakusuma summarises Neng Dara Affiah, a commissioner of the 
National Commission on Violence against Women and senior NU member, who 
explained her experience of Islamists’ strategic use of language, which:  
enabled them to polarise the debate into simple extremes. Whoever was not with them 
against pornography, was, in their terms, against them – and thus for pornography. At one 
point, Affiah herself was summoned by the Central Board of NU, and questioned. “You 
wear a jilbab [headscarf] and are from a pesantren [traditional Muslim boarding school],” 
they said, “How can you reject the Pornography Law? You should repent!21 
This method positions a moral good in a manner that is difficult to argue against from an 
Islamic position, a technique Islamists deployed in other circumstances. It is an 
application of the binary opposites way of dividing the world into good and evil. After 
2002, after the presidency’s constitutional powers were reduced and limited, parliament 
became more powerful than the presidency.22 This meant that legislators became subject 
to such positioning, and subject to the way the public responded to such debates. For 
Yudhoyono’s part, his signing of the pornography bill into law in 2008 helped him gain 
endorsement again from the Islamist PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Prosperous Justice 
Party). PKS, the party behind the bill, had used it to generate public debate on sharia.23 
According to Hilmy, to Islamists “the history of human civilisation consists of repeated 																																																								
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power struggles” with Islam being “spiritual guidance for individuals as well as a 
political order” based on the principal idea that Islam must achieve power and the sharia 
must regulate everyone’s lives, morals, habits and rituals.24  
Sharia and elections  
How is the Islamists’ broader power struggle to achieve power in society playing out? To 
answer that question, I will first talk about formal political outcomes Yudhoyono era 
before looking some more at informal practices. The relationship between sharia 
ambitions and formal politics is partly revealed in the positioning of political parties, 
which differ on whether or not sharia should be incorporated into the constitution. 
Figure 1 is a guide to the spectrum, from secularist on the left to Islamist on the right, 
which is sourced from academic-turned-Widodo-government education and culture 
minister Anies Rasyid Baswedan.25 
Figure 5a: Continuum of parties’ ideologies (2003) 
Secularist PDI-P Golkar PAN PKB PKS PPP PBB Islamist 
From Anies Rasyid Baswedan’s “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory.” 26 
PPP (the Suharto regime Islamic party), PBB (linked to DDII) and PKS (associated with 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Indonesia’s KAMMI student movement), are Islamist 
parties that favoured a conservative Islamisation of Indonesia, reinstatement of the 
Jakarta Charter (Medina charter – a watered down version – in PKS’s case after 2002) and 
the application of sharia.  
Nationally, the Islamist vote is a minority. In 2004, the Islamist parties PPP and PKS won 
15.5 percent of the votes, as shown in Table 5a. However, PPP and PBB, the two parties 
explicitly supporting the Jakarta Charter, received only 10.8 percent of the vote.27 In 
2009, the Islamist parties (PKS and PPP, the only two Islamist parties to pass the 2.5 																																																								
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percent threshold for parliamentary representation) garnered 13.2 percent, with a further 
10.9 percent going to the Islamic but non-Islamist PKB and PAN (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, National Mandate Party, associated with Muhammadiyah).28  
Table 5a: Parliamentary election results for 1999-2014 (popular vote) 
 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Party % of vote % of vote % of vote % of vote 
PDI-P 33.7 18.5 14.0 19.0	
Golkar 22.4 21.6 14.5 14.8	
PKB 12.6 10.6 4.9 9.0	
PPP 10.7 8.2 5.3 6.5	
PAN 7.1 6.4 6.0 7.6	
PD – 7.5 20.9 10.2	
PKS 1 (PK) 7.3 7.9 6.8	
Gerindra – – 4.5 11.8	
Hanura – – 3.8 5.3	
Nasdem – – – 6.7	
Other 13.5 19.9 18.2 2.3	
1999-2009 sourced from Mujani and Liddle’s “Personalities, Parties and Voters”.29  
2014 sourced from Fukuoka and Thalang30 
 
Compared with the strong support in the 1955 election for the sharia-supporting 
Masyumi (21 percent) and the sharia supporting but less committed NU (19 percent), the 
2009 election result suggests a decline in popular support for implementing sharia, 
although the contexts are different.31 The overall Islamic vote was well over 33 percent, 
however the PKB and PAN were non-Islamist, non-sharia aligned parties. It seems likely 
that failure to achieve electoral dominance meant that Islamists and conservatives had to 
look elsewhere for political leverage. One way was in coalitions with other parties and 
reciprocal arrangements with the president. Another was informal politics, the politics of 
generating threats, publicity, emotions, and mobilising people into action, as discussed 
in the previous chapter.  
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Organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Mummadiyah that in the past had positions 
supporting sharia for Indonesia (in the 1950s, for example), today no longer call for 
sharia to be written into the constitution, although they still articulate Muslim values and 
aspirations.32 Such a position does not stop them and other Islamic group promoting an 
Islamic agenda, which during the Suharto years saw them succeed in having sharia-
based or sharia-inspired laws enacted, such as the Basic Law of Religious Justice as well 
as the Compilation of Islamic Law.33 A large organisation such as NU must inevitably 
hold a broad range of views as just discussed. Not all leaders or member supported 
Wahid’s liberal attitudes, some believing them too radical.34  
Yudhoyono is accused of ignoring the GKI Taman Yasmin case in Bogor, among others.35 
The apparent lack of action at the national level occurred despite successful court 
appeals by the GKI congregation, which the local authorities refused to implement.36 
Despite advice from the Indonesian Ombudsman, Yudhoyono in effect left the matter to 
the local mayor, noting that the government must make the Muslim majority feel at ease 
“because the state’s duty is to prevent clashes from happening”.37 Yudhoyono’s rhetoric 
suggests he sees public order and harmony as more important than religious freedom 
and the rule of law. He takes a position that in effect supports Islamist activists who have 
stirred up trouble by suggesting the state would act to calm things down, rather than 
enforce the law. “President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has closed his eyes to 
various incidents of violation of religious/belief freedom”,38 Setara Institute argued in 
2011. Setara suggested Yudhoyono’s human rights agenda focused on abuses by the 
military and ignored religious rights and freedoms. By Yudhoyono’s second term, when 
intolerant acts peaked, he often dealt with difficult issues after commissioning polling to 
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align his decisions with majority opinion.39 This suggests that a large number of the 
public, possibly a majority, might have supported the positions he was taking. I will 
explore the attitudes and role of the public later this chapter.  
Fealy has detailed Yudhoyono’s extensive pattern of indecisiveness.40 This characteristic 
does not bolster action against intolerance, which requires a stand that could alienate 
Islamic activists. When the local and provincial MUIs ruled Shiism outside of Islam in 
the context of attacks in Sampang in 2012, the national MUI rejected that position, 
arguing as it had before that Shiism was inside Islam. Fealy writes that Yudhoyono’s 
government sidelined issues in the aftermath of the 2012 Sampang attacks on Shiites 
because it did not want to deal with challenging political and socio-religious issues.41 
Yudhoyono had enough other priorities, including as Sidel notes, consolidating a 
democracy that ensured the continued gratification of the interests of Suharto-era 
financial, business, military and civilian elites.42 Yudhoyono condemned the violent 
attacks, but he did not act publicly against Suryadharma Ali when his religious affairs 
ministers said repeatedly that Shiites were not Muslims.43 Any indecisiveness on 
Yudhoyono’s part in circumstances such as this did not damage his political interests or 
those of his team, some of whom were appointed to senior roles at least partly because 
of their political support for him.  
Yudhoyono’s government and team 
Yudhoyono is only one man and as president is more akin to the conductor than the 
orchestra. Yudhoyono’s ministers and advisers inevitably played a major role on policies 
and positions. Bush and Fealy both note that Ma’ruf Amin, a member of the Presidential 																																																								
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Advisory Council, a senior NU member and a director of MUI, had Yudhoyono’s ear on 
religious politics and contributed to government actions deemed to bolster intolerance, 
particularly by targeting Ahmadiyah.44 Amin chaired the MUI fatwa commission for 
many years after 2000 and was prominent in controversial MUI fatwas such as those 
against Ahmadiyah and secularism, pluralism and liberalism in 2005. Amin was but one 
conservative Islamic influence on Yudhoyono.  
Yudhoyono’s relationship with conservative Islam was sustained through both terms. PKS 
received three ministerial positions in the first Yudhoyono government, in return for its 
support.45 At the 2009 elections, Yudhoyono retained the backing of four Islamic 
(including two Islamist) parties (PKB, PAN, PPP, PKS), to a greater or lesser extent, for a 
second term as president.46 Another party in Yudhoyono’s coalition government was PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: United Development Party), whose leader Suryadharma 
Ali became Religious Affairs Minister. Suryadharma’s influence included granting a 
measure of official legitimacy to FPI by giving the keynote address at its 2013 annual 
congress in Jakarta.47 Suryadharma was one of four cabinet members who sat on the MUI 
board during Yudhoyono’s second term.48 The prevention of the construction of the GKI 
Taman Yasmin church in Bogor, which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter, also 
had Suryadharma’s backing.49 During most of the second Yudhoyono cabinet, 
Ahmadiyah communities were subject to Suryadharma’s power and influence. In 2010, 
for example, Suryadharma said banning Ahmadiyah would be the best solution, which 
led to subsequent demonstrations and attacks.50 Suryadharma framed the West’s 
liberalism as threatening to Islam, calling the human rights movement, for example, a 
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“new radicalism” of “freedom without limitation”, including no moral limitations.51  
The engagement between conservative Islam and state elites extended beyond cabinet 
and into state institutions. MUI’s campaign against heresy gathered support from the 
attorney-general, Hendarman Soepandji.52 The deviancy fatwa and its aftermath helped 
to revitalise and give purpose to Bakor Pakem (Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran 
Kepercayaan Masyakarat: Coordinating Board to Oversee Mystical Beliefs in Society), 
another Suharto-era organisation related to the regime agenda of control.53 Bakor Pakem, 
which is part of the Attorney-General’s department, became influential in the 
Yudhoyono years, pushing for the banning of Ahmadiyah, and the prosecution of Shiite, 
Ahmadiyah and atheist leaders.54 The government acted slowly in responding to the 
fatwa, and when it had not banned Ahmadiyah by 2008, pressure mounted and Bakor 
Pakem declared the JAI branch of Ahmadiyah had “deviated from the key tenets of Islam 
as it was understood in Indonesia, and had generated frustration and opposition in the 
public to the point where it was endangering public order”.55 MUI had an institutional 
ally within government, one that deployed the narrative of Islamism. This formal access 
to government increased the power of the alliance between conservatives and Islamists.  
Other institutional support for the Islamist/conservative alliance includes senior elements 
of the police. MUI’s campaign against heresy gathered support from General Sutanto, a 
national chief of police during Yudhoyono’s first term.56 In 2010, Yudhoyono appointed 
General Timur Pradopo to be national police chief, whereupon the new appointee said 
“the FPI should be embraced, and empowered, as they can contribute to national 
security”.57 Hefner suggests that FPI’s link to members of the military and political 
establishment might be the reason it can engage in apparently illegal activity with limited 
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official response.58 The failure of state institutions explains religious intolerance, 
according to a US report on religious freedom, which blames police, provincial officials 
and court tolerance for vigilantism, failure to enforce national laws protecting religious 
minorities, and lenient sentences for those convicted of violence towards minorities.59 
These institutions’ failure to act may contribute to future acts of intolerance, with radical 
Islamist vigilantes knowing they can act with varying degrees of impunity. Reasons for 
police inaction are complex, because sometimes the under-resourced local officers are 
confronted with crowds of hundreds of angry activists. However, other reasons – such as 
a vigilante action having the backing of powerful elite figures – have also been used to 
explain police inaction.60  
Indonesian authorities are apparently unable or unwilling to consistently enforce laws 
and constitutional provisions on religious freedom, Hefner says. “The unwillingness 
reflects serious disagreements among the country’s political elites over the question of 
how to balance religious freedom with social cohesion.”61 What are the dynamics of 
these political elites? Olle argues that in the absence of a dominant leader like Suharto, 
who was at the centre of many networks:  
intra-elite competition, previously contained within the boundaries of the state, has 
become more visible… competing elite groups use various organisations, both formal 
state and non-state bodies, in order to build their power and mobilise public support. 
Authoritarian habits, politics based on clientelisitic networks, and the use of scapegoating 
and violence as part of a political strategy, all have long histories in Indonesia.62 
Scapegoating is evident in the treatment of religious minorities in particular, an 
authoritarian tactic, with parallels in the idea of the creation of a villain in an ideological 
narrative. Meitzner explores an anti-reformist tendency among the elite that emerged in 
the early Yudhoyono years in opposition to ceding too much power to citizens.63 By 																																																								
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2009, this loose, ill-defined group, which included bureaucrats, military, businesspeople, 
and mainstream and militant religious leaders, sought to regain some control over the 
political process by revoking the popular vote for provincial governors. One supporter of 
the idea was Gamawan Fauzi, Yudhoyono’s minister for home affairs. Fauzi made 
repeated positive statements about FPI, including soon after an attack that led to the 
death of three Ahmadis in 2011, of which FPI was suspected of involvement.64 Fauzi is 
but one clear link between conservative Islam, the Yudhoyono government and the anti-
reformist tendency. Meitzner says a lapse in minority rights was one symptom of the 
democratic stagnation this group brought about. “Islamic elites… used the stagnation of 
reform to undermine the pluralist spirit of Indonesia’s legal and political foundations.”65 
Similarly, Islamist activist leaders have named retired generals (so-called “green 
generals”) as supporters of their conservative positions, including their stance against 
Ahmadiyah.66 All these elements highlight the interconnectivity of conservative power 
networks in the Yudhoyono era, straddling the elites of conservative politics, government 
bodies, the military and police, and Islamic organisations.  
From the evidence cited, it seems some elites, borrowing from Sidel’s line of argument,67 
are involved in acts of intolerance as part of efforts to forge or consolidate political blocs. 
Morality has a group-forming role in this process, similar to Menchik’s productive 
intolerance: “The debates over blasphemy are an attempt to affirm (by Muslim civil 
society) or disrupt (by liberals) norms and laws that help constitute the nation through 
belief in God”.68 In this process, actions are justified by the argument that what is good 
for the ingroup’s unity, strength and power, is good universally. If morality serves the 
group, and a group is a power structure, then morality serves the interests of a power 
structure. It is easier to unite when it is clear what the unity is against.  
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2008 joint decree 
The campaign to cast Ahmadiyah as deviant, which began in earnest in the lead-up to 
the 2005 MUI fatwas, reached crisis point in 2008. As detailed in chapter 2, attacks on 
Ahmadiyah spiked that year to a total of 238 acts of intolerance or violations of religious 
freedom, according to Setara Institute, which was two-thirds of the attacks recorded that 
year.69 The pressure contributed to the government’s decision to issue a joint ministerial 
decree in June 2008 ordering the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Ahmadiyah 
Community: JAI) to cease activities inconsistent with Islam, such as recognising a 
prophet after Muhammad.70 It is worth noting Ricklefs’ insight that were other larger 
targets of deviancy that were not pursued, such as LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam 
Indonesia). Ahmadiyah’s smaller size made it easier to attack.71 The essence of the 
decision was to ban Ahmadiyah from proselytising and “terminate Ahmadi activities for 
so long as the group claims to be part of Islam”.72 The decree had a knock-on effect, 
contributing to further attacks and at least 25 regulations by regional governments 
banning heretical sects and beliefs, according to Suaedy:  
A range of government agencies were involved, such as the Research and Development 
Agency of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; heads of regions and Bakorpakem (Badan 
Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, Coordinating Body for Monitoring 
Mystical Beliefs in Society) of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office; the police; and, of course, 
MUI. This demonstrates the active and deep involvement of government elements in the 
persecutions.73  
The regional decrees and local regulations were based on the blasphemy law, the joint 
decree and the MUI fatwa. Most of them related to the banning of Ahmadiyah in regions 
including Bogor City, Bogor District, Bekasi City, West Java Provincial Government, the 
Lombok Barat District and the Governor of West Nusa Tenggara/Lombok, the East Java 																																																								
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Provincial Government, the South Sumatra Provincial Government, Pekanbaru City in 
Riau Province; Padang City in West Sumatra Province; and the Samarinda District in East 
Kalimantan.74 This demonstrates the national impact of the joint decree, as well as the 
co-ordinated nature the process, with the participation ranging across government 
ministries, state institutions and Islamic organisations.  
The mainstream 
Fealy cautions against overemphasising the radicals’ role as the cause of intolerance and 
recommends giving more weight to mainstream attitudes, particularly those within NU 
and Muhammadiyah.75 For example, key members of NU’s and Muhammadiyah’s 
leadership encouraged Yudhoyono to ban Ahmadiyah. NU chairman Hasyim Mazudi 
argued in the crucial pre-joint decree period in 2008 that if Ahmadiyah was not banned, 
NU members might be drawn into violence against Ahmadiyah.76 This is another 
example of the instrumental use of the public order and harmony discourse, this time as 
an implied threat. Platzdasch suggests most NU leaders thought Ahmadiyah should be 
banned if they continued to claim to be Muslim.77  
The views of the local NU leadership I interviewed in Bogor were at odds with the 
sentiments of national leaders such as Mazudi. A senior member of NU’s political party, 
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), told me:  
For NU, it doesn’t matter to live side by side with Ahmadiyah as long as we respect each 
other. The problem is raised by small groups who has loud voice and creates problems at 
many times. Yes, radical, fundamental. Fundamentalism. In our view, they don’t represent 
Islam. It is politic interest covered by Islam. Interest-based politics.78 
The Bogor leader acknowledged the nuances, and NU’s role, though: “We know some 
people inside NU don’t like Ahmadiyah, but they have never done things as the radicals 
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have done.”79 Ricklefs notes the problematic characterisation of NU and 
Muhammadiyah as moderate, and suggests that while the term might distinguish the 
groups from Islamist and violent groups, it is not analytically useful.80 Hilmy is more 
explicit still, when he writes:  
Given these characteristics, we cannot define a clear fault line dividing peaceful Islamism 
from radical and violent Islamism… In reality, Islamism is on a borderless continuum 
where the boundary between it and so-called “moderate Islam” is blurred. In other words, 
Islamist ideas are contiguous for “moderate” ones on particular grounds and can gain 
broad resonance within some mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Despite their wide reputation as being “moderate” 
organizations, some segments of these organizations are surprisingly sympathetic to key 
points of the Islamists’ agenda. That is why their rhetoric can at times be remarkably similar 
to that of Islamist groups.81  
Perhaps that is why the idea of considering the emergence of a conservative 
Islamic/Islamist alliance in democratic Indonesia is useful, because of the shared views 
and interests of those groupings on some issues. As an example, NU leader Muzadi 
labelled the human rights movement “atheists riding on the democracy movement”, part 
of the new radicalism and extremism associated with Islamic liberalism.82 It would seem 
that more moderate leaders are the exception anyway, because contemporary surveys of 
Muslim civil society leaders show an overwhelming majority believe Ahmadis should 
not be allowed to hold public office, build houses of worship, or teach Islamic studies.83 
Those same leaders believe Christians and Hindus should be permitted greater religious 
freedom and political freedom. Such results reveal a clear distinction between the 
attitudes of mainstream Muslim leaders towards Ahmadiyah and Christians. 
So what does the population as a whole think? Hefner suggests the public is concerned 
about a collapse of public morality in the post-Suharto era.84 This would make the 																																																								
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population more receptive to narratives around morality. Political party leaders told 
Fealy that the polls tell them most Muslims do not like Ahmadiyah, resulting in the 
leaders not actively supporting that threatened minority.85 Fealy cites surveys revealing 
Indonesians believe they are tolerant, but that intolerance for some religious minorities in 
Indonesia is high by global standards. In 2012, 78 percent of Indonesian Muslims did not 
regard Ahmadis as Muslims, while their support for violence as a means of upholding 
religious principles increased from 10 percent to 20 percent (between 2005 and 2012).86 
Despite the rise, 80 percent do not support violence as a means of upholding religious 
principles, despite the trend in support for violence. These numbers suggest the 
conservative anti-Ahmadiyah campaign during the Yudhoyono years has had an impact 
on mainstream opinion.  
Local communities are a significant, and perhaps under-considered, factor in the issue of 
religious freedom, as Fealy says.87 Politicians pay attention to the majority, and 
politicians say speaking up for minorities does not win votes. Fealy quotes a leader of 
PAN who said it was not possible to support unpopular groups such as Ahmadiyah when 
they were threatened because the party would lose too many votes.88 Just as tellingly, a 
PKB leader said in 2012 the party would only support Ahmadiyah against persecution if 
Ahmadiyah donated enough money, which would be needed to win back votes that it 
would lose for standing up for Ahmadiyah. That is how politics works, he said.89 Fealy 
believes radical groups can only affect opinion to a limited extent because “mostly they 
have to work within the parameters of the local population’s opinion”.90 
What are the parameters of the population? Indonesian Muslims are highly aligned with 
sharia, with 71 percent of those polled in 2002 supporting the idea of the government 
requiring Muslims being required to follow sharia.91 This number is not clear-cut though, 
because further questioning revealed that only a large minority of survey respondents 																																																								
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preferred politicians who advocate and struggle for the implementation of Islamic law. 
When it comes time to vote, sharia is not pivotal, as revealed in the earlier discussion 
and the election results in Table 5a. Rather, the priorities of most Indonesians, according 
to data from Feillard and Madinier, are the cost of basic necessities, jobs, healthcare, 
education, security and political instability.92 This might not be as contradictory as it 
seems though, because as Hosen notes, most Muslims’ understanding of sharia is 
“looser” and “more abstract” than those who seek sharia’s integration into law.93 
Nevertheless, Islamist activists can influence voters and help set agendas that politicians 
respond to, Islamist organisations “foster hostility toward non-Muslim minorities” among 
the population, according to Jones.94 Wahid notes that Islamists have a strong influence 
over public opinion via the use of “a common religious language [which] makes radicals 
extremely dangerous, because it enables them to easily deceive many Muslims”.95  
Islamists, and indeed anyone, hoping to influence local populations had more 
opportunities after the fall of Suharto, when the Indonesian political system 
decentralised. This directed more power to provincial and city level with fewer 
remaining national responsibilities: security and defence, foreign policy, justice, and 
religious affairs.96 Local politicians in decentralised democratic Indonesia have the 
potential to play into Christianisation fears for electoral gain. For example, requests for a 
permit under the houses of worship law became increasingly politicised in the attempt to 
win votes, Crouch writes.97 Buehler argues that competition among state elites unleashed 
by free elections, reforms to the party system and decentralisation led to the elites 
seeking new political allies to survive. In the process they became more receptive to 
societal groups’ demands “but only if these groups provide resources that help those 
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elites gain and maintain power in Indonesian politics”.98 He cites evidence from 
gubernatorial elections in South Sulawesi province after 1998 showing state elites 
believe Islamist networks can provide “mobilisational, financial, and coercive resources 
important to entice voters… Often, sharia regulations have also served as a means to 
accumulate capital.”99 The sharia regulations have ended up raising money for the 
politicians, while local Islamist paramilitaries “many consisting of local thugs and petty 
criminals, frequently serve as election witnesses, intimidate voters, and act as ‘enforcers’ 
for local government heads”.100 Sharia creep in the regions might not be as clear a sign of 
national trends as some scholars, for example Abuza,101 have suggested, if these laws are 
largely enacted as part of local political maneuvering. Nevertheless, the apparent lack of 
commitment to implementing religion- or sharia-inspired regulations by local politicians 
leaves a political opportunity for radical Islamists to assume their role as enforcer of the 
laws (the laws they agree with).102 
Piety 
Islamisation in Indonesia over the past 50 years has seen most non-Sunni or nominal 
Muslims (such as Java’s abangan) move to the orthodox Sunni centre, Hefner suggests.103 
Ricklefs writes that while statistical evidence is limited, the group that had been abangan 
had probably moved from a majority to a minority over the Suharto years, as a result of 
the increase in the number of observant Muslims.104 He notes that the Islamisation 
process of the late 20th century seemed like the resumption of a process that had been 
occurring for centuries, but had been interrupted in the mid-19th to mid-20th century.  
One inference I could draw is that the opinions of the local population might be more 																																																								
98 Michael Buehler, "Elite Competition and Changing State-Society Relations: Shari'a Policymaking in 
Indonesia," in Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics, ed. Michele 
Ford and Tom Pepinsky (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2014), 158-59. 
99 Ibid., 173. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. 
102 Robin Bush, "Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?," in Expressing Islam: 
Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 
2008), 188. 
103 Hefner, "Islam in Indonesia, Post-Suharto." 
104 Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java. 
	 101	
amenable to Islamist messages than they would have been in the past. The public 
supported police morality crackdowns on gambling, drinking and prostitution, according 
to Ricklefs.105 It is only one step from there to supporting vigilante crackdowns. Brenner 
writes that over previous decades the Islamic movement (gerakan Islam):  
has been marked by a dramatic growth of interest in the study and practice of forms of 
Islam that have been purified of local heterodoxy… As a result, the influence of global 
Islam became increasingly visible in both public and private realms … as seen in 
changing modes of piety, ethical decorum, social interaction, and styles of dress… the 
struggle to gain symbolic dominance over public morality has rested in part on disputes 
over the shifting boundaries and meanings of public and private.106  
Thus in the context of an Indonesian Islam that is more comprehensively orthodox Sunni, 
less syncretic and “Indonesian”, as well as more conspicuously pious, the realm of 
public morality has become a zone of competition. The battle for moral authority 
between liberal and conservative Muslims promises political rewards for victory.107 The 
struggle is particularly over identities. Hence the need to maintain the awareness that 
there are moral threats, via public demonstrations, attacks and incidents.  
In democratic 21st century Indonesia, competition over religious symbols and institutions 
increased, which saw “populist preachers, neo-traditionalist Sufi masters, and secularly 
educated ‘new Muslim intellectuals’ challenge the monopoly of religious power earlier 
enjoyed by the ulama”.108 Hefner often notes great diversity and plurality exists within 
Indonesian Islam, and Islamisation is an ongoing process, the terms of which “remain 
highly contested, and for the moment the dominant discourses still balance Islamic 
values with a strong commitment to multiconfessional nationalism”.109 While Islamists 
and conservatives were effective in obtaining media attention and agenda-setting power 
in the early democratic era, van Bruinessen argues that various forms of Sufism seem to 
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be more influential among the urban middle class.110 Howell concludes that neo-Sufi 
practice in particular emphasises “felt connection with the Divine as a basis for ethical 
social prescriptions” which “strongly reinforces tolerance for religious pluralism”.111  
Overall, in this context of a more pious Indonesia, many aspects of which were evident 
by the late Suharto era and were noted in chapter 3, Yudhoyono’s contribution is 
important. In addition to the outcomes noted above, Yudhoyono – via biographies and 
other political messaging before his election in 2004 – wrapped himself in pious 
metaphorical garments, the effect of which Ricklefs notes would have been that “many 
thousands of politicians and bureaucrats across Java [and indeed Indonesia] understood 
such messages”.112  
While increased piety in society contributed to the way moral issues were framed and 
perceived, so too did decades of legislation, regulation and fatwas. A good example is 
the status of intermarriage between religions, which seems to have affected attitudes 
towards minorities. Fealy quotes a Pew survey which found only 2 percent of Indonesian 
Muslim parents would let their daughter marry a non-Muslim (6 percent would allow 
sons).113 The head of Setara Institute says the low rate of intermarriage is because of the 
1974 marriage laws, (not to mention the 1980 MUI fatwa against it), with far fewer 
interreligious marriages resulting in more segregation and religious homogeneity within 
families.114 The overall effect of this is a more tribal religious context, in which people 
spend less time with the religious Other, which in turn creates fewer opportunities to 
understand and empathise with the Other. Islamist narratives, especially those that 
involve threats to Islam or use the language of Islam, might well have more resonance 
with a more pious population. 
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Fundamentalists and the people 
The apparent level of support for fundamentalism is potentially reversible, says Kato, 
who questions the strength of the masses’ religious conviction and commitment. He 
argues that economic disenfranchisement drives popular support for the fundamentalists 
and their condemnation of government incompetence.115 Kato perceives something 
closer to a political alliance that could fade if the masses achieve their economic 
ambitions. Wilson has reached a similar conclusion about Islamic vigilantism, including 
FPI, which:  
is invoked spatially as a territorial identity in the defence of communities from perceived 
or actual encroachment from new or accelerated social forces. It is a defensive and 
reactive form of social conservatism, reflecting culturally embedded understandings of 
Islam that are often more parochial than radical despite the use of radical and militant 
symbolism. Looking behind the rhetorical stance of the FPI’s leadership and its ostensive 
concern with enforcing piety, public morality and conformity to its interpretation of 
Islam, the interests of urban poor members remained focused upon three key areas: 
defending notions of a socially heterogeneous and conservative community in the wake 
of demographic and socio-economic shifts; using this process as a means of increasing 
their own social and political capital; and having a means through which to voice 
generalized rather than specifically religious resentments and grievances at the state, 
social and political elites and the impacts of market capitalism.116  
Islamists might have serious moral motivations and ideological narratives, but that does 
not mean that those responding to them are doing so on the basis of the original 
intention. The analysis in this quotation raises a question I have barely touched upon, 
which is class, and the lack of access to power among the poor. Yudhoyono’s coalition 
appears to balance the interests of economic elites as well as conservative Islamic elites, 
among others. Wilson’s analysis also suggests that we not confuse rhetoric with more 
structural, underlying forces. The level of inequality in Indonesia is very high, and yet 
social unrest on that count is not a major issue. By gathering many of the most powerful 
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religious forces and voices into his political tent, Yudhoyono is obtaining their political 
support and their acquiescence on his economic agenda, with all its vested interests and 
unequal distributions of wealth. That raises the question of just who is playing whom?  
Conclusion 
Harmony, stability and order are highly valued assets in the Indonesian public space, 
unsurprisingly after the mayhem of the mid-1960s, and the riots, pogroms and jihad at 
the turn of the century. As president, Yudhoyono was committed to maintaining order 
and stability. Since democracy has widened the civic space in Indonesia, Islamists have 
attempted to provoke the still-present fear of chaos, not unlike conservative elites who 
have also used such manipulation as part of maintaining their interests and control. An 
appeal to group loyalty (within Islam) against those cast as heretics, such as Ahmadiyah, 
is the politics of identity, tribalism and morality. Conservatives and Islamists have 
procured elite support via presidential backing for MUI and cabinet-level endorsement of 
FPI. The elites, including Yudhoyono, have in turn benefited from the support of 
Islamists, shoring up their political positions. Islamisation proceeds in Indonesia, but it 
has resulted in multiple and varied manifestations of Islam in Indonesia. This is despite 
the increasing influence of a puritanical, Arabic stream of Islam. Islamists do not enjoy 
the power they would like given their expectation that a Muslim-majority country would 
be run as, essentially, an Islamic country. Instead, they exist like other players within a 
competitive environment where they must woo and win support. This competition 
creates too much uncertainty for them though, and is one of the main aspects of religious 
life they are trying to change. As a movement for whom morality is fundamental, 
morality is central to the manner in which they communicate with and hope to influence 
Indonesian Muslims.  
While Indonesia’s Islamists are a minority, they are able through commitment and 
organisation to exert influence beyond their numbers, attempting to bring ideas such as 
religious freedom into disrepute by their associations with Western or liberal 
	 105	
ideologies.117 They achieve such influence through their use of provocative 
demonstrations that gain media attention and provide a platform to call for legal changes 
in the name of restoring calm and order to the disturbed population. These groups 
undermine Indonesia’s constitutionalism and to some extent its democracy with their 
claims to a morally superior position with regard to the law.  
The “core Muslim leadership”, however, have rejected the Islamists’ reasoning, 
according to Hefner, instead supporting “a political framework that could work with 
rather than against their community’s diversity”.118 As such, key players have opted for a 
pluralistic Indonesian nationalism over the Islamists’ version of Islamic domination, 
which involves an attempt by this ambitious minority to manipulate the population with 
scapegoating discourses. In that sense, persecution of religious minorities has not 
overwhelmed Indonesia, because Indonesia’s democracy is alive, albeit challenged by 
the plutocracy. This democratic resilience is a testimony, despite the lapses, to the 
strength of the system created by Indonesians for their still relatively young nation. 
Indonesians have rejected authoritarianism at every post-Suharto national election, and 
have not opted to bring sharia into their legal system in any purposeful, thorough way, 
especially at the national level. There have, however, been so many instances of 
intolerance and persecution, including violence, and lapses of religious freedom, that the 
issue remains critical and pressing, and explanations important.  
Next chapter, I will examine the treatment of minorities in the Bogor area in the period 
under examination, 2004-2014, with reference to the GKI Taman Yasmin case and 
Ahmadiyah. I will explore the links between local, national and transnational Islamist 
groups and their ideological narratives, and opposition to religious minorities. I will also 
explore how morality relates to the law in the context of the treatment of religious 
minorities.  
																																																								
117 Hefner, "The Study of Religious Freedom in Indonesia," 25. 
118 Hefner, "A Conservative Turn in Indonesian Islam?," 45. 
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Chapter 6: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN BOGOR? 
In this chapter, I will examine the case of the GKI Bogor Yasmin church and some 
incidents relating to Ahmadiyah mosques in the Bogor area with reference to the 
interviews I conducted in Indonesia in 2014. Some factors involved in opposition to the 
church are local. Another factor is Islamist organisations with local, national and 
international Islamist connections. I break arguments against the building of the GKI 
Yasmin church into three categories: local concerns, contextual factors, and permit 
issues. A key feature among the permit issues is the fake signature argument. I will then 
examine some cases relating to Ahmadiyah, draw together relevant links between 
Islamist organisations, explore the meaning and relevance of their involvement, and 
situate their actions within their local, national and transnational context.  
A group of Christians in Bogor, West Java, has been prevented from building a church on 
land it owns in the Taman Yasmin residential district. The congregation collected local 
signatures in 2002 and 2003 as required by regulations, before being granted a permit by 
the Bogor city government in 2006.1 The permit was withdrawn in 2008 after local 
protests. The church subsequently won legal victories up to the Supreme Court, which in 
ruling that it could not hear the case reaffirmed the lower courts’ ruling in favour of the 
church.2 The church also drew support from the Indonesian Ombudsman.3 Indonesian 
legal authorities ruled that the local government’s initial decision to allow construction 
was legitimate and there had been no grounds for rescinding it. Yet the church grounds 
remained sealed from 2008 through to the time of writing in 2016, with building 
prohibited by local authorities.  
Interviewees told me that Bogor was a religiously tolerant community and that people 
lived in religious harmony.4 One political activist and head of a woman’s organisation 
said: “We live harmoniously between one religion and another. We care for each other 																																																								
1 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Defying the State; Ida Indawati Khouw, "Three Years on, GKI 
Yasmin Church Remains Victim of Absence of the State " The Jakarta Post, December 24, 2011. 
2 Melissa Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the Courts in West Java (London: 
Routledge, 2014). 
3 Human Rights Watch, In Religion's Name. 
4 Zainal Afatin (Muslim, political aspirant), interview with the author, Bogor, July 24, 2014.  
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and respect each other in practising our religion.”5 Nevertheless, many arguments 
against the church emerge in my data from local residents, as well as some in favour of 
the church.  
Technical concerns 
One Bogor resident neatly summarised the reasons some people oppose the building of 
GKI Yasmin church based on local concerns such as traffic problems, impact on property 
values and their desire not to live near civil disturbances and conflict.6 A Muslim Taman 
Yasmin resident, who lives near the church site, said some of his neighbours do not 
oppose the church: “Some they just don’t care… I don’t care. But some of them said it 
shouldn’t be here… I think economic motive… value of property.”7 This Muslim resident 
believes that a church affects property prices on the basis that Muslims do not want to 
live near churches. Another resident who lives close to the church site objected to the 
activists against the Christians who were holding their Sunday service on the footpath 
outside the sealed church site: “Every Sunday there is blocking mob in the street, it 
disturb us, Christian or Muslim [residents] disturbed by this group.”8 By referring to 
Christians and Muslims, I understood this source to mean that it did not matter which 
religion the residents were, they could still be put off the idea of the church by the civil 
disturbances.  
The nearby Muslim local resident, who has at times been a community leader, said: “If 
you want to build something here and then the society say no, you have to choose; you 
build here and then you get confrontation. Or you can accommodate what they want.”9 
In other words, to avoid confrontation about building a church, do not try to build a 
church where people will object. This argument is similar to the harmony, stability and 
order argument. The bigger problem with the argument is that it ignores the legality of 
church permits and the fact that in gathering 267 signatures in 2002 and 2003, the 																																																								
5 Dewi Sri Erna Harsiwi (Muslim, head of women’s organisation, political activist), interview with the 
author, Bogor, July 24, 2014.  
6 Aji Hermawan (Muslim, Taman Yasmin resident), interview with the author, Bogor, August 26, 2014.  
7 Interview with Taman Yasmin resident 1 who lives close to the church site, Bogor, September 6, 2014. 
8 Interview with Taman Yasmin resident 2, very close to church site, Bogor, September 11, 2014.  
9 Ibid, interview with the author, September 11, 2014.  
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church did attempt to find consensus and permission. Activists against the church can 
exploit such arguments, by protesting, making noise and generating conflict.  
Contextual issues 
One local summarised a point about West Java’s religiosity: “West Java is very different 
than other, compare to central and east. More conservative... For example, the Islamic 
law supporter is high, formalisation of sharia also higher.”10 It is often said that West Java 
is a conservative province. Evidence includes that the Darul Islam movement of the 
1950s and 60s was strongest in West Java.11 West Java is Indonesia’s largest province by 
population, so perhaps it is unsurprising that Setara Institute reported that it was the 
province with the highest number of violations of religious freedom in the period 2007 to 
2014, totalling 494.12 Ahmad Heryawan, the governor of West Java since April 2008, is a 
PKS party member.13 He has called for the banning of jaipongan folk dancing for being 
too provocative.14 Heryawan apparently made deals with FPI in his successful 2012 re-
election bid, promising in writing to outlaw Ahmadiyah.15  
Another issue is the ethnic identity of the group trying to establish a place of worship. A 
Taman Yasmin resident said: “This church, Bataknese church always have problem… 
Batak people more open, just like me, more straight-forward, sometime more aggressive. 
This is creating problem in the community. Many place in Tangerang, in Bekasi, always 
Bataknese church, not Javanese church.”16 While the argument about assertiveness of 
Batak people compared with Javanese or Sundanese might resonate with some people, 
the related and perhaps more relevant factor is that Batak people come from a region in 
Sumatra. Thus they are often economic migrants from a low-development area moving 
																																																								
10 Aji Hermawan (Taman Yasmin resident), interview with the author, Bogor, August 26, 2014.  
11 Bruinessen, "Muslim Fundamentalism: Something to Be Understood or to Be Explained Away?." 
12 Halili and Naipospos, From Stagnation to Pick the New Hopes. 
13 Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy, and Whit Mason, Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, 
Indonesia and Turkey (Longueville Books, 2008). 
14 Julie Chernov Hwang, "When Parties Swing: Islamist Parties and Institutional Moderation in Malaysia 
and Indonesia," South East Asia Research 18, no. 4 (2010). 
15 Wilson, "Resisting Democracy: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's 2014 Elections". 
16 Imam Soeseno (Muslim, Taman Yasmin resident), interview with the author, Bogor, September 5, 2014. 
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to the high-development areas around Jakarta, such as Bogor, Bekasi and Tangerang.17 
Identifiable new groups competing for jobs, land and other resources are a potential 
cause of conflict, as Wilson notes at the end of the previous chapter. Resentment towards 
Chinese Indonesians burst into violence several times in 20th century Indonesia. In the 
Suharto era, Chinese Indonesians were associated with cronyism and overriding local 
concerns about development, as well as with an increasing sense of growth of Christian 
churches in devout Muslim-majority neighbourhoods.18 Such attitudes towards Chinese 
Indonesians contributed to the fear of Christianisation.19  
Permit issues 
Local residents also mentioned concerns over permits and regulations. One local 
community leader, who lives near the church site, explained why it was important to 
consider who had signed approval of the church construction, and who had not: “It 
should be signed by the people influenced by this. Not from outside… not from outside. 
That’s the problem.”20 The question for this resident is not about the law, or has the 
church followed regulations, but what he thinks the law should consider (him and his 
neighbours), because they are closest to the church site. Implicit in this argument is a 
hierarchy topped by location, with the people nearest having a right to be consulted and 
a right to veto. It seems the hierarchy argument is moral, rather than legal, a moral 
argument privileging his own opinion above the law. This ‘our approval is required’ 
argument bears similarities to the argument by Islamist activist groups such as FPI, 
detailed in chapter 4, which places FPI’s moral assertions based on interpretations of 
Islam above the national law. The ‘our approval is required’ argument places the opinion 
of local residents above the law in arguing that it does not matter what the law says, 
because only one thing matters: our approval. Residents who hold this opinion use it to 
justify their support for the local authorities’ decision to prevent construction of the 
church.  																																																								
17 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: 'Christianisation' and Intolerance. 
18 Sidel, "On the 'Anxiety of Incompleteness'." 
19 Arifianto, "Explaining the Cause of Muslim-Christian Conflicts in Indonesia." 
20 Interview with Taman Yasmin resident 2, very close to church site, Bogor, September 11, 2014.  
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Some Islamist activists claim they became active in order to help local people. A Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia member described a demonstration at Bogor city hall:  
We [HTI] did the demonstration together with other Muslim groups such as KMB 
[Keluarga Muslim Bogor]… It was started from a Muslim group in Yasmin area. They 
were shocked when they saw the church being built. They had never signed anything 
approving the church. Then they discovered the church had manipulated the list of 
attendance in an RT [local community] meeting. This list was claimed as approval. It fired 
the demonstration and then we joined them.21 
Political activism is predicated on the “fake signatures” argument linked with the “our 
approval is required” argument. There are two arguments. Firstly, “our approval is 
required” but has not been granted. It implicitly suggests the law did the wrong thing by 
the people. Secondly, “fake signatures” suggests the church did the wrong thing by the 
law. Both are moral arguments, defining right and wrong. In the quotation from the HTI 
member, the claim about the fake signatures is almost certainly erroneous, as I will 
explain below. The church did not use the contentious signatures in its application, 
which was completed years before. I will elaborate on this issue because of its national 
implications, its use within Islamists’ ideological narratives and its centrality to the 
prevention of the church building.  
Fake signatures  
The fake signature argument, widely used in Bogor, is worth examining because it is also 
used elsewhere Indonesia, such as Bekasi.22 The allegation provides support for Islamists’ 
moral arguments and ideological narratives. The fake signatures argument fits within a 
discourse about the illegitimacy of the process. By raising doubt about the legality of the 
process, the activists have created a sense of the church as cheating. A local resident 
leader continually refers to the opinions and preferences of the community he belongs 
to: “They [the community] think they [the church] are cheating about the sign [signature] 
and you know for some people if you are cheating and then we cannot trust you 																																																								
21 Interview with member of HTI’s women’s arm, Bogor, September 12, 2014. 
22 Human Rights Watch, In Religion's Name, 54. 
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anymore. That’s the problem.”23 The issue of trust and the alleged bad behaviour of 
Christians outlined here is an example of moral arguments against a minority community 
undermining trust. This aligns with broader Islamist narratives about the untrustworthy 
nature of Christians and the West’s moral failings and attacks on Islam.  
Diani Budiarto, as mayor, was ultimately responsible for cancelling the permit to build. 
In 2008, Mayor Budiarto argued that the permit freeze was temporary and was due to 
Muslim activist protests.24 By 2010 he was arguing: “This is about a permit that is legally 
flawed because a community leader faked signatures of residents to procure it.”25 At 
other times, including in 2011, Mayor Budiarto also used the Muslim street scholar 
argument, which says the church should not be located on a street named after a Muslim 
scholar.26  
Hamdani argues that in the Bogor GKI Taman Yasmin case and in Indonesia generally, 
“radical Muslim groups will continuously trigger various social and cultural problems 
both with non-Muslims and moderate Muslim groups due to their conflicting ideology 
with the democratic and legal principles”.27 I discussed a number of these groups in the 
previous chapters, including FUI (Forum Umat Islam; Islamic Community Forum), FPI 
(Front Pembela Islam; Islamic Defenders Front) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). FUI 
has had close links to HTI in the past, and senior members include those who warn 
loudly of the perils of Christianisation and call for the restoration of the caliphate.28 
Another group involved in GKI Yasmin protests has been the local Taman Yasmin-based 
Forkami (Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Muslim Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Society 
Communications Forum). Forkami’s chairman, Ahmad Iman, said the group was 
coordinated by FUI: “We report our activities to the FUI.”29 Forkami apparently 
developed in 2009 and 2010 out of Taman Yasmin-area Islamic prayer groups to prevent 																																																								
23 Interview with Taman Yasmin resident 2, very close to church site, Bogor, September 11, 2014.  
24 Human Rights Watch, In Religion's Name. 
25 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Defying the State, 13. 
26 Camelia Pasandaran, "Churches Can't Be Built in Streets with Islamic Names: Bogor Mayor," Jakarta 
Globe, August 19, 2011. 
27 Hamdani, "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church [GKI]," 4. 
28 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: 'Christianisation' and Intolerance, 16. 
29 Khouw, "Three Years On." 
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the church being built, ultimately making an alliance with FUI.30 A Forkami activist, its 
secretary Ayu Agustin, was quoted in the Jakarta Globe just before Christmas in 2011, as 
saying the group had evidence of the fake signatures, and so:  
‘Forkami will always push security forces to disperse the congregation from the [church’s] 
sidewalk,’ she said… ‘It was proven that when we didn’t push hard enough, the 
congregation even dared to use musical instruments and sing… If they insist, we will act 
according to our Islamic law… This is the land of Muslims.’31  
Several Islamist themes appear in this quotation. One is that Islamists have to push the 
state agencies, such as the police, to act against Christians. The fake signature argument 
is one of the justifications Islamists use to encourage police action to prevent Christian 
worship at the site. Another Islamist theme in this quotation is that leaders of Forkami, a 
local civil society organisation, believe the group can act to prevent other civic actors 
(Christians in this case) from carrying out activities of which it disapproves. The 
justification for acting as a quasi-police force is the fake signature argument as well as 
“our Islamic law”. This is another instance promoting an interpretation of Islam, framed 
as Islamic law, as above Indonesian law. “This is the land of Muslims” is a tribal 
statement of territory and dominance that says in six words more about the activists’ 
motivation in opposing the church than a book full of arguments about street names or 
signature forgery. In this argument, this activist is co-opting a large group of people 
without their consent. Forkami is a self-appointed voice of Muslims claiming the right to 
define what Muslims believe in relation to the GKI Yasmin church. The signatures of 
approval from hundreds of local residents gathered by the GKI Yasmin congregation as 
part of the regulatory process acts as a strong counter argument. The church’s argument 
is supported by court and ombudsman rulings that the church building is legally 
approved and legitimate. That might explain why the signatures needed to be 
undermined. The legality of the church’s building process challenges the assertion of 
Islamist activists that the people do not want the church built in this location. It was 
politically advantageous to the Islamists for doubt about the signature process to arise.  																																																								
30 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Defying the State, 13. 
31 Khouw, "Three Years On." 
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This discourse of the people’s will, as defined by activists, backed with the weight of 
“our Islamic law” establishes an apparent clash between local desires and national law. 
The “we” are not Indonesians ruled by Indonesian law, but Muslims ruled by Islamic 
law. The foregrounding of Islamic identity precludes the Indonesian identity. The contest 
is not merely about whether or not to have a church, but about who decides whether it is 
permitted. The Islamists’ assertion of a right to speak on behalf of local Muslims against 
the church is an assertion of power, of Islamic power against state power.  
Mayor Budiarto denied his revoking of the permit to build was about religion, explaining 
to a newspaper in 2011: “This is about a permit that is legally flawed because a 
community leader faked signatures of residents to procure it.”32 However, there is 
considerable doubt about whether this occurred. In the Bogor GKI Yasmin case, the 
mayor and Islamist activists rely on the conviction of a local man, Munir Karta, for their 
fake signature argument. The Indonesian Ombudsman said the Munir Karta case was 
irrelevant, because the church relied on two other petitions with 170 and 97 signatures 
from 2002 and 2003 for its legitimately obtained permit.33  
The signatures in dispute in the Munir Karta case appear to have been collected as a 
record of a community meeting in 2006 but were only filed to the local government by 
another local community leader in 2010, long after the church was approved and the 
dispute had become heated.34 Nevertheless, Karta was convicted in 2011 over a list of 10 
signatures of local residents. The case against him claimed these misrepresented support 
for the building of GKI Yasmin. Karta said later that he had signed a police deposition 
under pressure from Forkami: “I was all alone seated there [at the police station] and was 
forced to follow what [Forkami] members said, and I now regret that.”35  
																																																								
32 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Defying the State, 13. 
33 Khouw, "Three Years On; Melissa Crouch, "The Inter-Religious Harmony Forum, the Ombudsman, and 
the State: Resolving Church Permit Disputes in Indonesia?," in Religioius Diversity in Muslim-Majority 
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2014). 
34 Khouw, "Three Years On." 
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Forkami’s efforts do not stop at legal arguments. There have been several documented 
attempts by Forkami members to harass and intimidate local community members into 
opposing the construction of the church.36 This forms part of a pattern of harassment by 
activist groups, such as when the GKI congregation were forced off the street on Sundays 
to worship in nearby private homes, Hamdani writes: “Some of them brought weapon 
and threatened the members of congregation, visitors from House of Representative and 
human right activists.”37  
Despite the legal irrelevance of the Munir Karta case, and the doubts about the 
conviction, many Bogor residents cite the fake signature allegation as their first and main 
reason for opposing GKI Yasmin church being built, or as the explanation for why others 
oppose the church. My evidence for this assertion is a range of interviews with Bogor 
residents. A Bogor PDI-P politician said: “The permit issued… is not good because at the 
beginning they have false signature.”38 The publisher of a local daily newspaper, whose 
office is situated directly across the street from the vacant church site with its half-built 
church said: “Regarding the legal permit, it was aborted by the court because of the fake 
signatures. So the main issue wasn’t about religious freedom, it was about the legal 
permit of the church.”39 The permit had been withdrawn by the mayor, but not by a 
court and long before the fake signature case arose. A number of other sources cited the 
fake signatures as the reason for the failure of the church to have a permit, sometimes in 
addition to the technical reasons already detailed.  
Apart from expressing the views of his fellow residents, this local resident also has his 
own opinion:  
In this case, as a Muslim, I don’t like… Because most of us is a Muslim, and I know that 
some of the church is using as a basis for, try to influence another people to become 
Christian. So we don’t want to do that because mosque, we have several mosques here 
and they do the intensive pengajian [study, teaching], meeting with our group. So if there 																																																								
36 Ali-Fauzi et al., Disputed Churches in Jakarta, 62. 
37 Hamdani, "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church[GKI]." 
38 Atty Somaddikarya. Interview with the author, July 23, 2014, Bogor.  
39 Hazairin Sitepu (publisher of Bogor’s daily Bogor Radar newspaper), interview with the author, Bogor, 
September 5, 2104.  
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is one group here, one group here, the location is very near I’m afraid it will be potential 
conflict among these two groups.40 
This local resident has expressed his judgment with an identification of himself as a 
Muslim, rather than as an Indonesian, which is consistent with the idea that people make 
assessments of a situation through the prism of a group’s identity if that identity is salient 
or active. His argument appears to be a combination of a stability and order argument, 
and an anti-proselytisation argument, combined with the previous argument about fake 
signatures. All these arguments were expressed despite this man’s earlier assertion of 
tolerance – and indeed friendship – between religions. This is not necessarily 
inconsistent. Menchik surveyed NU and Muhammadiyah elites and found that 82 
percent were comfortable living next door to a Christian, while 20 percent would 
approve the building of a church in their neighbourhood.41 It is possible to draw parallels 
with the general population, because Menchik cites surveys that show 84 percent of 
Indonesians would be willing to live next door to a person from another religion. The 
distinction here is that Indonesians seem able to distinguish between tolerance of 
individuals and tolerance towards an institution, such as a church. A neighbouring 
Christian is not necessarily a proselytising Christian. I posit that Christians pose little or 
no threat to most Indonesian Muslims, unless they proselytise or attempt to build new 
churches.  
Such was the consistency of the Muslim interviewees’ statements about Bogor’s 
tolerance, as well as the pattern of saying fake signatures caused the church’s problems, 
that I argue they are related discourses. On the one hand, Bogor is overtly and 
demonstrably tolerant, with Christians able to worship freely (in existing churches), albeit 
not always as near to their homes as they might prefer. On the other hand, there have 
been stark instances of religious intolerance against Ahmadiyah in Parung, near Bogor, 
and elsewhere, as well as against Christians hoping to build their GKI Yasmin church. 
One of the GKI congregation’s activist leaders perceives the situation in this way:  																																																								
40 Interview with Taman Yasmin resident 2, very close to church site, Bogor, September 11, 2014.   
41 Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 154. 
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I think there is a tendency just to keep kind of an illusion Indonesia as a really tolerant 
country. I mean, in general yes, but covering up cases like what happen with us, what 
happen with Ahmadiyah, what happen with the Shia... And why do they keep saying 
about regulation? It’s just to make it people will think that really there is no problem 
about intolerance in Indonesia, while actually it exists.42 
I suggest the fake signature discourse allows Bogor residents to maintain their sense of 
living in a tolerant, religiously free and untroubled community without having to closely 
examine the reality of the GKI Yasmin case. What, then, is the reality? One Bogor 
resident, an Islamic studies teacher, conducted in-depth research on the GKI church 
dispute, producing a thorough report.43 He said:  
In 2008, we held a local election. There was a new provocation. It was run by certain 
groups. The so-called militant radical such as KMB [Keluarga Muslim Bogor; Bogor 
Muslim Family], HTI. They took benefit from the election momentum to push the mayor 
withdraws the IMB [church building permit]… They will vote for him as long as he 
withdraw the church IMB… They built opinion among the community that the biggest 
mission in Southeast Asia will be located here.44 
The first point is local electoral politics, pressuring politicians with a threat not to vote for 
them. The Christian activist leader sees it this way: “This situation was started when 
Diani Budiarto, the previous mayor, was trying to get the seat for the second time, when 
he was then get a deputy mayor from PKS party.”45 The church activist believed formal 
politics played a role, PKS in particular. The deputy mayor of Bogor, Ahmad Ruhiyat, 
belonged to the Islamist PKS party, which was part of a coalition that supported Budiarto, 
was also involved in some decisions about the church site’s closure.46  
The second point, on a potential Christian mission, is (admittedly anecdotal) evidence by 
an informal expert of activists’ attempts to reinforce the Islamist discourse about Christian 																																																								
42 Bona Sigalingging (GKI congregation, activist), interview with the author, Bogor, September 7, 2014.  
43 Various, Diskriminas Atas Nama Agama: Gki Bogor – Bakal Pos Taman Yasmin, Kronologi Peristiwa 
(2002-2011) (2012). 
44 Khotimi Bahri, (Islamic studies teacher who made an indepth report, as cited, on his research into the 
GKI churhc situation, interview with the author, Bogor, August 27, 2014.  
45 Bona Sigalingging (GKI congregation, activist), interview with the author, Bogor, September 7, 2014. 
46 Ali-Fauzi et al., Disputed Churches in Jakarta. 
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proselytisation using an immense exaggeration. One Taman Yasmin resident who was 
also a former local Nahdlatul Ulama leader said the opposition by activists, that is 
Islamist groups, was not necessarily about signatures, but about Christians. “They refuse 
at all, don’t build the church here. I was invited in a meeting some religious leaders and I 
know that some of them try to refuse the building of the church in Bogor. So for 
whatever reasons. Any church. Any new church.”47 The groups he referred to were 
opposed to the development of other religions. He said they were FPI and HTI.  
The suggestion revealed by this interviewee that FPI and HTI were involved in the 
opposition to the church because they always oppose new churches is worth examining. 
An HTI spokeswoman, who lives in Bogor, said: “The Christian community, they didn’t 
follow the rules. They manipulate signature of some people around the building.”48 Yet 
the spokeswoman continued with an argument that had no relationship with the legality 
of the process, but related to her interpretation of the houses of worship laws as being 
about “the number of followers of religion in that area”, and therefore:  
in this case, the GKI Yasmin I think the best policy is not giving the permit because the 
majority is Muslim and then the Christian in that place is only some number, so when 
there is a church there the one coming to the church is not people from around the place, 
but people from other places, even from other cities.49 
When combined with the Forkami spokeswoman’s statement above that “this is the land 
of Muslims”, there appears to be an Islamist argument to limit the growth of Christianity 
in so-called Muslim areas. It is worth noting, and fair to note, that like other Muslims, 
this HTI spokeswoman says Christians can and do worship in Bogor and Indonesia. 
However, if these Christians want to build a new church, they should do so where “there 
are relatively big number of Christian, so in that area it is possible and it is their right to 
build their church”.50 This quotation seems to say that majority Muslim areas get no new 
churches, but majority Christian areas could get new churches. This seems similar to an 																																																								
47 Aji Hermawan (Taman Yasmin resident), interview with the author, Bogor, August 26, 2014.  
48 Iffah Ainur Rochmah (women’s spokeswoman and head of women’s arm of HTI), interview with the 
author, Bogor, September 12, 2014. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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argument for segregation. It suggests that no new churches is what the Islamists want, 
and the arguments used to achieve that goal, moral or legal, are justifications to help 
them get what they want.  
An example of activists from elsewhere is Garis (Gerakan Islam Reformis: Islamic Reform 
Movement), a Cianjur-based group with links to Darul Islam.51 Its leader, Chep 
Hernawan, established the group in 1998, and its actions have included campaigns 
against Ahmadiyah since 2005, and against a pilgrimage at a Catholic monastery in 
2007.52 Hamdani notes that Garis has at times mobilised 200 to 300 militant supporters 
against GKI Yasmin church, coordinating activities with FUI, FPI, HTI, KMB (Keluarga 
Muslim Bogor: Bogor Muslim Family), and the local Forkami group.53 Garis sent 
members to Bogor every Sunday to confront the GKI Yasmin congregation and their 
supporters in front of their abandoned church, where they were holding makeshift 
services.  During the Suharto era, Hernawan – who is suspected of talent scouting for 
Jemaah Islamiyah – was an activist with the student group GPI (Gerakan Pemuda Islam: 
Islamic Youth Movement), which supports the establishment of an Islamic state and sent 
hundreds of jihadis to Afghanistan in late 2001 to fight with the Taliban against the US.54 
In 2014, Hernawan said he had been appointed president of the Indonesian chapter of 
ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and had recruited jihadis to send to the Middle East 
to fight with them.55 Hernawan had been encouraged to set up a mass-based militant 
organisation by leaders from DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia; Council of 
Indonesia for the Propagation of Islam), which as previously detailed had developed an 
anti-Christianisation, anti-Zionist and anti-Western discourse.56 
The national MUI has also opposed the construction of GKI Yasmin, including support 																																																								
51 Buehler, "Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari'a Politics in Two 
Indonesian Provinces," 71. 
52 Human Rights Watch, In Religion's Name, 28. 
53 Hamdani, "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church [GKI]." 
54 Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 72. 
55 try/nrl, "Ini Profil Chep Hermawan, 'Presiden' Isis Indonesia Yang..." detik.com, 
http://news.detik.com/berita/2660690/ini-profil-chep-hermawan-presiden-isis-indonesia-yang-ditangkap-
polisi; Associated Press, "The Muslim Nation Where Isis Is Free to Recruit," CBS News, 
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56 Hamdani, "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church [GKI]." 
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for Bogor Mayor Budiarto in defying the Supreme Court decision.57 While Mayor 
Budiarto’s actions and decisions can be seen at least partly as “sharia policymaking… an 
investment strategy aimed at establishing and reproducing social relationships that can 
be used by local state elites to gain or maintain power”,58 the same reasoning cannot 
apply to MUI. The GKI Yasmin issue is bigger than local politics, the support from MUI 
and other organisations strongly suggests. Instead of this being a case of genuine outrage 
and concern about a particular legal breach – fake signatures – I argue this case fits into 
the pattern of harassment of churches around Indonesia, the dimensions of which have 
been explained in chapter 2 based on research by Setara Institute and other sources. The 
Islamist activists deploy ideological narratives that help to mobilise support against 
imagined enemies or threats. Islamists tell the story of the GKI Yasmin church as one in 
which Islamic activist heroes oppose church construction and villainous Christians cheat 
their way to a building permit. The angry confrontations at the closed church site are one 
means of vanquishing the evil misdeed, and the balanced and proper state is a Muslim-
majority community that should not have to experience the existence of an alien entity, a 
church, in its midst.  
There is a connection between these activist actions against minorities, their ideological 
narratives and morality. Morality serves to bind groups together, making them more 
functional, but also to justify actions towards outgroups that would not be tolerated 
towards the ingroup. Haidt suggests racism can be taught by triggering disgust towards 
other groups, for being dirty, or anger can generated towards them because of their 
cheating.59 Indonesian Islamists have associated their religious opponents with filthy 
matter as part of the process of creating the Other. 60 My data shows a pattern of belief 
among interviewees in Bogor that the GKI Yasmin had been proven to have cheated in 
their application for a church-building permit. However, there is credible evidence that 
they did not cheat, and that the cheating allegations were fabricated, or at least 
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irrelevant, albeit widely believed.61 I conclude that it is easier for people who believe in 
religious tolerance to agree with the prevention of establishing a church if there is some 
justification, such as the wrongdoing of the church. It appears that Islamist activists have 
attempted to create the impression of cheating in the Bogor GKI Yasmin case to further 
their cause.62 This in turn allows tolerant people to justify intolerant actions, in the case 
of the community, and in the case of the activists, a cover under which intolerant people 
can attempt to deny their actions are intolerant in an effort to secure more support.  
Ahmadiyah 
The Ahmadiyah communities in and around Bogor are subject to different dynamics than 
Christians. Yet despite these different religions being persecuted for different reasons, 
Ahmadiyah and GKI Yasmin Christians are targeted by the same groups. Garis leader 
Hernawan has admitted responsibility for attacks on an Ahmadiyah community in 
Sukadana in September 2005.63  In the Bogor area, FPI was involved in the attack on 
Ahmadiyah’s national headquarters in 2005.64 FUI was formed in the wake of the MUI 
fatwas against Ahmadiyah, and HTI and FPI were two of its core groups.65 FPI, HTI, Garis 
and FUI have all been closely involved in the actions against GKI Yasmin and 
Ahmadiyah, as detailed. This cannot be a coincidence. The shared targets and co-
operation reveal a mutual intention, the unifying factor being their common ideology of 
Islamism. They present their attacks and harassment of these religious minorities as 
defence of Islam, against heresy and deviance in the case of Ahmadiyah, and against 
proselytisation and Western imperialist aggression, in the case of Christians.  
In previous chapters I detailed some aspects of Islamists’ ideological narrative against 
Ahmadiyah. During my interviewees with Ahmadiyah community members and leaders, 
they mentioned different ways that they were described or labelled by those who 
attacked them or intimidated them, including this reference to the Islamist-led attack on 																																																								
61 Hamdani, "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church [GKI]." 
62 Ibid. 
63 Robertson, "Indonesia: Guarantee Freedom of Religion and Stop Attacks on Ahmadiyah. Letter to 
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their national headquarters in Parung in July 2005: “We were discriminated against. 
They yelled ‘Murtad’, [traitor to the religion]… They also used the word ‘Kafir’, [not 
within Islam]… If I go to the market, they throw stones and shouted at me. There was 
someone who shouted ‘I will beat you down!’”66 These words are consistent with the 
narrative that depicts Ahmadiyah as heretics or deviants. On some occasions, that is 
precisely the way they were referred to by people intending to accuse them, calling out: 
“Sesat… gone astray, not the real Muslim. They said Ahmadiyah is deviate and led 
astray.”67 
I have detailed in previous chapters the other labeling that Ahmadiyah receives, 
including some that are apparently imported from Pakistan, which is the global centre of 
discrimination against Ahmadiyah. I have previously noted that the origins of the 
rejection of Ahmadiyah date to the 1920 and 1930s, and to Sukarno in the 1960s. 
Ahmadis see a direct link to Islamic politics in Pakistan, with a senior leader describing 
the response in Indonesia:  
After 1974 when something moved in Pakistan, so they try to make intolerance to 
Ahmadiyah community. After 80s the ambassador of different countries especially 
Muslim countries try to influence the Muslim country to act upon the tradition in Pakistan 
against Ahmadiyah. Before that, it’s OK, we were in peace, free in conveying Ahmadiyah 
message.68 
This quotation situates the response to Ahmadiyah in a global Islamist context, a point 
that Menchik notes when he writes that in 1974 the Organisation of Islamic States urged 
Muslims worldwide to declare Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority, with Indonesia’s MUI 
subsequently issuing a fatwa in 1980 that classed them as heretical.69  
Ahmadis also blame petro-Islam, or Saudi promotion of Wahhabi doctrine, for increased 
persecution:  
Wahhabi. They dropped a lot of money to ban Ahmadiyah. They will give the money to 
																																																								
66 Qamaruddin Syahid (Ahmadiyah missionary), interview with author, Parung, September 10, 2014. 
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those who ban Ahmadiyah, burn the mosque, lock the mosque, and destroy the 
mosque… Only to shifting the issue, instead of focusing on corruption or government 
official mistakes… This is an opportunity for them to get money from Arab countries.70 
This quotation suggests scapegoating of Ahmadiyah might advantage elites by focusing 
attention away from corruption and bad government. The suggestion that Saudi money 
influences events in Indonesia rests on solid ground. The July 2005 attacks on the Parung 
headquarters were co-ordinated by LPPI (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam: 
Islamic Research and Study Institute) led by Amin Djamaluddin.71 The Saudi-funded LPPI 
is focused on opposing “deviant sects”, has links to Persatuan Islam (Persis) and FUI and 
is credited with persuading the attorney-general’s office and the ministry of religion to 
take a stand against Ahmadiyah, leading to the 2008 ministerial decree banning teaching 
of its faith.72 
The evidence of the transnational character of the campaign against Ahmadiyah ranges 
from Saudi funding through to groups with explicit international networks such as HTI, 
and other Islamist groups with national networks that have international connections 
with Saudi Arabia (FPI) and ISIS (Garis), among others. Given Islamists concern with 
international issues, be it US hegemony, or the fate of Palestinians, it seems their 
influences are national and global, while they are expressed locally. All these factors 
interact, with the local and national aspects constituting Indonesia’s particular 
characteristics within the global Islamic and Islamist diversity.  
The French scholar of Islamism Olivier Roy referred to religion in a globalised world, 
writing that fundamentalism breaks away from culture and promotes identification with 
people of the same faith, as opposed to an accommodationist position in which “the 
believer can share a common culture and values with the non-believer”.73 
Fundamentalists thus see a secular state as pagan and the space for accommodation non-
existent, leading to a deculturating of religion which defines a religious purity that: 																																																								
70 Interview with Ahmadiyah community leader, with the author, September 2014. 
71 As'ad, "Ahmadiyah and the Freedom of Religion in Indonesia." 
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73 Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways, trans. Ros Schwartz (Oxford: 
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transforms the gap between believer and non-believer into a barrier… all the 
intermediary spaces of non-practising believers, nominal followers, culturally religious 
non-believers are vanishing… Believers feel themselves to be minorities surrounded by 
an atheist, pornographic, materialistic, secular culture which worships false gods.74  
This description resembles aspects of the Islamisation of Indonesia. The last sentence in 
the quotation is similar to the situation in 21st century Indonesia, in which Islamists see 
themselves as holding back a tide of pornography and porno-action in just such a 
materialistic, secular culture. Furthermore, in the early to mid-20th century, the 
modernists began attempts to remove syncretic practices. Islamists have constructed a 
barrier between believers and non-believers, fostering a sense of being under siege while 
they seek to define and impose orthodoxy. Christians are protected by Pancasila and 
state freedom of religion laws, as well as by the concept of dhimmitude, which promises 
protection to people of the book. The Ahmadiyah are more marginalised than Christians 
due to their alleged heretical status and by virtue of attempts to declare them outside 
Islam. But what is this heretical status?  
Burhani argues that heresy is not an objective state, and deviance not inherent in a 
person or a group, but conferred by others. “Is there any boundary that separates 
reformer from heretic? … The boundary is blurred.”75 Instead of Ahmadiyah having a 
difference of opinion with fellow believers with whom they share so much, Ahmadiyah 
are framed as heretics and their opinions become an attack on the rest of Islam and its 
instititionalised ways of speaking about the world. Zito notes: “It is therefore a thing of 
distinctly social kind, directly related to social deviance… the labelling of some 
statement as heretical must be performed by some authoritative group constituting a 
moral community.”76 The act of proclaiming a group heretical is an assertion of power, 
while a successful attempt is the consolidation of that power.  
I described in chapter 3 Menchik’s analysis that Ahmadiyah served a role in the 1930s 
and 1940s as the act of exclusion which “helped to congeal the fractious Muslim groups 																																																								
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75 Burhani, "Hating the Ahmadiyya." 
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and contributed to the institutional foundation for the postcolonial state”.77 The binding 
role of the Ahmadiyah threat continues to the present with the group playing the role of 
villain in an ideological narrative that presents non-orthodox expressions of Islam as 
attacks on Islam, in some ways reflecting power struggles within the Islamic community 
internationally. In this case, a crucial aspect of the threat is towards a sacred object, 
Muhammad, and his status as the final prophet. Ahmadiyah members are vulnerable 
because of the status they grant their founder-guru Ahmad, a status that Muslim 
orthodoxy casts as heretical. Ahmadiyah occupies a different space to Christians, the 
space on the margins of Islam or outside as defined by some, in the zone of heresy.  
Conclusion  
The threat of Christian proselytisation, in contrast, is the threat of a competitor, of being 
outnumbered and of apostasy. Ahmadiyah and Christians share the role of being cast as 
a threat to orthodox Sunni Islam by those who seek to define and shape orthodoxy. Both 
these minorities have productive roles in generating fear among Muslims that benefits 
Islamist elites. The targeting of GKI Yasmin seen this way is not about permits but its role 
in the Islamist narrative, a manufactured threat exacerbated by a contrived fake signature 
outrage that serves to remind Muslims that certain Islamist groups have a right to and are 
protecting their spiritual territory.  
In this chapter, I have outlined three categories of reasons that Bogor residents believe 
explain the GKI Taman Yasmin church has not been built: local concerns, contextual 
issues and permit issues. Underlying these, however, is an Islamist activist agenda that 
connects these local actions with national and international patterns of Islamist thought 
and behaviour. These connections include links to jihadi networks and international 
power struggles within the Islamic world. GKI church and Ahmadiyah centres of 
worship, including in Parung, Bogor, are territories in the symbolic battleground of the 
righteous fight for Islamic purity in the face of the threat of the religious Other. Morality 
plays a role in justifying actions against the Other, who are cast as the villain in an 
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ideological narrative that sees Islamists as the heroes and territory governed under sharia 
law as the utopian goal. 
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CONCLUSION 
During the 20th century, Indonesia underwent significant Islamisation, which only served 
to heighten the competition to define Islam. In the early 21st century, Islamists aligned 
with conservatives on issues including the problem of deviancy. MUI fatwas in 2005 
provided a foundation for a conservative and Islamist alliance to pressure national, 
regional and local governments for responses to their concerns, including deviancy. A 
mutually beneficial arrangement produced conservative/Islamist alliance support for 
President Yudhoyono, while the president supported the alliance’s leadership on Islamic 
matters, via MUI and various appointments he made. The win/win for this coalition of 
networks was a loss for Indonesia’s religious minorities. Fealy presents strong evidence 
that pressure from conservative elements of the mainstream groups NU and 
Muhammadiyah had at least as much influence as radical Islamists on the decision to 
issue the 2008 joint ministerial decree on deviancy.1 Members of Ahmadiyah were the 
principal victims of this push. But conservatives and Islamists were not so united in 
response to Christians, with radical Islamists taking a hard line.  
So, what role did morality play? Threat is the common element in the persecution of 
minorities in Indonesia. Morality as understood in moral foundations theory is a 
mechanism that responds to threats, and those threats are to the group. Therefore 
morality extends to the boundaries of the group. Islamists assign right to themselves and 
wrong to the Other, in this case religious minorities. While morality appears to motivate 
Islamists’ desire to protect Islam, it also justifies their persecution of minorities, by 
inviting Muslims to see the world in binary terms, us and them, Islam against the 
unbeliever or heretic. A shared belief within a group that another group is evil is a pre-
condition for inflicting idealistic violence on them; an act of evil in response; a defensive 
act. Idealistic evil or violence is “nearly always fostered by groups, as opposed to 
individuals”2 and is most likely to happen across divides between moral visions or  
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worlds. This sense that the other group is doing evil is related to the sense that they are a 
threat.  
Perspective explains the contradiction by which two groups can label each other as evil. 
Each group lacks insight into the other’s perspective. Empathy is missing when someone 
fails to perceive another’s perspective. Empathy is antithetical to selfishness (and 
tribalism: group selfishness) but is instead ”a dignifying experience precisely because, as 
a witness to someone else’s emotional experience, one is transported out of oneself”.3 I 
have detailed the Islamist positioning of the US as evil. Islamists are not wrong in an 
objective sense. They stand within their perspective, in this case a distinct worldview, 
separate from other worldviews such as capitalist democracy. Moral outrage is part of an 
argument about moral norms, or people’s neglect of moral norms; a process of holding 
people to account.  
It is easy to see the international human rights agenda from the West’s perspective. From 
an Islamist perspective, human rights, like freedom, are part of an alien ideology being 
forced upon the world. “Capitalism and democracy lead to freedom values, which break 
Islamic values, Islamic rules,” a Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia leader said.4 A range of Islamists 
and conservatives – including within mainstream groups such as NU and within the 
Yudhoyono government – share this perspective.5 This view was expressed in the MUI 
fatwa against secularism, pluralism and liberalism. In a sense, the notion of godly 
nationalism is part of Menchik’s effort to see the Muslim perspective “beyond the 
secular-liberal conception that dominates scholarship on religious pluralism,” which 
allows him to argue that Islamic organisations are tolerant but not liberal.6 
If freedom means free to consume in malls, consume drugs or alcohol, to consume 
immoral services such as prostitution, is freedom positive? Is freedom objectively good? 
Or is freedom a Western notion that ultimately privileges power, the law of the jungle? 																																																								
3 Shweder and Haidt, "The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions," 401.  
4 Iffah Ainur Rochmah (women’s spokeswoman and head of women’s arm of HTI), interview with the 
author, Bogor, September 12, 2014. 
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Islam, and indeed religion in general, as Haidt notes, offers an alternative to the 
indulgence of profane desires.7 Religions offer not only a moral order that allows 
everyone to live together, but also a series of activities (prayer, spiritual life, social 
service) that allow people to focus on noble themes, longer-term goals, and other 
people. At the same time, the rituals bind people together in their groups.8  
The problem lies not in the perspective or the argument, but in when a moral position 
becomes absolutist. Isaiah Berlin warns that “unbridled monism… some call it 
fanaticism, but monism is at the root of every extremism”.9 The argument for instituting 
sharia law is that it is God’s law and the right thing to do. If instituted by Islamic 
fundamentalists as part of an “absolutist universalism”, as Tibi expresses it, it becomes 
one aspect of a transnational effort to undo the international order of nation-state 
superstructures that was imposed “after the West’s dissolution of the Islamic order” in the 
period of European colonialism.10 Following this line of reasoning, instituting sharia law 
nationally in Indonesia would increase the clerics’ power at the expense of democracy. 
There is also a possibility that any Islamic state would develop in an authoritarian 
direction, as with Iran or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Possibilities such as these have led 
Tibi to describe Islamic fundamentalism as the “most serious challenge to secular 
democracy” globally.11 From an Islamist perspective that is not bad, because theirs is a 
project that resists Western imperialism and defends Islam, Islamic culture and the 
ummah against the threat of alien and hegemonic ideology.  
After the New Order, democracy created the space for competition for power. Versions 
of Islam have to compete with other viewpoints, ideologies and interests. In this 
competition, Islamists deploy ideological narratives that situate their global struggles for 
justice and Islamic dominance in Muslim lands against religious freedom. Feillard and 
Madinier conclude Islamism is a tempting “simplistic explanation… [an] unquestionable 
norm in a relativist world… [and] the temptation of an instrumentalisation for social or 																																																								
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political ends”.12 In other words, Islamism uses a simplified form of Islam to achieve 
political goals. With the physical absence of God on Earth, and democracy considered 
illegitimate, many Islamists position themselves as moral judges and the legitimate 
political leaders in a drive for power that tends towards the totalitarian.13 Many 
conservative Muslims, and their Islamist allies, take Islam as their sole or dominant 
identity and ideological influence. More liberal Muslims, however, accept that secular 
nationalism is a part of the Indonesian political fabric and constitution. As such, secular 
nationalism, democracy and liberal versions of Islam are all in competition with a 
conservative version of Islam.  
Morality helps confirm people’s righteousness within this confusing, competitive 
environment. Morality is determined within a group, and perspective is critical in the 
sense that someone’s group membership and perspective critically influences their 
morality. Morality is ultimately part of a mechanism that supports a power structure, but 
from inside an individual’s perspective it appears to be the truth. Conservative Muslims 
in Indonesia, including Islamists, are resisting American-flavoured modernity as it thrusts 
people out of their traditional world into the individualistic world that is Western in 
origin and emitting a neo-colonial aroma. They reject the aspects of Western thinking 
they see as threatening to Islam. Christianity, democracy, secularism, Judaism, human 
rights, women’s rights, individualism, and consumerism all challenge Islam on some 
level (as Islam challenges them in return). Christians within Indonesia are a threat, 
explicitly because of proselytisation (if enough Muslims convert eventually there will be 
no Islam) and by association (Christians represent the imperialistic West remnant in 
Indonesia).  
The data I collected in Bogor and the literature show that Islamists played a significant 
role in the persecution of Ahmadiyah members in the area, and against Christians trying 
to build their GKI Taman Yasmin church. I conclude then that Islamists have created 
ideological narratives that activate tribalistic impulses in an appeal to the Islamic 																																																								
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community to defend against the demonised Other, who threaten the Islamic order. 
Islamists base such narratives on a range of moral grounds, such as loyalty in defence of 
the group, as well as purity. As moral foundations theory has helped to explain, this 
range of moral motivations are formed within group perspectives. They inspire emotions 
that in turn inspire actions. These actions might be harmful to the Other, but they are 
deemed beneficial to the ingroup, which has cast itself as acting defensively. Ultimately, 
Islamists and those who accept a message of intolerant action towards religious 
minorities justify the actions they have taken with moral arguments after the fact. As 
Haidt argues, moral reasoning is mostly “a post hoc search for reasons to justify the 
judgments people had already made”.14 Morality both motivates and justifies.  
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